[Infowarrior] - A better way than the TSA

Richard Forno rforno at infowarrior.org
Wed Mar 21 13:13:09 UTC 2007


csmonitor.com - The Christian Science Monitor Online
from the March 21, 2007 edition -

http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0321/p09s01-coop.html

A better way than the TSA
Private security firms would actually keep us safe, not just make us feel
that way.
By Becky Akers
 
NEW YORK

The Improving America's Security Act recently passed by Congress allows the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) airport screeners to
unionize. This bill could add about 50,000 dues-paying members to union
rolls while breathing new life into TSA's unofficial slogan: Thousands
Standing Around.

The White House has threatened to veto the legislation because it claims
that collective bargaining will destroy the TSA's flexibility. And according
to the White House, "flexibility is ... how the ... TSA protects Americans
while they travel." Who knew?

Cynics probably put "flexible" at the bottom of the TSA's attributes, right
after "competent" and "fun-loving." But flexible or not, screeners have
little effect on security. They are there to make passengers feel safe, not
to actually keep them safe.

The TSA itself virtually confirms this. So does its parent bureaucracy, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the General Accounting Office
(GAO). All three routinely test screeners' ability to intercept weapons
smuggled through checkpoints. And screeners routinely flunk.

Washington's reaction is to tinker with department rules and spend millions
on "better" technology. But a far better approach would be to scrap
federally regulated flight security altogether. Private security firms would
rely on effective antiterrorist tools rather than political correctness.
They would actually keep us safe, not just make us feel that way.

The TSA was barely a year old when the GAO gave it failing marks in a report
to the House Aviation Subcommittee in 2003. The committee's then chairman,
John Mica (R) of Florida, summarized the findings: TSA was "still a very
poor system" that "needs a dramatic overhaul." By April 2005, the agency's
incompetence was so glaring that not one but two federal reports documented
it. Both the GAO and the DHS found that screening was no more effective than
before 9/11.

The TSA had gone from bad to worse a year later when undercover
investigators packed their bags with common household items that explode
when combined. They tried to smuggle these ingredients past the checkpoints
at 21 airports - and they succeeded every time.

Barraged by criticism, DHS pooh-poohed the test's premises: "While random
items commonly found under a kitchen sink could conceivably be concocted
into an IED [improvised explosive device], we find it highly implausible."

Months later, British police announced that they had foiled a plot to
smuggle explosive components aboard planes, combine them en route, and blow
up 10 transatlantic flights. That "highly implausible" scenario now has
American passengers bagging their gels and liquids like tuna sandwiches.

You might suppose the TSA's failures would force it to improve. You'd be
right: In 2006, screeners flunked only 20 of the TSA's 22 tests.

The TSA squanders vast amounts of flyers' time and $5 billion per year in
taxes, so its failures are infuriating. But they're not surprising. After
all, the agency responds to a problem that doesn't exist: terrorists
thronging airports and boarding flights. The 9/11 attacks succeeded largely
because of their novelty. The bad guys are smart enough to know this even if
American bureaucrats aren't. That's why no TSA screener has found a single
terrorist. Instead, they're frisking toddlers and wheelchair-bound seniors.

I'm not calling for a return to the way things were before 9/11, mind you.
Even those privately employed screeners were heavily regulated by
government. Indeed, federal officials have micromanaged aviation since its
beginning. The resulting mess - long lines, high fares, inconvenient routes,
and the arrogance that passes for service - is largely due to that
interference.

Now, with the TSA as useless as an expired ticket, it's time to put federal
control on the "Do Not Try" list. Why not let the free market protect
aviation as it has our banking with ATM cards and PINs, our cars and homes
with their burglar, smoke, and carbon-monoxide alarms, and even our
telephones with caller-ID?

Privatized protection isn't a panacea, but it's better than the TSA. Without
that federal straitjacket, security wouldn't be uniform and easy to game:
each airline would adapt its policies to its own routes, destinations, and
customers. Meanwhile, experts could design security systems without mandates
from bureaucrats who understand paperwork and politics but not planes and
passengers. Jets worth billions and the repeat business that comes only from
satisfied, living customers will compel the airlines to provide potent
protection.

One thing is certain: Any airline that treated flyers as the TSA does would
lose business fast. And should.

. Becky Akers is writing a book about the Transportation Security
Administration.




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