---[ Phrack Magazine Volume 8, Issue 52 January 26, 1998, article 19 of 20
-------------------------[ P H R A C K W O R L D N E W S
Phrack World News - 52
New categorization:
-[ Stories
-[ Book Releases
-[ Conventions
-[ Other Headlines of Interest
--------[ Issue 52
0x1: Hacker Acquitted & Iraq Computerises
0x2: The Impact of Encryption on Public Safety
0x3: Urban Ka0s -- 26 Indonesian Servers Haxed
0x4: Hacker accused of sabotaging Forbes computers
0x5: Privacy, Inc. Unveils its Internet Background Check
0x6: Commerce Dept encryption rules declared unconstitutional
0x7: The Million Dollar Challenge
0x8: High Profile Detainee Seeks Legal Help
0x9: Kevin Mitnick Press Release
0xa: SAFE crypto bill cracked again
0xb: RC5 Cracked - The unknown message is...
0xc: Kashpureff in custody.
0xd: XS4ALL refuses Internet tap
0xe: The FCC Wants V-Chip in PCs too
1x1: Book Title: Underground (review)
1x2: Book Title: The Electronic Privacy Papers
1x3: Book Title: "Computer Security and Privacy: An Information Sourcebook..
2x0: Convention:
3x1: Misc: Civil Liberties Groups ask FCC to Block FBI Proposal
3x2: Misc: Anti-Spam Bills in Congress
3x3: Misc: Justice Dept Charges Microsoft..
3x4: Misc: Small Minds Think Alike
3x5: Misc: Cyber Promotions tossed offline
0x1>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
[submitted by: the wizard of id]
Phrack,
I thought that you guys may be able to make use of these articles which I
found in my newspaper's IT section. Perhaps you should pass them on to the
editors of Phrack World News.
Hacker Acquitted
================
Extract from The Age, Victoria, Australia. -Tuesday
11/25/97
The US Air Force failed last Friday to convince Woolwich Crown Court in
the UK that Matthew Bevan, 23, hacked into its secret files with his home
computer. Computer guru Bevan was cleared of all accusations, which led to
fears of US national security risk. He was charged with three offences of
"unauthorised access and modification" into sensitive research and
development files at New York's Griffiss Air Force Base and Lockheed Space
and Missle Company in California via the Internet.
The article is accompanied by a very cool picture of Bevan in a black
suit, wearing mirrored sunglasses. :)
Iraq Computerises
=================
Extract from The Age, Victoria, Australia. -Tuesday
11/25/97
To conceal its deadliest arms from U.N. weapons inspectors, Iraq increasingly
has turned to computers, including American brands sold to Baghdad since
the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War in violation of international sanctions,
according to US officials and U.N. diplomats.
Iraq is using mostly Western-made computers for two cirtical functions: To
transfer data from bulky paper to small disks that they can easilly
disperse, making the information difficult for U.N. weapons inspection
teams to track.
For research and development in all four categories of weapons Iraq has
been forbidden from keeping under terms of the U.N. resolution ending the
war - nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and long-rnge missiles.
Because of shifting tactics, computer specialists have become an ever more
important component of the weapons inspections teams, US and U.N. sources
say.
Their work often involves digging into hard drives and unearthing material
that was erased after being transferred to disks.
0x2>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
[submitted by: Mike Kretsch]
Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Before the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, United States House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.
September 9, 1997
This man must be stopped. For other fun reading,
check out his statements about the FBI's International
Crime fighting efforts. Errrr. Wasnt international
supposed to be CIA and domestic FBI?
The Impact of Encryption
on Public Safety
Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.
September 9, 1997
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to
discuss the issue of encryption and I applaud your willingness to deal with
this vital public safety issue.
The looming spectre of the widespread use of robust, virtually unbreakable
encryption is one of the most difficult problems confronting law enforcement
as the next century approaches. At stake are some of our most valuable and
reliable investigative techniques, and the public safety of our citizens.
We believe that unless a balanced approach to encryption is adopted that
includes a viable key management infrastructure that supports immediate
decryption capabilities for lawful purposes, our ability to investigate
and sometimes prevent the most serious crimes and terrorism will be severely
impaired. Our national security will also be jeopardized.
For law enforcement, framing the issue is simple. In this time of dazzling
telecommunications and computer technology where information can have
extraordinary value, the ready availability of robust encryption is
essential. No one in law enforcement disputes that. Clearly, in today's
world and more so in the future, the ability to encrypt both contemporaneous
communications and stored data is a vital component of information security.
As is so often the case, however, there is another aspect to the encryption
issue that if left unaddressed will have severe public safety and national
security ramifications. Law enforcement is in unanimous agreement that the
widespread use of robust unbreakable encryption ultimately will devastate
our ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism. Unbreakable encryption
will allow drug lords, spies, terrorists and even violent gangs to
communicate about their crimes and their conspiracies with impunity. We wll
lose one of the few remaining vulnerabilities of the worst criminals and
terrorists upon which law enforcement depends to successfully investigate
and often prevent the worst crimes.
For this reason, the law enforcement community is unanimous in calling for
a balanced solution to this problem. Such a solution must satisfy both the
commercial needs of industry for strong encryption and law enforcement's
public safety decryption needs. In our view, any legislative approach that
does not achieve such a balanced approach seriously jeopardizes the
long-term viability and usefulness of court-authorized access to transmitted
as well as stored evidence and information. Electronic surveillance and
search and seizure are techniques upon which law enforcement depends to
ensure public safety and maintain national security.
One such balanced solution to this problem is key recovery encryption.
Under this approach, a decryption "key" for a given encryption product is
deposited with a trustworthy key recovery agent for safe keeping. The key
recovery agent could be a private company, a bank, or other commercial or
government entity that meets established trustworthiness criteria. Should
encryption users need access to their encrypted information, they could
obtain the decryption key from the key recovery agent. Additionally, when
law enforcement needs to decrypt criminal-related communications or computer
files lawfully seized under established legal authorities, they too, under
conditions prescribed by law and with the presentation of proper legal
process, could obtain the decryption key from the key recovery agent. This
is the only viable way to permit the timely decryption of lawfully seized
communications or computer files that are in furtherance of criminal
activity.
