[Infowarrior] - 5 myths about keeping America safe from terrorism

[Richard Forno]

5 myths about keeping America safe from terrorism
By Stephen Flynn
Sunday, January 3, 2010; B03

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/31/AR2009123101159_pf.html
With President Obama declaring a "systemic failure" of our security  
system in the wake of the attempted Christmas bombing of a Detroit- 
bound airliner, familiar arguments about what can and should be done  
to reduce America's vulnerabilities are again filling the airwaves,  
editorial pages and blogosphere. Several of these arguments are based  
on assumptions that guided the U.S. response to the Sept. 11, 2001,  
attacks -- and unfortunately, they are as unfounded now as they were  
then. The biggest whopper of all? The paternalistic assertion that the  
government can keep us all safe without our help.

1. Terrorism is the gravest threat facing the American people.
Americans are at far greater risk of being killed in accidents or by  
viruses than by acts of terrorism. In 2008, more than 37,300 Americans  
perished on the nation's highways, according to government data. Even  
before H1N1, a similar number of people died each year from the  
seasonal flu. Terrorism is a real and potentially consequential  
danger. But the greatest threat isn't posed by the direct harm  
terrorists could inflict; it comes from what we do to ourselves when  
we are spooked. It is how we react -- or more precisely, how we  
overreact -- to the threat of terrorism that makes it an appealing  
tool for our adversaries. By grounding commercial aviation and  
effectively closing our borders after the 2001 attacks, Washington  
accomplished something no foreign state could have hoped to achieve: a  
blockade on the economy of the world's sole superpower. While we  
cannot expect to be completely successful at intercepting terrorist  
attacks, we must get a better handle on how we respond when they happen.

2. When it comes to preventing terrorism, the only real defense is a  
good offense.
The cornerstone of the Bush administration's approach to dealing with  
the terrorist threat was to take the battle to the enemy. But offense  
has its limits. We still aren't generating sufficiently accurate and  
timely tactical intelligence to adequately support U.S.  
counterterrorism efforts overseas. And going after terrorists abroad  
hardly means they won't manage to strike us at home. Just days before  
the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253, the United  
States collaborated with the Yemeni government on raids against al- 
Qaeda militants there. The group known as al-Qaeda of the Arabian  
Peninsula is now claiming responsibility for having equipped and  
trained Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who allegedly tried to blow up the  
flight. The group is also leveraging the raids to recruit militants  
and mount protests against Yemen's already fragile central government.

At the same time, an emphasis on offense has often come at the expense  
of investing in effective defensive measures, such as maintaining  
quality watch lists, sharing information about threats, safeguarding  
such critical assets as the nation's food and energy supplies, and  
preparing for large-scale emergencies. After authorities said  
Abdulmutallab had hidden explosives in his underwear, airline  
screeners held up flights to do stepped-up passenger pat-downs at  
boarding gates -- pat-downs that inevitably avoided passengers'  
crotches and buttocks. This kind of quick fix only tends to fuel  
public cynicism about security efforts. But if we can implement smart  
security measures ahead of time (such as requiring refineries next to  
densely populated areas to use safer chemicals when they manufacture  
high-octane gas), we won't be incapacitated when terrorists strike.  
Strengthening our national ability to withstand and rapidly recover  
from terrorism will make the United States a less appealing target. In  
combating terrorism, as in sports, success requires both a capable  
offense and a strong defense.

3. Getting better control over America's borders is essential to  
making us safer.
Our borders will never serve as a meaningful line of defense against  
terrorism. The inspectors at our ports, border crossings and airports  
have important roles when it comes to managing immigration and the  
flow of commerce, but they play only a bit part in stopping would-be  
attackers. This is because terrorist threats do not originate at our  
land borders with Mexico and Canada, nor along our 12,000 miles of  
coastline. They originate at home as well as abroad, and they exploit  
global networks such as the transportation system that moved 500  
million cargo containers through the world's ports in 2008. Moreover,  
terrorists' travel documents are often in perfect order. This was the  
case with Abdulmutallab, as well as with shoe-bomber Richard Reid in  
2001. Complaints about porous borders may play well politically, but  
they distract us from the more challenging task of forging  
international cooperation to strengthen safeguards for our global  
transportation, travel and financial systems. They also sidestep the  
disturbing fact that the number of terrorism-related cases involving  
U.S. residents reached a new high in 2009.

4. Investing in new technology is key to better security.
Not necessarily. Technology can be helpful, but too often it ends up  
being part of the problem. Placing too much reliance on sophisticated  
tools such as X-ray machines often leaves the people staffing our  
front lines consumed with monitoring and troubleshooting these  
systems. Consequently, they become more caught up in process than  
outcomes. And as soon procedures become routine, a determined bad guy  
can game them. We would do well to heed two lessons the U.S. military  
has learned from combating insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan: First,  
don't do things in rote and predictable ways, and second, don't  
alienate the people you are trying to protect. Too much of what is  
promoted as homeland security disregards these lessons. It is true  
that technology such as full-body imaging machines, which have  
received so much attention in the past week, are far more effective  
than metal detectors at screening airline passengers. But new  
technologies are also expensive, and they are no substitute for well- 
trained professionals who are empowered and rewarded for exercising  
good judgment.

5. Average citizens aren't an effective bulwark against terrorist  
attacks.
Elite pundits and policymakers routinely dismiss the ability of  
ordinary people to respond effectively when they are in harm's way.  
It's ironic that this misconception has animated much of the  
government's approach to homeland security since Sept. 11, 2001, given  
that the only successful counterterrorist action that day came from  
the passengers aboard United Airlines Flight 93. These passengers  
didn't have the help of federal air marshals. The Defense Department's  
North American Aerospace Defense Command didn't intercept the plane --  
it didn't even know the airliner had been hijacked. But by charging  
the cockpit over rural Pennsylvania, these private citizens prevented  
al-Qaeda terrorists from reaching their likely target of the U.S.  
Capitol or the White House. The government leaders whose  
constitutional duty is "to provide for the common defense" were  
defended by one thing alone -- an alert and heroic citizenry.

This misconception is particularly reckless because it ends up  
sidelining the greatest asset we have for managing the terrorism  
threat: the average people who are best positioned to detect and  
respond to terrorist activities. We have only to look to the attempted  
Christmas Day attack to validate this truth. Once again it was the  
government that fell short, not ordinary people. A concerned Nigerian  
father, not the CIA or the National Security Agency, came forward with  
crucial information. And the courageous actions of the Dutch film  
director Jasper Schuringa and other passengers and crew members aboard  
Flight 253 thwarted the attack.

Stephen Flynn is the president of the Center for National Policy and  
author of "The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation."