[Infowarrior] - Breaking Bing - enter DMCA!
Richard Forno
rforno at infowarrior.org
Tue Nov 10 13:38:01 UTC 2009
Not sure how long it will last, but Microsoft appears to be seeking
the Streissand Effect by going after the guy who first poined this
little feature out with a DMCA notice. ---rick
Slashdot:
http://yro.slashdot.org/story/09/11/09/2319233/Microsoft-Tries-To-Censor-Bing-Vulnerability?from=rss
Original Post from Bing's Cache:
http://cc.bingj.com/cache.aspx?d=4879267570255838&mkt=en-CA&setlang=en-US&w=90157511,9ea4ebc5
Breaking Bing Cashback Posted November 4th, 2009 by Samir
I’ve never bought anything using Bing Cashback, but the balance of my
account is $2080.06. Apparently, I placed two $1 orders on January
24th of this year, and spent another $104,000 on October 24th. Let’s
see how these transactions might have “accidentally” got credited to
my account.
First, we need to try to figure out how transactions get into Bing
Cashback. Microsoft posted some documentation here. The explanation of
how a merchant reports transactions to Bing starts on page 20.
Merchants have a few options for reporting, but Bing suggests using a
tracking pixel. Basically, the merchant adds a tracking pixel to their
order confirmation page, which will report the the transaction details
back to Bing. The request for the tracking pixel looks something like
this:
https://ssl.search.live.com/cashback/pixel/index?
jftid=0&jfoid=<orderid>&jfmid=<merchantid>
&m[0]=<itemid>&p[0]=<price>&q[0]=<quantity>
This implementation, while easy for the merchant, has an obvious flaw.
Anyone can simulate the tracking pixel requests, and post fake
transactions to Bing. I’m not going to explain exactly how to generate
the fake requests so that they actually post, but it’s not
complicated. Bing doesn’t seem to be able to detect these fake
transactions, at least not right away. The six cents I earned in
January have “cleared,” and I’m guessing the remaining $2080 will
clear on schedule, unless there is some manual intervention.
Even if Bing detects these fake transactions at some point in the
future, the current implementation might have another interesting side
effect. I haven’t done enough work to say it with confidence, but a
malicious user might be able to block another user’s legitimate
purchases from being reported correctly by Bing (I only tried this
once, but it seemed to work). Posting a transaction to Bing requires
sending them an order ID in the request. Bing performs a reasonable
sanity check on the order ID, and will not post a transaction that
repeats a previously reported order ID. When a store uses predictable
order ID’s (e.g. sequential), a malicious user can “use up” all the
future order ID’s, and cause legitimate transactions to be ignored.
Reporting would be effectively down for days, causing a customer
service nightmare for both Bing and the merchant.
Based on what I’ve found, I wouldn’t implement Bing Cashback if I were
a merchant. And, as an end user and bargain hunter, it does not seem
smart to rely on Bing Cashback for savings. In our next blog post,
I’ll demonstrate some other subtle but important reasons to avoid
using Bing Cashback.
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