The decryption key or information would be provided to the law enforcement
agency under very strict controls and would be used only for its intended
public safety purpose. Under this approach, the law-abiding would gain the
benefits of strong, robust encryption products and services with emergency
decryption capabilities and public safety and national security would be
maintained--as manufacturers produce and sell encryption products that
include features that allow for the immediate decryption of criminal-related
encrypted communications or electronic information.
This solution meets industry's information security and communications
privacy needs for strong encryption while addressing law enforcement's
public safety needs for immediate decryption when such products are used
to conceal crimes or impending acts of terrorism or espionage.
Some have argued that government policy makers should step aside and let
market forces solely determine the direction of key recovery encryption,
letting market forces determine the type of technologies that will be used
and under what circumstances. They argue that most corporations that see
the need for encryption will also recognize the need for, and even insist
on, key recovery encryption products to secure their electronically stored
information and to protect their corporate interests should an encryption
key be lost, stolen or used by a rogue employee for extortion purposes.
We agree that rational thinking corporations will act in a prudent manner
and will insist on using key recovery encryption for electronically stored
information. However, law enforcement has a unique public safety requirement
in the area of perishable communications which are in transit (telephone
calls, e-mail, etc.). It is law enforcement, not corporations, that
has a need for the immediate decryption of communications in transit. There
is extraordinary risk in trusting public safety and national security to
market forces that rightfully are protecting important but unrelated
interests. Law enforcement's needs will not be adequately addressed by
this type of an approach.
It is for this reason that government policy makers and Congress should
play a direct role in shaping our national encryption policy and adopt a
balanced approach that addresses both the commercial and the public safety
needs. The adverse impact to public safety and national security associated
with any type of "wait and see" or voluntary market force approach would
be far too great of a price for the American public to pay.
Several bills have recently been introduced which address encryption.
Language in some of the proposed bills makes it unlawful to use encryption
in the furtherance of criminal activity and set out procedures for law
enforcement access to stored decryption keys in those instances where
key recovery encryption was voluntarily used. Only one of these bills,
S. 909, comes close to meeting our core public safety, effective law
enforcement, and national security needs. S. 909 takes significant strides
in the direction of protecting public safety by encouraging the use of key
recovery encryption through market based incentives and other inducements.
All of the other bills currently under consideration by the Congress, to
include S. 376, S. 377 , and H.R. 695, would have a significant negative
impact on public safety and national security and would risk great harm
to our ability to enforce the laws and protect our citizens if enacted.
Unfortunately, S. 909 still does not contain sufficient assurances that
the impact on public safety and effective law enforcement caused by the
widespread availability of encryption will be adequately addressed. We look
forward to working with you to develop legislative accommodations that
adequately address the public safety needs of law enforcement and a balanced
encryption policy.
Further, some argue the encryption "Genie is out of the bottle," and that
attempts to influence the future use of encryption are futile. I do not
believe that to be the case. Strong encryption products that include
decryption features for lawful purposes can, with government and industry
support, become the standard for use in the global information
infrastructure.
No one contends that the adoption of a balanced encryption policy will
prevent all criminals, spies and terrorists from gaining access to and
using unbreakable encryption. But if we, as a nation, act responsibly
and only build systems and encryption products that support and include
appropriate decryption features, all facets of the public's interest can
be served.
And as this committee knows, export controls on encryption products exist
primarily to protect national security and foreign policy interests.
However, law enforcement is more concerned about the significant and
growing threat to public safety and effective law enforcement that would
be caused by the proliferation and use within the United States of a
communications infrastructure that supports the use of strong encryption
products but that does not support law enforcement's immediate decryption
needs. Without question, such an infrastructure will be used by dangerous
criminals and terrorists to conceal their illegal plans and activities
from law enforcement, thus inhibiting our ability to enforce the laws
and prevent terrorism.
Congress has on many occasions accepted the premise that the use of
electronic surveillance is a tool of utmost importance in terrorism cases
and in many criminal investigations, especially those involving serious
and violent crime, terrorism, espionage, organized crime, drug-trafficking,
corruption and fraud. There have been numerous cases where law enforcement,
through the use of electronic surveillance, has not only solved and
successfully prosecuted serious crimes and dangerous criminals, but has
also been able to prevent serious and life-threatening criminal acts. For
example, terrorists in New York were plotting to bomb the United Nations
building, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, and 26 Federal Plaza as well as
conduct assassinations of political figures. Court-authorized electronic
surveillance enabled the FBI to disrupt the plot as explosives were being
mixed. Ultimately, the evidence obtained was used to convict the
conspirators. In another example, electronic surveillance was used to
prevent and then convict two men who intended to kidnap, molest and then
kill a male child.
Most encryption products manufactured today do not contain features that
provide for immediate law enforcement decryption. Widespread use of
unbreakable encryption or communications infrastructure that supports the
use of unbreakable encryption clearly will undermine law enforcement's
ability to effectively carry out its public safety mission and to combat
dangerous criminals and terrorists.
This is not a problem that will begin sometime in the future. Law
enforcement is already encountering the harmful effects of encryption
in many important investigations today. For example:
convicted spy Aldrich Ames was told by the Russian Intelligence
Service to encrypt computer file information that was to be passed
to them. an international terrorist was plotting to blow up 11
U.S.-owned commercial airliners in the Far East. His laptop computer
which was seized during his arrest in Manilla contained encrypted
files concerning this terrorist plot. a subject in a child pornography
case used encryption in transmitting obscene and pornographic images
of children over the Internet. a major international drug trafficking
subject recently used a telephone encryption device to frustrate
court-approved electronic surveillance.
Requests for cryptographic support pertaining to electronic surveillance
interceptions from FBI field offices and other law enforcement agencies
have steadily risen over the past several years. For example, from 1995
to 1996, there was a two-fold increase (from 5 to 12) in the number of
instances where the FBI's court-authorized electronic efforts were frustrated
by the use of encryption products that did not allow for lawful law
enforcement decryption.
Over the last three (3) years, the FBI has also seen the number of
computer-related cases utilizing encryption and/or password protection
increase from 20 or two (2) percent of the cases involving electronically
stored information to 140 or seven (7) percent. These included the use of
56-bit data encryption standard (DES) and 128-bit "pretty good privacy"
(PGP) encryption.
