[Infowarrior] - How secure is the U.S. communications network?

Richard Forno rforno at infowarrior.org
Mon Apr 13 11:56:07 UTC 2009


http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-10217550-94.html?part=rss&subj=news&tag=2547-1_3-0-20

April 13, 2009 4:00 AM PDT
How secure is the U.S. communications network?
by Marguerite Reardon

A simple snip of a few fiber-optic communications cables left  
thousands of people in Silicon Valley and throughout parts of the San  
Francisco Bay Area without phone, Internet, or wireless service for  
more than 12 hours on Thursday.

The San Jose Police Department is investigating the incidents, which  
took place in two different locations in San Jose and San Carlos and  
classified as acts of vandalism. Now that the network is up and  
running again, people are asking how difficult is it to take down the  
nation's communications network? And should we be more worried about  
the fiber optic cables that ring our communities and crisscross the  
country carrying all of our communications?

"A couple of well-placed attacks could do a lot of damage to the  
communications network," said Sam Greenholtz, co-founder and principal  
of Telecom Pragmatics, a consulting and research firm specializing in  
the telecommunications market. "And it's not really that hard to  
figure out where the fiber optic cables are laid and to get access to  
them."

That said, Sgt. Ronnie Lopez of the San Jose Police Department said  
there is no reason yet to suspect terrorism in this case. But the FBI  
has been briefed on the case.

AT&T is offering a $250,000 reward to anyone who can provide  
information that leads to the arrest and conviction of the vandals.

"We are aggressively working with law enforcement authorities to see  
that those responsible for this willful act are apprehended and  
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law," the company said in a  
statement Friday.

AT&T also said in a press release that following the terrorist attacks  
of September 11, 2001, its networks were declared National Critical  
Infrastructures, which means that anyone who tampers with, destroys,  
or disrupts the company's network or its components is in violation of  
both federal and state laws.

Wondering about vulnerabilities
Still, with recent reports that our nation's electrical grid has  
gotten less secure due to technological advances, incidents such as  
this one leaves many wondering how vulnerable the communications  
network really is.

I talked to a few experts about how telecommunications networks are  
built and how they operate. And I've concluded that while it's  
somewhat easy to figure out where fiber is laid and to gain access to  
the fiber infrastructure in the ground, it's much harder to actually  
cause major damage unless you know what you're doing.

Let me explain. In the AT&T fiber cut case, it was fairly easy for the  
perpetrator to access the fiber-optic cables that were eventually cut.  
Sgt. Lopez said that it appeared that whoever cut the fibers simply  
lifted the manhole cover, went down the ladder, and cut two cables.

But knowing exactly which manhole cover to open and which cables to  
cut that would cause widespread damage to the network is another story.

Greenholtz, who was a former manager in the Planning and Engineering  
Group at Verizon where he worked for nearly 28 years, said that  
causing a network outage of this magnitude was likely orchestrated by  
someone who not only knew which manholes provided access to AT&T  
fibers, but also knew which places on the network were most vulnerable  
and could cause the most damage.

"The manhole covers are not locked," he said. "Anybody can open them  
and go down there. But most of these networks have redundancy and  
diversity built-in to the architecture, so if you cut a cable, it  
reroutes itself and recovers."

Greenholtz explained that someone with knowledge of the network would  
know the most vulnerable points in the network and could pinpoint  
those areas.

Built in rings

AT&T declined to discuss specifics of the company's network  
architecture, but experts say that the Baby Bell phone companies, such  
AT&T's predecessor SBC Communications, typically built their regional  
fiber networks in rings. The rings themselves would help provide  
protection against an outage, because if a line were cut, the traffic  
could just reverse itself in less than 50 milliseconds and go the  
other direction around the ring.

But the phone companies also typically ran redundant lines that are  
spaced some distance apart from each other, so that if one line is  
cut, there is also a separate fiber carrying the traffic. And to  
ensure that the redundant line can handle excess traffic in an  
emergency, most phone companies run these systems at 50 percent  
capacity.

The fiber-optic cables that were cut in San Carlos, which were owned  
by Sprint Nextel, appear to have worked in this way. The traffic was  
quickly rerouted to another path, and service to Sprint's business  
customers was not interrupted.

Unlike regional networks, which have multiple fiber rings running  
through and between cities, undersea cables that connect continents do  
not have this type of redundant architecture because it's much too  
expensive to build it that way. This means that undersea cables are  
particularly vulnerable to fiber cuts. But because they are deployed  
beneath the ocean floor, they tend to be more difficult to tamper  
with. That said, cables are severed and massive outages do occur from  
time to time.

