[Infowarrior] - Stopping the ACTA Juggernaut
Richard Forno
rforno at infowarrior.org
Thu Nov 19 23:56:29 UTC 2009
November 19th, 2009
Stopping the ACTA Juggernaut Legislative Analysis by Eddan Katz
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/11/stopping-acta-juggernaut
The ACTA juggernaut continues to roll ahead, despite public
indignation about an agreement supposedly about counterfeiting that
has turned into a regime for global Internet regulation. The Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has already announced
that the next round of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
negotiations will take place in January — with the aim of concluding
the deal "as soon as possible in 2010."
For the rest of us, with access to only leaks and whispers of what
ACTA is about, there are many troubling questions. How can such a
radical proposal legally be kept so secret from the millions of Net
users and companies whose rights and freedoms stand to be affected?
Who decides what becomes the law of the land and by what influence?
Where is the public oversight for an agreement that would set the
legal rules for the knowledge economy? And what can be done to fix
this runaway process?
We wrestle with these questions in an essay on “The Impact of ACTA on
the Knowledge Economy”(PDF here) in the Yale Journal of International
Law (November 2009 edition). We explain how ACTA got this far, in this
form, and propose four mechanisms for USTR transparency reforms, that
will give the public a voice in ACTA, if U.S. citizens — and their
elected officials — speak loudly and quickly enough.
In brief, the ACTA process has been deliberately more secretive than
customary practices in international decision-making bodies to evade
the debates about intellectual property (IP) at established
multilateral institutions. The Office of the USTR has chosen to
negotiate ACTA as a sole executive agreement. Because of a loophole in
democratic accountability on sole executive agreements, the Office of
the USTR can sign off on an IP Enforcement agenda without any formal
congressional involvement at all. But the negotiations do not have to
be secret, and the sole executive agreement process does have
mechanisms for oversight: they have not been used in ACTA, but can and
should be.
The excuse for using sole executive agreements is that ACTA will be
fully respectful of U.S. law. But the constraint of coloring within
the lines of US law, as one anonymous trade official described it, is
a fragile linchpin upon which the weight of public trust and
democratic legitimacy is bearing down. In an interview with "Inside
U.S. Trade", for their June 19, 2009 edition (paywall link here), the
USTR was far less confident:
When pressed whether the U.S. would be open to any negotiated
difference from U.S. law in the ACTA, the official said that the goal
of the U.S. "is to stick as closely to U.S. law as possible."
How can the USTR negotiate an international agreement that sets new
global IP enforcement norms requiring changes to U.S. law and policy
as an Executive Agreement, without the knowledge or involvement of
Congress? Having failed to get similar proposal adopted via the World
Customs Organization, the USTR conceived ACTA as a plurilateral
agreement, avoiding the checks and balances of existing multilateral
norm-setting bodies. After the announcement of ACTA but prior to
commencing formal negotiations, the USTR had prepared a
confidentiality agreement that it asked all negotiating countries to
accept, which explicitly binds the negotiating partners from public
disclosure.
The USTR has exploited this as the justification for classifying all
correspondence between negotiating countries in the interest of
national security under Executive Order 12958. The Mexican IP Office,
which is hosting the next ACTA negotiations, still gave indications
that the documents will not be made available to the public. The
Internet Chapter was reportedly delivered to negotiating partners in
physical, watermarked copies designed to guard against leaks. If the
traditional justification for secrecy in trade negotiations is to
safeguard details of sensitive US positions in negotiations for
diplomatic advantage over other foreign governments, then why is this
confidentiality agreement being used to prevent disclosure of ACTA
texts to its own citizens?
Upon the expiration of Trade Promotion Authority in 2007, the USTR
chose to negotiate ACTA as a sole executive agreement. As a result,
ACTA will not require congressional advice and approval, which is
integral to the constitution's delicate balance of executive and
legislative powers. As staunch a defender of executive privilege as
John Yoo once convincingly argued that the limits of executive power
to negotiate foreign agreements on intellectual property matters
unchecked would deprive the House of its constitutional function.
From early on, civil society has protested ACTA's secrecy, and
despite continued public pressure, the USTR’s transparency theater
rehearsals of internal review have concluded that showing a selective
few Washington insiders the Internet provisions under non-disclosure
agreements would satisfy the demands of openness, transparency, and
oversight.
Sole executive agreements are not meant to be unaccountable. There are
in fact systems in place to stop our executive (and private interests)
from having untrammeled power to change the law. We've outlined four
ways that Congress, or an Administration sincere about transparency,
could put their house in order.