Just as when the Congress so boldly addressed the digital telephony issue
in 1994, the government and the nation are again at an historic crossroad
on this issue. The Attorney General and the heads of federal law enforcement
agencies as well as the presidents of several state and local law enforcement
associations recently sent letters to every member of Congress urging the
adoption of a balanced encryption policy. In addition, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriff's Association and
the National District Attorneys Association have all enacted resolutions
supporting a balanced encryption policy and opposing any legislation that
undercuts or falls short such a balanced policy.
If public policy makers act wisely, the safety of all Americans will be
enhanced for decades to come. But if narrow interests prevail, then law
enforcement will be unable to provide the level of protection that people
in a democracy properly expect and deserve.
Conclusion
We are not asking that the magnificent advances in encryption technology
be abandoned. We are the strongest proponents of robust, reliable encryption
manufactured and sold by American companies all over the world. Our position
is simple and, we believe, vital. Encryption is certainly a commercial
interest of great importance to this great nation. But it's not merely a
commercial or business issue. To those of us charged with the protection of
public safety and national security, encryption technology and its
application in the information age--here at the dawn of the 21st century
and thereafter--will become a matter of life and death in many instances
which will directly impact on our safety and freedoms. Good and sound
public policy decisions about encryption must be made now by the Congress
and not be left to private enterprise. Legislation which carefully balances
public safety and private enterprise must be established with respect to
encryption.
Would we allow a car to be driven with features which would evade and outrun
police cars? Would we build houses or buildings which firefighters could not
enter to save people?
Most importantly, we are not advocating that the privacy rights or personal
security of any person or enterprise be compromised or threatened. You can't
yell "fire" in a crowded theater. You can't with impunity commit libel or
slander. You can't use common law honored privileges to commit crimes.
In support of our position for a rational encryption policy which balances
public safety with the right to secure communications, we rely on the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution. There the framers established a delicate
balance between "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects (today we might add personal computers, modems,
data streams, discs, etc.) against unreasonable searches and seizures."
Those precious rights, however, were balanced against the legitimate right
and necessity of the police, acting through strict legal process, to gain
access by lawful search and seizure to the conversations and stored evidence
of criminals, spies and terrorists.
The precepts and balance of the Fourth Amendment have not changed or altered.
What has changed from the late eighteenth to the late twentieth century is
technology and telecommunications well beyond the contemplation of the
framers.
The unchecked proliferation of unbreakable encryption will drastically
change the balance of the Fourth Amendment in a way which would shock its
original proponents. Police soon may be unable through legal process and
with sufficient probable cause to conduct a reasonable and lawful search
or seizure, because they cannot gain access to evidence being channeled or
stored by criminals, terrorists and spies. Significantly, their lack of
future access may be in part due to policy decisions about encryption made
or not made by the United States. This would be a terrible upset of the
balance so wisely set forth in the Fourth Amendment on December 15, 1791.
I urge you to maintain that balance and allow your police departments,
district attorneys, sheriffs and federal law enforcement authorities to
continue to use their most effective techniques to fight crime and
terrorism--techniques well understood and authorized by the framers and
Congress for over two hundred years.
I look forward to working with you on this matter and at this time would
be pleased to answer any questions.
0x3>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Urban Ka0s -- 26 Indonesian Servers Haxed
Greetings Phrack,
Today, our group (Urban Ka0s) and several portuguese Hackers attacked
several Indonesian servers, in order to defend East Timor rights!
We are Portuguese Hackers Agaisnt Indonesian Tirany.
"Thix Site Was Haxed & Deleted by PHAiT. This attack is not
against indonesian people but against its government and their
opression towards the republic of timor. These actions were
made to honour and remember all the 250 people killed in Dili
on the 12 november 1991.
As a result all sites belonging to indonesia's goverment were
erased, the rest only had their webpages changed."
East Timor, One People, One Nation
"Whether it is in Tibet or Poland, the Baltics or the
South Pacific, Africa or the Caribbean, it has been shown
that force and repression can never totally suffocate the
reasons underlying the existence of a people: pride in its
own identity, capacity to preserve, without restriction,
everything that identifies it as such, freedom to pass all
this on to future generations, in brief, the right to manage
its own destiny."
Xanana Gusmão
October 5, 1989
Please inform all ciber citizens of this action.
Our contact is at:
-- Urban Ka0s --
http://urbankaos.org
irc: PT-Net irc.urbankaos.org
0x4>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Hacker accused of sabotaging Forbes computers
Source: Infobeat News
Author: unknown
Date: unknown
A former temporary computer technician at business publisher Forbes
Inc has been charged with sabotage and causing a massive crash of the
firm's computer network, prosecutors said. According to the complaint
filed in Manhattan Federal Court and unsealed Monday, George Mario
Parente, 30, of Howard Beach in the borough of Queens was accused of
hacking his way into the Forbes' network in April from his home,
using an unauthorized password. Prosecutors alleged he erased vital
information including budgets and salary from Forbes' computers
because he was angry with the company after he was fired.
0x5>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Privacy, Inc. Unveils its Internet Background Check
Source:
Author: unknown
Date: August 1, 1997
Aurora, Colorado
Privacy, Inc. (www.privacyinc.com) today released its Internet Background
Check, a utility that empowers users to determine if they are at risk from
the plethora of databases that are being placed on the Internet. Searches
quickly scan through hundreds of databases beng placed on-line by state and
local governments and law enforcement angencies in categories such as:
* Registered Sex Offenders and Predators
* Deadbeat Parents
* Wanted Persons
* Missing Persons
* Arrest/Prison
'The Computer Is Never Wrong'
"Errors and risks of mistaken identity in this data are a key concern," says
Edward Allburn, founder and president of Privacy, Inc. The recent flurry of
activity by government and law enforcement agencies to distribute such
volatile information on the Internet creates an environment that potentially
places innocent people at risk, especially for mistaken identity.
Advanced technology was incorporated into the development of the Internet
Background Check with this risk in mind. This technology allows users to
also search for names that look and/or sound similar to their own while still
delivering highly focused results that standard Internet search engines
(such as Yahoo! and Lycos) are incapable of producing.
One More Tool
The release provides one more tool for consumers to protect themselves in the
Information Age. Additional resources provided by Privacy, Inc. include:
* Consumer Privacy Guide
* Government Database Guide
* Government Dossier Service
* David Sobel's Legal FAQ
* Privacy News Archive, updated weekly
Guido, the Cyber-Bodyguard is another utility planned to be released in the
coming months. Guido will interface with the Internet Background Check to
automatically alert users via e-mail if/when their name appears in a new or
updated database, in effect monitoring the Internet so users don't have to.
