[Infowarrior] - What Happens When They Change Targets?

[Richard Forno]

Total Security Does Not Exist

What Happens When They Change Targets?
http://www.counterpunch.org/forno01132010.html

By RICHARD FORNO

The failed in-flight bombing of a US airliner on Christmas Day 2009 is  
a reminder that terrorism is still with us. And, just as with the  
failed in-flight bombing of a US airliner by Richard Reid in 2001,  
once the 2009 event was foiled, a wave of 'enhanced' aviation security  
measures were announced to protect the traveling public. These  
measures ranged from preventing passengers from using pillows during  
the final hour of the flight and locking lavatories to preventing  
flight crews from making cabin announcements of geographic points of  
interest along the flight route.

In other words, the response ranged from the sublime to the  
ridiculous. Thankfully, some of the more idiotic 'enhancements' were  
softened once it became obvious that both passengers and aircrews  
believed such lunacy did not 'enhance' anything but their discomfort  
and confusion while aloft.

We know how little it takes to spook the public and lawmakers about  
aircraft and airport security, even in cases when the vulnerability in  
question has been remedied. Yet after the Christmas 2009 bombing  
attempt, pundits and fear-inspiring Congressmen still discuss how easy  
it would be to commandeer an aircraft in-flight despite reinforced  
cockpit doors, passengers willing to fight back, and in some cases as  
a last resort, armed pilots. There is no limit to the real or  
perceived what-ifs that can drive homeland security policy decisions,  
it seems.

Our adversaries -- be they al-Qaeda or others -- realize this. As  
such, my question is: Despite the high-profile attraction of passenger  
aviation, what happens when they change their target?

After 9/11, I gave a briefing describing several terrorism scenarios  
in the United States and the possible outcomes. These examples ranged  
from 'traditional' ideas like chemical plant attacks and schoolyard  
shootings to more sinister and subdued schemes. The latter category  
included synchronized pipe bombs going off in mall garbage cans on the  
Friday after Thanksgiving, introducing small bombs into commercial  
office buildings or city busses concealed in consumer electronics and  
laptops, planting small bombs around key roadway intersections,  
bridges, or interchanges (think present-day Iraq), and other  
'doable' (i.e., simple) possibilities. In each case, I emphasized that  
wide-scale damage or death was not required to cause significant  
damage to the American economy and national psyche, and that even  
failed attacks would yield tangible results for our adversaries by  
forcing us to spend vast sums to counter those threats and change  
significantly our mindsets and daily routines. The failed and foiled  
Christmas 2009 bombing attempt reminds us of this fact.

But given the erratic and schizophrenic security responses to  
terrorism involving aircraft since 9/11, what will be our national  
response when our adversaries shift their focus towards other non- 
aviation targets? Here, I refer to things closer to our homes and  
families, such as schools, movie theaters, and shopping malls.

My primary concern is not just the adverse significant impact on the  
economy or sense of public well-being resulting from such hypothetical  
events, but the national reaction to these events and their impact on  
American society and psyche. I worry that such responses will be  
inconsistent, overly aggressive, and rooted in a fearful, risk-adverse  
philosophy ... which in turn facilitates and sustains a fearful and  
risk-adverse society. Such is what Ron Suskind refers to as the 'One  
Percent Doctrine', or how the previous Administration viewed threats:  
specifically, that if a threat is believed only to have a one percent  
chance of occurring, countermeasures to that threat must be enacted as  
if the threat had a one-hundred percent chance of occurring.  
Unfortunately, when an adversary can devise new tactics quickly,  
that's a lot of One Percents requiring defense, even if the actual  
chances of them occurring are infinitely remote. And that's what is  
happening now at our airports and on our aircraft. It's both time- 
consuming and costly, too

For aircraft, first it was guns and grenades, then knives, mace, and  
box-cutters. Then it was liquid explosives in shoes and crotches. Thus  
we pass through metal detectors and have restrictions on carry-on  
liquids and gels, shoes being removed and scanned, and now, calls for  
full-body scanners to detect crotch-bombs. One only wonders what the  
security 'enhancements' will be for our schools, movie theaters, and  
shopping malls if they become terror's next target within the American  
homeland. How will our lives be disrupted then in the name of security?

In the security world, we accept risk and realize that Total Security  
does not exist nor is achievable. However, while Washington  
politicians might agree with this sentiment in their media interviews  
(and some have made such statements, ironically) the efforts of the  
homeland security industrial complex supported by these politicians,  
is the exact opposite. Thus, again we witness the 'One Percent  
Doctrine' being used to promote new, 'enhanced' measures that suggest  
Total Security indeed is doable. It is not -- but for some, it  
certainly will be profitable. Such is the nature of politicians' logic  
during times of crisis: something must be done: this is something, so  
therefore we must do it.

Sadly, America must accept a certain amount of risk in its daily life,  
and recognize the reality that our adversaries can, and will, change  
tactics and targets to accomplish their nefarious tasks of sowing  
terror. Certainly, we can, and should, raise the bar where possible  
and prudent, but not in a knee-jerk manner based on fear rather than  
objective risk analysis and management. We cannot afford, socially or  
economically, to let every single failed incident serve as a 'wake up  
call' that leads to further inconveniencing of the law-abiding  
citizenry under the rubric of 'enhanced' security.

Therefore, the question remains: What Happens When They Change Targets?

Richard Forno can be reached through his website: www.infowarrior.org