[Infowarrior] - Interview with MIT Subway Hacker Zack Anderson
Richard Forno
rforno at infowarrior.org
Fri Aug 22 14:12:41 UTC 2008
Exclusive Interview with MIT Subway Hacker Zack Anderson
By Chris Ladd
Published on: August 21, 2008
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/industry/4278892.html
Its rare that a hacker convention makes national news, but three MIT
students caused a whole lot of controversy when they planned a
presentation about security holes in Boston's subway system for DefCon
in Las Vegas earlier this month. They were forced to cancel the talk
at the last minute by a 10-day federal restraining order, requested by
Boston's Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA). On Tuesday, a
judge denied motions by the MBTA to issue a preliminary injunction
aimed at keeping the students quiet for a further five months. Now, in
his most extensive interview to date, MIT subway hacker Zack Anderson
talks with PM about what's wrong with the Charlie Card, what happened
at DefCon, and what it's like to tango with the FBI and the MBTA.
Popular Mechanics: All this started as a class project at MIT—is that
right?
Zack Anderson: For Computer Network Security class, and it was
basically the final project.
We wanted to look at some system which might have some
vulnerabilities, figure out what they were, and how some of those
problems could be fixed if they existed. So we thought about fare
collection systems for the subway, and we looked at the MBTA. It's
local, so we could take a pretty extensive analysis.
What did you find?
We found quite a few things. Some significant physical security
problems were present—not technology related, just things that are
very easily overlooked. People could hit a button in an open box and
all the turnstiles would open. I mean, why resort to some high-tech
hack when you could just hit a button?
We also looked at the Charlie Ticket, which is a magnetic card.
Actually, the MIT Tech [the university's daily newspaper] has a good
article that basically went over everything that was made public—some
of which came out through MBTA filings, not through anything we
released.
But the Charlie Ticket is [vulnerable to] cloning and forgery attacks.
The cloning attack means that you can, say, take a $5 card and make
two $5 cards. The forgery attack means you change the data on the
cards to actually represent a new value. Both attacks are possible.
What about the RFID Charlie Card?
Yes, the Charlie Card is an RFID [radio-frequency identification] card
which has weak encryption. And because of that weak encryption, there
are ways to recover the key on the card, and the key allows you to
read from and write to the card.
So you could walk through a subway station without contact and kind of
rub your briefcase with a little antenna in it against someone's
pocket and grab their card's key. And then you could use that until
it's depleted or deactivated or whatnot. That's always the danger with
RFID cards—you don't even need contact to read it.
So you wrote your report and gave your final presentation at MIT. How
was it received?
It was very well received. People were pretty impressed and surprised
that these vulnerabilities existed. This was toward the end of class.
It might have been the very last day.
And you immediately start thinking about DefCon?
We'd been to DefCon before, and thought it would be pretty interesting
to give a talk. And we thought it was very applicable—there's a lot of
subway systems, a lot of them might be suffering from the same
vulnerabilities, and it's really an important issue that needed to be
addressed. And we thought DefCon would be an interesting venue.
So DefCon accepts your application, you start booking plane tickets
and hotel rooms. What happens next?
A bit of time passed and around mid-July we e-mailed our professor,
Ron Rivest, and asked if he could contact MBTA for us and tell them
that we did this security analysis, this is what we found, and here's
some ways to fix each of the problems. And also, you know, tell them
we're giving this talk at DefCon, this is what we're going to discuss
and also, this is a key point, that we were going to be withholding a
few key details. We were not going to go over the full process to
replicate the system, so people would not be able to replicate these
attacks.
What was the reaction?
When Ron Rivest got back to us, he said, "You know, we have a serious
problem." And we asked him what happened, and he said "The MBTA does
not want to talk to me. They already know about the talk, and they
said the FBI has been involved."
When you hear "FBI," that's got to be a bit chilling.
I couldn't believe it. I was like, "What have we done? The FBI? Why?"