0x6>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Commerce Dept encryption rules declared unconstitutional
Source: fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
Author: unknown
Date: unknown
A Federal judge in San Francisco ruled today that the Commerce
Department's export controls on encryption products violate the
First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech.
In a 35-page decision, U.S. District Judge Marilyn Patel said the
Clinton administration's rules violate "the First Amendment on the
grounds of prior restraint and are, therefore, unconstitutional."
Patel reaffirmed her December 1996 decision against the State
Department regulations, saying that the newer Commerce Department
rules suffer from similar constitutional infirmities.
Patel barred the government from "threatening, detaining,
prosecuting, discouraging, or otherwise interfering with" anyone
"who uses, discusses, or publishes or seeks to use, discuss or
publish plaintiff's encryption programs and related materials."
Daniel Bernstein, now a math professor at the University of
Illinois, filed the lawsuit with the help of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation.
Patel dismissed the State, Energy, and Justice departments and
CIA as defendants. President Clinton transferred jurisdiction over
encryption exports from the State to the Commerce department on
December 30, 1996.
The Justice Department seems likely to appeal the ruling to the
Ninth Circuit, which could rule on the case in the near future.
0x7>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: The Million Dollar Challenge
Source: unknown mail list
Ultimate Privacy, the e-mail encryption program combining ease
of use with unbreakability.
Ultimate Privacy is serious cryptography. On the Links page we
have links to other Internet sites that discuss One-Time Pad
cryptography and why it is unbreakable when properly
implemented.
Nevertheless, should you wish to try, the first person to be able
to discern the original message within a year (following the
simple requirements of the Challenge) will actually receive the
million dollar prize as specified in the Rules page. The prize
is backed by the full faith and credit of Crypto-Logic
Corporation and its insurors.
You might be interested in to know how the Challenge was done. We
used a clean, non-network-connected computer. After installing
Ultimate Privacy, one person alone entered the Challenge message
and encrypted it. After making a copy of the encrypted message,
we removed the hard disk from the computer and it was
immediately transported to a vault for a year.
Therefore, the original message is not known by Crypto-Logic
Corporation staff (other than the first few characters for
screening purposes), nor are there any clues to the original
message on any media in our offices.
0x8>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: High Profile Detainee Seeks Legal Help
Source: fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
Author: unknown
Date: September 3, 1997
Mr. Kevin Mitnick has been detained in Federal custody without
bail on computer "hacking" allegations for over thirty months.
Having no financial resources, Mr. Mitnick has been appointed
counsel from the Federal Indigent Defense Panel. As such, Mr.
Mitnick's representation is limited; his attorney is not permitted
to assist with civil actions, such as filing a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
For the past two years, Mr. Mitnick has attempted to assist in his
own defense by conducting legal research in the inmate law library
at the Metropolitan Detention Center (hereinafter "MDC") in Los
Angeles, California. Mr. Mitnick's research includes reviewing
court decisions for similar factual circumstances which have
occurred in his case. MDC prison officials have been consistently
hampering Mr. Mitnick's efforts by denying him reasonable access
to law library materials. Earlier this year, Mr. Mitnick's lawyer
submitted a formal request to Mr. Wayne Siefert, MDC Warden,
seeking permission to allow his client access to the law library
on the days set aside for inmates needing extra law library time.
The Warden refused.
In August 1995, Mr. Mitnick filed an administrative remedy request
with the Bureau of Prisons complaining that MDC policy in
connection with inmate access to law library materials does not
comply with Federal rules and regulations. Specifically, the
Warden established a policy for MDC inmates that detracts from
Bureau of Prison's policy codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations.
Briefly, Federal law requires the Warden to grant additional law
library time to an inmate who has an "imminent court deadline".
The MDC's policy circumvents this law by erroneously interpreting
the phrase "imminent court deadline" to include other factors,
such as, whether an inmate exercises his right to assistance of
counsel, or the type of imminent court deadline.
For example, MDC policy does not consider detention (bail),
motion, status conference, or sentencing hearings as imminent
court deadlines for represented inmates. MDC officials use this
policy as a tool to subject inmates to arbitrary and capricious
treatment. It appears MDC policy in connection with inmate legal
activities is inconsistent with Federal law and thereby affects
the substantial rights of detainees which involve substantial
liberty interests.
In June 1997, Mr. Mitnick finally exhausted administrative
remedies with the Bureau of Prisons. Mr. Mitnick's only avenue of
vindication is to seek judicial review in a Court of Law. Mr.
Mitnick wishes to file a Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his
conditions of detention, and a motion to compel Federal
authorities to follow their own rules and regulations.
Mr. Mitnick is hoping to find someone with legal experience, such
as an attorney or a law student willing to donate some time to
this cause to insure fair treatment for everyone, and to allow
detainees to effectively assist in their own defense without
"Government" interference. Mr. Mitnick needs help drafting a
Habeas Corpus petition with points and authorities to be submitted
by him pro-se. His objective is to be granted reasonable access
to law library materials to assist in his own defense.
If you would like to help Kevin, please contact him at the
following address:
Mr. Kevin Mitnick
Reg. No. 89950-012
P.O. Box 1500
Los Angeles, CA 90053-1500
0x9>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Kevin Mitnick Press Release
Source: Press Release
Author: Donald C. Randolph
Date: August 7, 1997
THE UNITED STATES V. KEVIN DAVID MITNICK
I. Proceedings to Date
With 25 counts of alleged federal computer and wire fraud violations still
pending against him, the criminal prosecution of Kevin Mitnick is
approaching its most crucial hour. The trial is anticipated to begin in
January, 1998. In reaching this point, however, Kevin has already
experienced years of legal battles over alleged violations of the
conditions of his supervised release and for possession of unauthorized
cellular access codes.
A. Settling the "Fugitive" Question
The seemingly unexceptional charges relating to supervised release
violations resulted in months of litigation when the government attempted
to tack on additional allegations for conduct occurring nearly three years
after the scheduled expiration of Kevin's term of supervised release in
December, 1992. The government claimed that Kevin had become a fugitive
prior to the expiration of his term, thereby "tolling" the term and
allowing for the inclusion of additional charges. After months of
increasingly bold assertions concerning Kevin's "fugitive" status,
evidentiary hearings were held in which the government was forced to
concede that its original position in this matter was unsupported by the
facts.
