
From ciac@rumpole.llnl.gov Fri Dec 24 01:53:03 1999
From: CIAC Mail User <ciac@rumpole.llnl.gov>
Resent-From: mea culpa <jericho@dimensional.com>
To: ciac-bulletin@rumpole.llnl.gov
Resent-To: jericho@attrition.org
Date: Wed, 22 Dec 1999 05:16:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: CIAC Bulletin K-012: Cisco Cache Engine Authentication Vulnerabilities

[  For Public Release  ]
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            __________________________________________________________

                       The U.S. Department of Energy
                    Computer Incident Advisory Capability
                           ___  __ __    _     ___
                          /       |     /_\   /
                          \___  __|__  /   \  \___
             __________________________________________________________

                             INFORMATION BULLETIN

                  Cisco Cache Engine Authentication Vulnerabilities 

December 21, 1999 17:00 GMT                                       Number K-012
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM:       Cisco has identified three Cache Engine vulnerabilities: 
	       1)  Allows unauthorized persons to substitute arbitrary 
                   material in place of legitimate content for a website. 
               2)  View performance information via web interface. 
               3)  Allow a null username and password pair to be accepted as 
                   valid authentication credentials. 
PLATFORM:      Cisco Cache Engine 2050, Release 1.0 through 1.7.6, Cisco 
               Cache Engine 500, Release 2.0.1 through 2.0.2. 
DAMAGE:        1)  Allow an opportunistic content provider to populate a Cisco 
		   Cache Engine with content of their choosing, yet make it 	
		   appear as any other host name was serving this content.
               2)  A script can be written to bypass an authentication request 
                   and gain access to the performance statistics without 
                   authentication.
               3)  Permit unauthorized persons to alter files on the Cache 
                   Engine.
SOLUTION:      Upgrade software to Cisco Cache Engine 500, Version 2.0.3. 
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY  The risk is MEDIUM. Cisco knows of no public announcements of 
ASSESSMENT:    these vulnerabilities, nor have any malicious uses been reported 
	       to Cisco.
______________________________________________________________________________


http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/k-012.shtml

______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Cisco for the 
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________


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