We were completely surprised. So we said, you know, we need to resolve
this quickly. We need to call them back and set up a meeting to make
sure there's trust here, to make sure they see what we've done, to
make sure they see what we're planning on presenting so they have
peace of mind. And also, our initial point was that MBTA needs to fix
some of these problems, because they do exist.
You set up a meeting with the MBTA, I understand.
That's right. So at that meeting what was planned was an MBTA official
to be present there, and we were going to have it at MIT's campus. So
in walks someone from the MBTA [a detective], and behind him was a
special agent from the FBI.
It was like, "This is a bit more serious." Because, you know, the MBTA
told us "The FBI is investigating," but we didn't know how truthful
that was. Certainly we thought there was some truth, like they'd
contacted the FBI, but submitting some Web form is different from a
full-on investigation.
Having the FBI agent there made it more real. But after about a
minute, I calmed down and realized that we needed to just show them
that this is not a big deal, this is not a problem. There's no reason
for the FBI to be concerned here. There's no reason for the MBTA to be
concerned. Let's just lay out what it is we're doing, and what we
found, and clear things up.
How did the meeting end?
It ended on a very good note. [The MBTA detective] said that he didn't
see any reason why we shouldn't proceed with the talk. He said he
would e-mail his supervisor and tell him that he met with us, and
things are fine, and there's no problem. The FBI agent said,
basically, this is not going to be an investigation. We don't have
anything here. Don't worry about it.
So we told them we'd provide them a vulnerability report, going over
what we found, and also methods that could fix these problems, and
they said we could get that to them within two weeks. We had actually
planned on getting it to them within the week, before business hours
ended on Friday, so they'd have this in their hands before we gave the
talk. We felt this was a courtesy we should give them.
This report was not going over what we were speaking about at DefCon,
that wasn't the point. Some other people at MBTA have claimed that it
was, but the point of the report was to go over the vulnerabilities,
and go over ways that they could fix them. That's what we provided
them, and we got it to them that Friday.
So at the end of the week you get on a plane and fly to Las Vegas and
go to DefCon?
Yes. Friday was the first day of the conference and we went to a talk
in the morning and we were having lunch when I got a call from an
attorney from MIT, saying that the MBTA is in court right now and
they're suing us and MIT. They're filing a lawsuit right now,
basically, and nobody's in court for us—just MBTA lawyers—and we don't
fully know what's going on.
CONTINUED >>>
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A Red Line train rolls into South Station in downtown Boston, Mass.
(Photo by Darren McCollester/Getty Images)
What did you do?
I don't remember exactly what happened in the rest of the
conversation. I think it was just trying to figure out any
information, what [MIT counsel] knew. I think he recommended at that
point that, guys, we really need to get legal counsel.
We went to the booth of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and
it was a little more hectic than, "Let's sit down." It was a little
more like "Oh, God!" But yeah, all day Friday was really trying to get
information about what was happening. We were communicating with the
MBTA, their legal counsel. We got the paperwork from the federal docket.
Did they hire someone back in Boston right away?
They tried, but this was Friday and there was an emergency hearing
scheduled for the next morning. So we were desperately trying to find
someone in Boston that could help us, but in that time frame we
weren't able to.
Did you have additional contact with the MBTA?
There was a little bit of contact. There was kind of a back-and-forth.
I'd called some of the attorneys from the MBTA. I briefly spoke with
kind of their only technical guy, who runs security on the fare
systems. And at that point, we tried the best we could to show them
that this is kind of out of line, and it's probably going to be
counterproductive. Because if there's one thing that people at DefCon
don't like, it's a squelched talk. What they were hoping for was to
not make this a big deal, and for us not to reveal details that would
allow people to defraud the system, the latter of which we'd always
maintained that we were not going to do.
Saturday is the hearing. We were up all night preparing and we made a
telephonic appearance in Boston court on Saturday morning. We didn't
have anybody representing us in court, just on the phone, and MIT was
present as well.
At the end, the judge basically ruled in favor of MBTA and their
motion, which was a temporary restraining order which basically
blocked us from talking about anything that could possibly assist in
any way someone circumventing the fare collection system. It became
obvious that we had to cancel the talk. Then, it just really exploded
from a media perspective. We answered what we could. But, the talk was
clearly over. There was no way to appeal the decision in that time
frame. It was not possible, really. The problem was that they filed
their paperwork in the last few minutes the court was open on Friday.