B. Sentencing
In June of this year Kevin was sentenced for certain admitted violations of
his supervised release and for possession of unauthorized access codes.
The court imposed a sentence of 22 months instead of the 32 months sought
by the government. Since Kevin has been in custody since his arrest in
February 1995, this sentence has been satisfied. We are currently
preparing a request for release on bail.
During this stage of the proceedings, the government sought to impose
restrictions on Kevin's access to computers which were so severe as to
virtually prohibit him from functioning altogether in today's society. The
proposed restrictions sought to completely prohibit Kevin from "using or
possessing" all computer hardware equipment, software programs, and
wireless communications equipment. After arguments that such restrictions
unduly burdened Kevin's freedom to associate with the on-line computer
community and were not reasonably necessary to ensure the protection of the
public, the court modified its restrictions by allowing for computer access
with the consent of the Probation Office. Nonetheless, the defense
believes that the severe restrictions imposed upon Mr. Mitnick are
unwarranted in this case and is, therefore, pursuing an appeal to the Ninth
Circuit.
II. The Government Seeks to make an Example of Mr. Mitnick
One of the strongest motivating factors for the government in the
prosecution of Kevin Mitnick is a desire to send a message to other
would-be "hackers". The government has hyped this prosecution by
exaggerating the value of loss in the case, seeking unreasonably stiff
sentences, and by painting a portrait of Kevin which conjures the likeness
of a cyber-boogie man.
There are a number of objectives prompting the government's tactics in this
respect. First, by dramatically exaggerating the amount of loss at issue
in the case (the government arbitrarily claims losses exceed some $80
million) the government can seek a longer sentence and create a
high-profile image for the prosecution. Second, through a long sentence
for Kevin, the government hopes to encourage more guilty pleas in future
cases against other hackers. For example, a prosecutor offering a moderate
sentence in exchange for a guilty plea would be able to use Kevin Mitnick's
sentence as an example of what "could happen" if the accused decides to go
to trial. Third, by striking fear into the hearts of the public over the
dangers of computer hackers, the government hopes to divert scrutiny away
from its own game-plan regarding the control and regulation of the Internet
and other telecommunications systems.
III. Crime of Curiosity
The greatest injustice in the prosecution of Kevin Mitnick is revealed when
one examines the actual harm to society (or lack thereof) which resulted
from Kevin's actions. To the extent that Kevin is a "hacker" he must be
considered a purist. The simple truth is that Kevin never sought monetary
gain from his hacking, though it could have proven extremely profitable.
Nor did he hack with the malicious intent to damage or destroy other
people's property. Rather, Kevin pursued his hacking as a means of
satisfying his intellectual curiosity and applying Yankee ingenuity. These
attributes are more frequently promoted rather than punished by society.
The ongoing case of Kevin Mitnick is gaining increased attention as the
various issues and competing interests are played out in the arena of the
courtroom. Exactly who Kevin Mitnick is and what he represents, however,
is ultimately subject to personal interpretation and to the legacy which
will be left by "The United States v. Kevin David Mitnick".
0xa>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: SAFE crypto bill cracked again
Source:
Author: By Alex Lash and Dan Goodin
Date: September 12, 1997, 8:40 a.m. PT
For the second time in a week, a House committee has made significant
changes to the Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act to
mandate that domestic encryption products give law enforcement agencies
access to users' messages.
The changes by the Intelligence Committee, which were passed as a
"substitute" to SAFE, turn the legislation on its head. The amendment
follows similar changes two days ago in the House National Security
Committee.
Initially drafted as a way to loosen U.S. export controls on encryption,
legislators have instead "marked up" the bill, or amended it at the
committee level, to reflect the wishes of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other law enforcement agencies that want "wiretap"
access to all encrypted email and other digital files.
Both the Intelligence and the National Security committees tend to favor
export controls, because they view encryption as a threat to
information-gathering activities by U.S. military and law enforcement
officials.
The Intelligence Committee cited those concerns today when announcing
the substitute legislation. "Terrorist groups...drug cartels...and those
who proliferate in deadly chemical and biological weapons are all
formidable opponents of peace and security in the global society," said
committee chairman Porter Goss (R-Florida) in a statement. "These bad
actors must know that the U.S. law enforcement and national security
agencies, working under proper oversight, will have the tools to
frustrate illegal and deadly activity and bring international criminals
to justice."
Opponents of government attempts to regulate encryption, including a
leading panel of cryptographers, have argued that built-in access to
encrypted files would in fact threaten national and individual security
and be prohibitively expensive to implement.
The amended legislation calls for all imported or U.S.-made encryption
products that are manufactured or distributed after January 31, 2000, to
provide "immediate access" to the decrypted text if the law officials
present a court order. "Law enforcement will specifically be required to
obtain a separate court order to have the data, including
communications, decrypted."
A markup of the same bill in the House Commerce Committee was postponed
today for two weeks. It will be the fifth such committee vote on the
bill since its introduction.
The Intelligence and National Security amendments this week are by no
means a defeat of the bill. Instead, they would have to be reconciled
with versions of the bill already approved by the House Judiciary and
International Relations committees. That reconciliation most likely
would have to happen on the House floor. The rapidly fragmenting bill
still has several layers of procedure to wend through before it reaches
a potential floor vote, but people on both sides of the encryption
debate openly question if the bill--in any form--will make it that far
this year.
The legislation has 252 cosponsors, more than half of the House
membership.
0xb>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: RC5 Cracked - The unknown message is...
Source:
Author: David McNett [:]
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 1997 08:43:38 -0500
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
It is a great privilege and we are excited to announce that at 13:25
GMT on 19-Oct-1997, we found the correct solution for RSA Labs' RC5-
32/12/7 56-bit secret-key challenge. Confirmed by RSA Labs, the key
0x532B744CC20999 presented us with the plaintext message for which we
have been searching these past 250 days.
The unknown message is: It's time to move to a longer key length
In undeniably the largest distributed-computing effort ever, the
Bovine RC5 Cooperative (http://www.distributed.net/), under the
leadership of distributed.net, managed to evaluate 47% of the
keyspace, or 34 quadrillion keys, before finding the winning key. At
the close of this contest our 4000 active teams were processing over
7 billion keys each second at an aggregate computing power equivalent
to more than 26 thousand Pentium 200's or over 11 thousand PowerPC
604e/200's. Over the course of the project, we received block
submissions from over 500 thousand unique IP addresses.
