[Infowarrior] - Why intelligence-sharing can't always make us safer

[Richard Forno]

Why intelligence-sharing can't always make us safer
By Jennifer Sims and Bob Gallucci
Friday, January 8, 2010; A19

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/07/AR2010010703242_pf.html
According to the Obama administration and its critics, U.S.  
intelligence agencies have a problem with information-sharing.  
Although this critique appears to have some merit, theory and history  
suggest our most recent intelligence failure is of another kind.  
Intelligence-sharing sounds good if we imagine the happy project of  
dot-connecting. But the concept sounds bad, and risky, if it more  
resembles the game of Telephone, in which critical information is  
rather predictably dropped or garbled as it is passed around. The  
question is: How do we get good, actionable information to the  
decision maker in time to make a difference?

Sharing information is not a cost-free enterprise: It takes time to  
pass information and time for "the community" to analyze and interpret  
data. Intelligence succeeds not when it paints a complete picture but  
when it lubricates choice -- that is, when it helps key policymakers  
or military officers act faster or smarter than their adversaries.  
Former director of national intelligence Mike McConnell recognized  
this point in his strategic document "Vision 2015," issued in July  
2008. He identified the intelligence mission as one of gaining  
competitive advantage, not perfect knowledge of the enemy, an approach  
his successor has maintained. The purpose is not to know everything --  
an impossible goal in any case. The purpose is to win.

To win against a networked adversary, the intelligence community must  
share critical information with decision makers but not always with  
every element of its own community first. Assembling "puzzles" from  
many pieces is often necessary for planning and strategy; it takes  
time and the meticulous management of databases by analytical experts.  
But for day-to-day operations, decision makers often hold as many or  
more pieces than intelligence agencies do and certainly know better  
from moment to moment what knowledge they need to act. In terms of  
tactical decisions, sharing among intelligence agencies so that an  
"all source" product can be generated can be a form of hoarding. It  
can result in finished analyses that are irrelevant, unhelpful or even  
harmful to national security.

To understand why, consider a historical example. During the Civil  
War, Gen. George McClellan uncharacteristically chased down his  
adversary before the Battle of Antietam largely because of one  
soldier's intelligence coup: the discovery of a discarded copy of  
Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee's Special Order 191, wrapped around  
some cigars. This order revealed how Lee intended to divide his forces  
and where he planned to go. Although McClellan bungled the chase,  
history records Antietam as a win for the Union. One excellent source  
delivered by one trusted collector motivated McClellan to act in a way  
that was not perfect but was more right than wrong. He didn't know  
everything about Lee's situation, but he knew what he needed to know  
to act faster than Lee had anticipated.

Yet if this instance suggests that single, timely tips can be enough,  
psychological research suggests that intelligence-sharing can be  
downright bad. Psychology professor Daniel Gilbert observed in his  
best-selling book, "Stumbling on Happiness," that the only thing worse  
than looking for a needle in a haystack is looking for a particular  
needle in a stack of needles. So when an intelligence establishment  
composed of at least 16 federal agencies, supported by a raft of state  
and local law enforcement agencies, mandates an obligation to share  
information with each other, we shouldn't be surprised when the most  
critical pieces are harder, not easier, for analysts to identify. This  
is where proximity to decisions makes a difference. Take, for example,  
airline ticket agents. They might not judge a father's anxiety about  
his son enough to stop the son from flying, but knowing this clue when  
the son offers up cash to fly baggage-free could trigger timely  
action. Holding up the delivery of the first clue until the arrival of  
the second cedes decision advantage to the adversary, because the  
decision is made at the airline counter, not back in Washington.

To win in network warfare, then, decision makers must think of  
themselves as collectors and analysts, too. In real-world terms, this  
means that ambassadors and intelligence station chiefs who know their  
sources are good should be able to flag a name for airlines and  
counselor officers without first circulating information within the  
intelligence community.

It is worth remembering that Gen. Joseph Hooker, a later leader of the  
Union Army, was the architect of the first all-source intelligence  
bureau, the Bureau of Military Information, but nonetheless suffered a  
devastating loss at Chancellorsville. Intelligence-sharing helped him  
plan that battle and achieve initial surprise, but the all-source  
analysts couldn't keep up with the wily maneuvers of Stonewall Jackson  
and Robert E. Lee. For that, Hooker needed a match for Jackson's  
cavalry, which did intelligence on the fly. He didn't have it, and he  
lost.

Jennifer Sims is a visiting professor at Georgetown University and a  
senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Bob Gallucci,  
president of the MacArthur Foundation, served as an assistant  
secretary of state in the Clinton administration. Sims has consulted  
for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under Dennis  
C. Blair and Mike McConnell.