We had this ruling when the courts were closed.
At this point there's nothing you can do until Monday morning.
We had been going on for 30-plus hours without sleep, and the fact was
that it was kind of over. While we were very disappointed, it was a
little bit ... it gave us a chance to breathe and sleep and stuff.
And you guys basically turned into DefCon celebrities.
It was definitely a pretty big issue. A lot of people were talking
about it. A lot of people were coming up to us and were interested,
but we really couldn't talk about much to anyone.
And the media takes a much larger interest as well, I'm sure.
There was a lot of disinformation, and really we saw that Monday when
some of the national newspapers and stuff picked it up. There was a
lot of misinformation that the MBTA was claiming about the content of
the talk, saying that we were going to allow people free subway rides
for life. If you look at, if any technical person looks at the slides,
they'll understand that there isn't enough information to do that.
So I just tried to clear it up. I guess when people see the word
"hacker," it has a nefarious stigma to the general public, which is
unfortunate because a lot of people consider themselves hackers when
the average person would never say "That's a hacker." Most people hear
hacker and they think it's some horrible person breaking into the
system and causing havoc and damage.
So Sunday rolls around and the conference is over.
On Sunday, after Vegas was behind me, I kind of felt like "Oh my God,
what happened this week?" because it was pretty shocking. My first
weekend in Vegas after turning 21. Who would've thought that this was
going to be the excitement? A federal lawsuit?
Then, Tuesday was the really big court hearing where some of my
attorneys flew out to Boston, a couple local attorneys were there, and
the rest of us listened in on the telephone. It was probably about an
hour and a half long, both sides presented their case, and at the end
the judge spoke about how he saw the law, how he interpreted the case,
and kind of went over the conflicting interests. So for the first 10
minutes he was kind of not really siding with one side, showing both
sides. And then it started to get exciting when he started saying how
the MBTA didn't really have a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act for several reason. There are several things that need to be met
under the act and a multiple of them did not apply in this case.
What was your reaction?
I actually muted the phone during the entire hearing, just in case
there was any sound that I didn't want to blast through the courtroom.
But, yeah, it was pretty exciting listening in as the judge started to
slant our way. And in the end, when he both lifted the TRO [temporary
restraining order] and lifted the previous judge's order, and he threw
out the MBTA's motion for a preliminary injunction that would last
five months, it was really relieving. It was really satisfying that
the court interpreted the law correctly.
What happens next? There's still a lawsuit from the MBTA, right?
Probably the next thing is, hopefully at this point we'll be able to
settle this and make it go away. If not, we're going to have to file a
motion to dismiss the case, but I think, and I definitely hope, that
things are kind of over now. We didn't give the talk, which was I
think a primary aim that they had. That was effective on their part.
And, you know, we still maintain that we never planned on releasing
all of the details. Even though now we're allowed to, we're still not
going to.
What do you think the legal implications of the case will be in the
future?
I think that's a question best posed to the EFF, but definitely this
was one of the first cases where the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was
tested in such a way that the MBTA tried to apply to speech, and the
judge threw it out. So there was some uncharted territory that was
tested here. Certainly if the court had ruled the other way, that
would have set a very problematic precedent for the security research
community in general.
You're heading back to MIT soon. You guys are going to be something
like celebrities on campus.
One blog called us "veritable hacking heroes." I don't know if it's
justified to be "heroes" or something. Again, I feel this turned into
this huge production when really, it wasn't a huge issue to start
with. To be a hero, you need to have done something absolutely amazing
on its own merits.
I think we did a very thorough security research project, and the
presentation that we were going to give and the work was very good. We
stood up there and we got through this, but I think that really, the
true heroes in this case are our lawyers because they're the ones that
fought this case, and they're the ones that won at least this first
motion to throw out the restraining order and throw out the
preliminary injunction. If anyone's a hero in this case, I'd say it's
our attorneys.
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