The winning key was found by Peter Stuer with
an Intel Pentium Pro 200 running Windows NT Workstation, working for
the STARLab Bovine Team coordinated by Jo Hermans
and centered in the Computer Science
Department (DINF) of the Vrije Universiteit (VUB) in Brussels,
Belgium. (http://dinf.vub.ac.be/bovine.html/). Jo's only comments
were that "$1000 will buy a lot of beer" and that he wished that the
solution had been found by a Macintosh, the platform that represented
the largest portion of his team's cracking power. Congratulations
Peter and Jo!
Of the US$10000 prize from RSA Labs, they will receive US$1000 and
plan to host an unforgettable party in celebration of our collective
victory. If you're anywhere near Brussels, you might want to find
out when the party will be held. US$8000, of course, is being
donated to Project Gutenberg (http://www.promo.net/pg/) to assist
them in their continuing efforts in converting literature into
electronic format for the public use. The remaining US$1000 is being
retained by distributed.net to assist in funding future projects.
Equally important are the thanks, accolades, and congratulations due
to all who participated and contributed to the Bovine RC5-56 Effort!
The thousands of teams and tens of thousands of individuals who have
diligently tested key after key are the reason we are so successful.
The thrill of finding the key more than compensates for the sleep,
food, and free time that we've sacrificed!
Special thanks go to all the coders and developers, especially Tim
Charron, who has graciously given his time and expertise since the
earliest days of the Bovine effort. Thanks to all the coordinators
and keyserver operators: Chris Chiapusio, Paul Chvostek, Peter
Denitto, Peter Doubt, Mishari Muqbil, Steve Sether, and Chris
Yarnell. Thanks to Andrew Meggs, Roderick Mann, and Kevyn Shortell
for showing us the true power of the Macintosh and the strength of
its users. We'd also like to thank Dave Avery for attempting to
bridge the gap between Bovine and the other RC5 efforts.
Once again, a heartfelt clap on the back goes out to all of us who
have run the client. Celebrations are in order. I'd like to invite
any and all to join us on the EFNet IRC network channel #rc5 for
celebrations as we regroup and set our sights on the next task. Now
that we've proven the limitations of a 56-bit key length, let's go
one further and demonstrate the power of distributed computing! We
are, all of us, the future of computing. Join the excitement as the
world is forced to take notice of the power we've harnessed.
Moo and a good hearty laugh.
Adam L. Beberg - Client design and overall visionary
Jeff Lawson - keymaster/server network design and morale booster
David McNett - stats development and general busybody
0xc>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: Kashpureff in custody.
Source: Marc Hurst
Author: Marc Hurst
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 1997 10:40:20 -0500 (EST)
Eugene Kashpureff, known for his redirect of the NSI web page,
was apprehended this morning in Toronto by undercover RCMP
detectives.
Pending a deportation hearing, he will be returned to New York to
face Felony Wire Fraud charges that were sworn out against him
after he had settled out of court with NSI in regard to their
civil suit.
Early in the week Eugene relinquished control of the Alternic to
an adhoc industry group and that group will be making an
announcement in the next few days.
A this time I have no further information to volunteer.
Sincerely
Marc Hurst
0xd>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: XS4ALL refuses Internet tap
Source: Press Release
Author: Maurice Wessling
Date: November 13th 1997, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
XS4ALL Internet is refusing to comply with an instruction from the
Dutch Ministry of Justice that it should tap the Internet traffic
of one of its users as part of an investigation. XS4ALL has
informed the Ministry that in its view the instruction lacks any
adequate legal basis. The company's refusal makes it liable for a
penalty but XS4ALL is hoping for a trial case to be brought in the
near future so that a court can make a pronouncement.
On Friday October 31st, a detective and a computer expert from the
Forensic Science Laboratory issued the instruction to XS4ALL. The
Ministry of Justice wants XS4ALL to tap for a month all Internet
traffic to and from this user and then supply the information to
the police. This covers e-mail, the World Wide Web, news groups,
IRC and all Internet services that this person uses. XS4ALL would
have to make all the technical arrangements itself.
As far as we are aware, there is no precedent in the Netherlands
for the Ministry of Justice issuing such a far-reaching
instruction to an Internet provider. The detectives involved also
acknowledge as much. Considering that a national meeting of
Examining judges convened to discuss the instruction, one may
appreciate just how unprecedented this situation is. Hitherto,
instructions have mainly been confined to requests for personal
information on the basis of an e-mail address.
XS4ALL feels obliged in principle to protect its users and their
privacy. Furthermore, XS4ALL has a commercial interest, since it
must not run the risk of action being brought by users under Civil
Law on account of unlawful deeds. This could happen with such an
intervention by the provider which is not based in law. Finally,
it is important from the social point of view that means of
investigation have adequate statutory basis. To comply with the
instruction could act as an undesirable precedent which could have
a major impact on the privacy of all Internet users in the
Netherlands.
XS4ALL has no view on the nature of the investigation itself or
the alleged crimes. It is happy to leave the court to decide that.
Nor will XS4ALL make any comment on the content of the study or
the region in which this is occurring for it is not its intention
that the investigation should founder. XS4ALL has proposed in vain
to the examining judge that the instruction be recast in terms
which ensures the legal objections are catered for.
The Ministry of Justice based its claim on Article 125i of the
Penal Code. This article was introduced in 1993 as part of the
Computer Crime Act. It gives the examining judge the option of
advising third parties during statutory preliminary investigations
to provide data stored in computers in the interest of
establishing the truth. According to legal history, it was never
the intention to apply this provision to an instruction focused on
the future. Legislators are still working to fill this gap in the
arsenal of detection methods, by analogy with the Ministry of
Justice tapping phone lines (125g of the Penal Code). The Dutch
Constitution and the European Convention on the Protection of
Human Rights demand a precise statutory basis for violating basic
rights such as privacy and confidentiality of correspondence. The
Ministry clearly does not wish to wait for this and is now
attempting to use Article 125i of the Penal Code, which is not
intended for this purpose, to compel providers themselves to start
tapping suspect users. The Ministry of Justice is taking the risk
of the prosecution of X, in the context of which the instruction
was issued to XS4ALL, running aground on account of using illegal
detection methods. Here, again, XS4ALL does not wish to be liable
in any respect in this matter.