Reform trade advisory committees for more diverse representation
Input to U.S. trade negotiators on IP needs to reflect the views of
all stakeholders in the U.S. knowledge economy to counterbalance the
disproportionate influence of lobbyists for incumbent industries. This
requires reform of the current trade advisory committee system to
include civil society and technology industry participation in the
tier 3 industry trade advisory committee on intellectual property,
ITAC-15, or the creation of new equivalent level advisory committees.
Public interest values such as health and consumer protection should
play an important role in the new bipartisan trade policy for the
knowledge economy.
Strengthen congressional oversight and negotiating objectives
Congressional oversight of foreign trade negotiations, especially
agreements affecting areas of non-trade domestic policy, should
require the USTR to comply with negotiating objectives that reflect
the interests of all stakeholders in the U.S. economy. In addition to
the labor and environmental standards articulated in proposed bills
like the TRADE Act (H.R. 3012), IP enforcement provisions in
agreements must not undermine internationally agreed upon commitments
on public health, and flexibilities that protect citizens’ access to
knowledge, nor obstruct IP exceptions and limitations appropriate for
the digital age. In addition, the Congressional Oversight Group, a
statutory supervisory group comprising members of the House and the
Senate designed to liaise with the Trade Representative could conduct
a thorough review and certify that the new negotiating objectives have
been met before a trade agreement could be brought for a congressional
vote.
Institutionalize transparency guidelines for trade negotiations
Given the significance of the substantive provisions being debated to
Internet users, the ACTA process especially should enable citizens to
participate and provide input on the public policy impacts like in
other negotiations, where it is customary practice to make documents
available. The Office of the USTR incorporating these reforms should
heed the Attorney General's instruction to adopt a presumption in
favor of disclosure to usher in the President's new era of open
Government. At a minimum, negotiating texts, when distributed to all
negotiating countries should be made public.
Implement the State Department’s Circular 175 procedure.
Finally, the State Department plays an important role in checking the
unfettered power of the USTR through its Circular 175 Procedure. These
are the regulations that "ensure the proper exercise of the treaty-
making power." The State Department Foreign Affairs Manual goes into
great detail on the Legal Advisor's criteria for review of
international agreements. There are multiple procedures on hand,
including formal congressional consultation, when there is a serious
question regarding the type of agreement being negotiated. [11 FAM
723.4(b)] It is also made clear that the approval of authorization to
negotiate does not constitute advance approval of the text or
authorization to enter into the agreement. [11 FAM 724.2] The State
Department investigates whether the proposed agreement is "in conflict
with other international agreements or U.S. law" [11 FAM 722(2)] and
whether it follows the "general international practice as to similar
agreements." [11 FAM 723.3(8)] Most significantly for the public's
stake in Internet freedom, the Circular 175 declares that:
The interest of the public be taken into account and, where in the
opinion of the Secretary of State or his or her designee the
circumstances permit, the public be given an opportunity to comment.
[11 FAM 725.1(6)]
The Office of the USTR transparency practices must be reformed, and
they have failed at reforming themselves. Now that the leaked
documents confirm everything we feared, it is time to take a look at
how we might hold USTR Ambassador Kirk and Assistant McCoy, the lead
ACTA negotiator, to account for their promises:
• On diverse representation for advice on trade: "I can assure you
that I am committed to working very closely with Congress and all
interested stakeholders on all of our trade
agreements and negotiations, including ACTA." (Ronald Kirk
Confirmation Hearings, March 9, 2009)
• On congressional oversight and legislative power: "Q: Will the ACTA
rewrite U.S. law? A: No. Only the U.S. Congress can change U.S.
law." (ACTA Fact Sheet, August 4, 2008)
• On transparency practices: President Obama’s trade officials met
with several civil society groups and promised a thorough review of
the USTR policies regarding transparency. The review is expected to be
completed within a few months. The process will include a meeting
within a month to discuss initial specific proposals for openness and
transparency. Citizens and NGOs are encouraged to think about the
specific areas where openness and transparency can be enhanced and
how. (USTR Transparency Review KEI Report, March 19, 2009 - as
reviewed by Daniel Sepulveda, Assistant USTR for Congressional Affairs)
• On public participation: The ACTA negotiations "[p]articipants also
discussed the importance of transparency including the availability of
opportunities for stakeholders and the public in general to provide
meaningful input into the negotiating process." (USTR Press Release,
November 6, 2009)
Such accountability is available in the U.S. system, but it cannot
come from the Office of the USTR alone. If ACTA is going to regulate
the global Internet, we believe that should warrant the opportunity
for public comment.
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