By contrast, some networks in highly trafficked regions or networks  
that service critical customers have even more redundancy built into  
them. Michael Howard, a principal analyst at telecommunications  
research firm Infonetics Research, said that carriers such as Deutsche  
Telekom have begun building meshed networks so that there is a third  
path for traffic if fibers are cut or there is some other disruption  
on the network.

"The more traffic there is on the route, the more redundancy the  
carrier provides," he said. "There are usually two aspects to a backup  
plan for networks. One is providing a diversity of virtual routes for  
the traffic, but the other is providing physically separate routes on  
separate fibers. I'd have to say the outage that occurred in Silicon  
Valley seems odd, given the traditional network architecture."

An inside job?

Indeed, AT&T's network failure seems to suggest that at least one  
other path that would have rerouted the traffic was also damaged or  
cut. Given that the police indicated that the incidents occurred in  
only two locations, San Jose and San Carlos, it seems likely that  
there was already some damage or issue happening on AT&T's network at  
the time the fiber was cut or the vandals managed to cut the ring in  
two places.

Of course, neither I nor any other expert could know this for sure.  
But the fact is that fibers are cut all the time in regional networks,  
and rarely do they cause massive outages that shut down entire regions  
for hours. Most of these incidents are accidents. Someone might be  
landscaping a yard and a back-hoe severs a cable. Or another utility  
worker accidentally damages a cable while working in the same manhole  
where communication cables are located.

"Fiber cuts happen more often than people realize," said Crystal  
Davis, a spokeswoman for Sprint Nextel. "It happens by accident all  
the time when someone is drilling or digging up a street. Or they're  
doing regular maintenance. We know this, and that's why traffic can be  
quickly rerouted."

This is also why Greenholtz believes that the AT&T fibers were likely  
cut by someone who knew the network and its potential weaknesses.

"If there was an ongoing maintenance issue on one side of the fiber  
ring that hadn't been addressed," he said. "And then the other side is  
cut, it would cause a major outage like the one AT&T experienced. But  
in order to cause that much damage, someone would have to know that.  
Otherwise, it was just a very lucky vandal."

This line of thinking has caused some bloggers to suspect that the  
vandal was a disgruntled former or current AT&T employee.

And some have even gone so far as to suggest that the perpetrator  
could be an unhappy union worker. AT&T is currently in contract  
negotiations with its largest union the Communications Workers of  
America, which represents some 80,000 workers at AT&T. Workers have  
already voted to strike if a new contract can't be agreed upon. So  
far, no date has been set for a strike, and Candice Johnson, a  
spokeswoman for the union said that the two sides are still negotiating.

But Johnson also said that the union was not involved in the vandalism  
and that claims that its members might be involved are unfounded.

"There is no basis for speculation that our members were involved in  
this act of vandalism," she said. "We are cooperating with  
authorities. We are currently at the bargaining table with AT&T  
management, and our workers are on the job. Our goal is to get a  
contract renewed."

Sgt. Lopez from the San Jose Police Department said that it's still  
too early in the investigation to talk about suspects or motives.

Regardless of whether the cables were cut by disgruntled employees or  
random vandals, the recent incident highlights the potential for such  
an attack to be undertaken on a broader scale by foreign terrorists,  
who may infiltrate our nation's telephone companies or gain access to  
information about the country's communications network. But Greenholtz  
and other experts say that because these networks have always been  
built with redundancy in mind, it would take a massive coordinated  
effort to target individual manholes and to cut fibers.

"If you really want to take down the communications network and cause  
damage, you'd probably target a central office," Greenholtz said.

A central office is the nerve center of a telecommunications network.  
It houses all the switching equipment and billing data for a  
particular region of the network. As an example, Greenholtz said that  
if a terrorist was able to damage Verizon's central office on 38th  
Street in Manhattan, communications services on Wall Street could be  
wiped out not just for a few hours, but likely for days, weeks, or  
even a month. Because these facilities are so critical, he said all  
the major phone companies have tight security.

"Those places have tons of security," he said. "You'd probably need  
Jack Bauer (of the TV show '24') to help you get in there."


Marguerite Reardon has been a CNET News reporter since 2004, covering  
cell phone services, broadband, citywide Wi-Fi, the Net neutrality  
debate, as well as the ongoing consolidation of the phone companies. E- 
mail Maggie.



More information about the Infowarrior mailing list