For information please contact:
XS4ALL
Maurice Wessling
email: maurice@xs4all.nl
http://www.xs4all.nl/
0xf>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title: The FCC Wants V-Chip in PCs too
Source: Cyber-Liberties Update
Author:
Date: Monday, November 3, 1997
Mandating that all new televisions have built-in censorship technology
is not the only thing that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
is seeking, said ACLU Associate Director Barry Steinhardt, it is also
looking to require that the same technology be added to all new personal
computers.
Last year, culminating a protracted campaign against TV violence,
Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, a law requiring that
new televisions be equipped with the so-called V-chip. The V-chip is a
computerized chip capable of detecting program ratings and blocking
adversely rated programs from view.
Now, the FCC has announced that it is soliciting public comments through
November 24, on the idea of placing V-chips inside personal computers
since some are capable of delivering television programming.
^SAt the time the V-chip was being considered we warned that with the
growing convergence between traditional television (broadcast and cable)
and the Internet, it was only a matter of time before the government
would move to require that the V-chip be placed in PC's. Now that has
happened,^T Steinhardt said.
^SHardwiring censorship technology into the PC is part of the headlong
rush to
a scheme of rating and blocking Internet content that will turn the
Internet into a bland homogenized medium in which only large corporate
interest will have truly free speech,^T Steinhardt said.
The ACLU has criticized the mandatory requirement of V-chip arguing that
it is a form of censorship clearly forbidden by the First Amendment.
^SAlthough its supporters claim the V-chip gives parents control over
their
children's viewing habits, in fact it will function as a governmental
usurpation of parental control,^T said Solange Bitol, Legislative Counsel
for the ACLU^Rs Washington National Office.
^SUnder the legislation, it is the government (either directly or by
coercing private industry), and not the parents, that will determine how
programs will be rated. If a parent activates the V-chip, all programs
with a "violent" rating will be blocked. What kind of violence will be
censored? Football games? War movies? News reports?^T she added.
The ACLU is opposed to mandatory addition or use of censoring
technologies and we will be filing comments with the FCC later this
month. We believe people are smart enough to turn off their television
sets or PCs on their own if they don^Rt like what they see.
Tell the FCC what you think. Submit comments to them online at
, and send us a copy as well so that we make
sure your voice is heard. E-mail them to CSehgal@aclu.org.
=-=
To subscribe to the ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update, send a message to
majordomo@aclu.org with "subscribe Cyber-Liberties" in the body of your
message. To terminate your subscription, send a message to
majordomo@aclu.org with "unsubscribe Cyber-Liberties" in the body.
1x1>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Book Title: Underground
Poster: George Smith via Crypt Newsletter
Date: 27 Aug 97 00:36:12 EDT
From: "George Smith [CRYPTN]" <70743.1711@CompuServe.COM>
Subject: File 5--An "Underground" Book on Australian Hackers Burns the Mind
Source - CRYPT NEWSLETTER 44
AN "UNDERGROUND" BOOK ON AUSTRALIAN HACKERS BURNS THE MIND
Crypt News reads so many bad books, reports and news pieces on
hacking and the computing underground that it's a real pleasure to
find a writer who brings genuine perception to the subject.
Suelette Dreyfus is such a writer, and "Underground," published by
the Australian imprint, Mandarin, is such a book.
The hacker stereotypes perpetrated by the mainstream media include
descriptions which barely even fit any class of real homo sapiens
Crypt News has met. The constant regurgitation of idiot slogans
-- "Information wants to be free," "Hackers are just people who
want to find out how things work" -- insults the intelligence.
After all, have you ever met anyone who wouldn't want their access
to information to be free or who didn't admit to some curiosity
about how the world works? No -- of course not. Dreyfus'
"Underground" is utterly devoid of this manner of patronizing
garbage and the reader is the better for it.
"Underground" is, however, quite a tale of human frailty. It's
strength comes not from the feats of hacking it portrays --and
there are plenty of them -- but in the emotional and physical cost
to the players. It's painful to read about people like Anthrax, an
Australian 17-year old trapped in a dysfunctional family.
Anthrax's father is abusive and racist, so the son --paradoxically
-- winds up being a little to much like him for comfort,
delighting in victimizing complete strangers with mean jokes and
absorbing the anti-Semitic tracts of Louis Farrakhan. For no
discernible reason, the hacker repetitively baits an old man
living in the United States with harassing telephone calls.
Anthrax spends months of his time engaged in completely pointless,
obsessed hacking of a sensitive U.S. military system. Inevitably,
Anthrax becomes entangled in the Australian courts and his life
collapses.
Equally harrowing is the story of Electron whose hacking pales in
comparison to his duel with mental illness. Crypt News challenges
the readers of "Underground" not to squirm at the image of
Electron, his face distorted into a fright mask of rolling eyes
and open mouth due to tardive dyskinesia, a side-effect of being
put on anti-schizophrenic medication.
Dreyfus expends a great deal of effort exploring what happens when
obsession becomes the only driving force behind her subjects'
hacking. In some instances, "Underground's" characters degenerate
into mental illness, others try to find solace in drugs. This is
not a book in which the hackers declaim at any great length upon
contorted philosophies in which the hacker positions himself as
someone whose function is a betterment to society, a lubricant of
information flow, or a noble scourge of bureaucrats and tyrants.
Mostly, they hack because they're good at it, it affords a measure
of recognition and respect -- and it develops a grip upon them
which goes beyond anything definable by words.
Since this is the case, "Underground" won't be popular with the
goon squad contingent of the police corp and computer security
industry. Dreyfus' subjects aren't the kind that come neatly
packaged in the
"throw-'em-in-jail-for-a-few-years-while-awaiting-trial"
phenomenon that's associated with America's Kevin Mitnick-types.
However, the state of these hackers -- sometimes destitute,
unemployable or in therapy -- at the end of their travails is
seemingly quite sufficient punishment.
Some things, however, never change. Apparently, much of
Australia's mainstream media is as dreadful at covering this type
of story as America's. Throughout "Underground," Dreyfus includes
clippings from Australian newspapers featuring fabrications and
exaggeration that bare almost no relationship to reality. Indeed,
in one prosecution conducted within the United Kingdom, the
tabloid press whipped the populace into a blood frenzy by
suggesting a hacker under trial could have affected the outcome of
the Gulf War in his trips through U.S. computers.
