[Infowarrior] - Cold Boot Encryption Attack - code release

[Richard Forno]

Source Code Released:
http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/code/

More:
http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/

Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys

J. Alex Halderman, Seth D. Schoen, Nadia Heninger, William Clarkson,  
William Paul, Joseph A. Calandrino, Ariel J. Feldman, Jacob Appelbaum,  
and Edward W. Felten

Abstract Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern  
computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is  
lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a  
motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not  
refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist  
sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full- 
system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability  
of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an  
attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on  
popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and  
TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials. We experimentally  
characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and  
report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple  
techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in  
memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we  
discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we  
know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.