Those inclined to seek the unvarnished truth will find
"Underground" an excellent read. Before each chapter, Dreyfus
presents a snippet of lyric chosen from the music of Midnight Oil.
It's an elegant touch, but I'll suggest a lyric from another
Australian band, a bit more obscure, to describe the spirit of
"Underground." From Radio Birdman's second album: "Burned my eye,
burned my mind, I couldn't believe it . . . "
+++++++++
["Underground: Tales of Hacking, Madness and Obsession on the
Electronic Frontier" by Suelette Dreyfus with research by Julian
Assange, Mandarin, 475 pp.]
Excerpts and ordering information for "Underground" can be found
on the Web at http://www.underground-book.com .
George Smith, Ph.D., edits the Crypt Newsletter from Pasadena,
CA.
1x2>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Book Title: The Electronic Privacy Papers
: Documents on the Battle for Privacy in the Age of Surveillance
by: Bruce Schneier + David Banisar
publisher: John Wiley 1997
other: 747 pages, index, US$59.99
_The Privacy Papers_ is not about electronic privacy in general: it covers
only United States Federal politics, and only the areas of wiretapping
and cryptography. The three topics covered are wiretapping and the
Digital Telephony proposals, the Clipper Chip, and other controls on
cryptography (such as export controls and software key escrow proposals).
The documents included fall into several categories. There are broad
overviews of the issues, some of them written just for this volume.
There are public pronouncements and documents from various government
bodies: legislation, legal judgements, policy statements, and so forth.
There are government documents obtained under Freedom of Information
requests (some of them partially declassified documents complete with
blacked out sections and scrawled marginal annotations), which tell
the story of what happened behind the scenes. And there are newspaper
editorials, opinion pieces, submissions to government enquiries, and
policy statements from corporations and non-government organisations,
presenting the response from the public.
Some of the material included in _The Privacy Papers_ is available
online, none of it is breaking news (the cut-off for material appears
to be mid-to-late 1996), and some of the government documents included
are rather long-winded (no surprise there). It is not intended to be a
"current affairs" study, however; nor is it aimed at a popular audience.
_The Privacy Papers_ will be a valuable reference sourcebook for anyone
involved with recent government attempts to control the technology
necessary for privacy -- for historians, activists, journalists,
lobbyists, researchers, and maybe even politicians.
--
%T The Electronic Privacy Papers
%S Documents on the Battle for Privacy in the Age of Surveillance
%A Bruce Schneier
%A David Banisar
%I John Wiley
%C New York
%D 1997
%O hardcover, bibliography, index
%G ISBN 0-471-12297-1
%P xvi,747pp
%K crime, politics, computing
1x3>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Book Title: "Computer Security and Privacy: An Information Sourcebook:
Topics and Issues for the 21st Century"
by Mark W. Greenia
List: $29.95
Publisher: Lexikon Services
Win/Disk Edition
Binding: Software
Expected publication date: 1998
ISBN: 0944601154
[PWN: I haven't seen this one in stores, and no further information or
reviews have been found.]
3x1>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
CDT POLICY POST Volume 3, Number 12 August 11, 1997
(1) CIVIL LIBERTIES GROUPS ASK FCC TO BLOCK FBI ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
PROPOSAL
The Center for Democracy and Technology and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation today filed a petition with the Federal Communications
Commission to block the FBI from using the 1994 "Digital Telephony" law to
expand government surveillance powers.
The law, officially known as the "Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act" (CALEA), was intended to preserve law enforcement
wiretapping ability in the face of changes in communications technologies.
In their filing, CDT and EFF argue that the FBI has tried to use CALEA to
expand its surveillance capabilities by forcing telephone companies to
install intrusive and expensive surveillance features that threaten privacy
and violate the scope of the law.
3x2>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anti-Spam Bills in Congress
Source - ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update, Tuesday, September 2, 1997
Unsolicited e-mail advertisement, or "spam," has few fans on the
net. Court battles have been waged between service providers, such
as AOL and Compuserve, and spam advertisers, including Cyber
Promotions, over whether the thousands of messages sent to user
e-mails can be blocked. Congress and several state legislatures
have also stepped into the debate and have introduced some bills
fraught with First Amendment problems because they ban commercial
speech altogether or are content specific.
[Laws against spam.. oh neat. So, how do they plan on enforcing it?]
3x3>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT CHARGES MICROSOFT WITH VIOLATING 1995 COURT ORDER
Asks Court to Impose $1 Million a Day Fine if Violation Continues
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The Department of Justice asked a
federal court today to hold Microsoft Corporation--the world's
dominant personal computer software company--in civil contempt
for violating terms of a 1995 court order barring it from
imposing anticompetitive licensing terms on manufacturers of
personal computers.
[PWN: Hey Bill.. nah nah nah, thptptptptptptp, nanny nanny boo boo]
3x4>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Small Minds Think Alike
Source - : fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
CyberWire Dispatch Bulletin
Washington --In this boneyard of Washington, DC it doesn't take
long for big dawgs and small alike to bark. A couple of small
ones yipped it up today.
Rep. Marge (no relation to Homer) Roukema, R-N.J. and Sen. Lauch
(??) Faircloth, R-N.C. introduced a bill to amend the
Communications Act that would ban convicted sex offenders from
using the Internet.
[PWN: Oh yeah.. that will be easy to enforce.]
3x5>-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyber Promotions tossed offline
Cyber Promotions tossed offline
By Janet Kornblum
September 19, 1997, 1:25 p.m. PT
Cyber Promotions, antispammers' enemy No. 1 on the Net, has once again
been dumped by its access provider.
Backbone provider AGIS cut off Cyber Promotions Wednesday, and the
company has been scrambling for another ISP since.
[PWN: Hey Samford.. ha ha ha, nanny nanny, thptptptptp.]
"Ping-flood attacks observed originating from the West Coast into AGIS
and directed to the Washington and Philadelphia routers severely
degraded AGIS network performance to [an] unacceptable level...AGIS
had no alternative but to shut off services to Cyber Promotions,"
reads a statement that Wallace put on his page. He alleged that the
statement came from an AGIS engineer.
[PWN: If a ping flood took them down this time...]
----[ EOF