[Infowarrior] - U.S Cyber Command Goes Online

[Richard Forno]

U.S Cyber Command Goes Online
Posted by The Editors
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2009/10/us-cyber-command-goes-online-.html

Today, several Cyber Security experts including NSN Advisory Board  
member Richard Clarke, released the following memo on the launch of  
U.S Cyber Command, or USCYBERCOM:

Beginning today, the U.S Cyber Command, or USCYBERCOM, is supposed to  
go online. But the Pentagon has not yet revealed what the scope of  
Cyber Command’s mission will be. Even in the most basic terms, we do  
not know whom the Cyber Command will defend nor what sorts of cyber  
threats they will defend against.  For instance, in the event of a  
cyber attack on U.S. infrastructure, such as the electrical grid,  
would Cyber Command help to repel the attack? Or will the Cyber  
Command only be concerned with defending military networks from cyber  
attacks?

We do not know the answers to these critical questions and others  
because even basic information on the Cyber Command has not been  
released to the public.  These are the publicly known facts about the  
Cyber Command:

	• Cyber Command will exist as a subordinate, unified command under  
the Strategic Command.
	• The head of Cyber Command will be the Director of the NSA  
(currently Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander), who will receive a promotion  
from 3-stars to 4-stars.
Anything else about the Cyber Command, its mission, and how it will  
execute its mission is conjecture at this point for anyone not privy  
to the discussion going on behind closed doors.

Despite the veil of secrecy, the creation of Cyber Command does seem  
to signify the relevance of cyberspace as a new domain for fighting  
wars, making it at least equal in importance to land, sea, air and  
space.  The Pentagon has considered cyberspace as a domain, however,  
since at least December 2006, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of  
Staff issued a then-classified National Military Strategy for  
Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO).

Yet the NMS-CO is not quite a strategy for the use of cyberspace  
operations, but more of an appreciation for the importance of them.   
It defines cyberspace as “a domain characterized by the use of  
electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and  
exchange data via networked systems and physical infrastructures.”   
Cyberspace is thus imagined as a broad field of potential military  
action that stretches from personal desktop computers to corporate  
data systems to fighter pilots’ dashboards. Despite the obvious  
challenges of dominating every nook and node of cyberspace, the  
“strategy” speaks reverently of the importance of cyberspace to  
military operations, stating “the United States must have cyberspace  
superiority to ensure our freedom of action and deny the same to our  
adversaries.” It correctly points out that the U.S. risks parity with  
its adversaries in cyberspace if a “significant effort” is not made.

As words should be matched with deeds, grand ambitions of “cyberspace  
superiority” should be matched with a careful articulation of the  
means to achieve them.  But the document, like the creation of Cyber  
Command, only begs the question: is it smart policy for the U.S. to  
signal to the rest of the world an intent to build offensive cyber  
capabilities without establishing a coherent defensive plan detailing  
which “significant efforts” are required to secure our cyber-based  
infrastructures and assets at home? Because so many facets of our  
society, economy and military depend upon Internet technologies, the  
U.S. is one of the most vulnerable nations to cyber attack, and  
therefore an attitude that considers “good offense as the best  
defense” might not necessarily be the best defense strategy in the  
case of cyber warfare.

This is just one of the many outstanding issues that arise from the  
creation of the Cyber Command.  The following questions also need  
public discussion:

	• Do the advantages of having a cyber offensive capability outweigh  
the disadvantages of potentially initiating a cyber arms race?
	• Should the U.S., because of its vulnerabilities to cyber attack,  
initiate international negotiations on limiting the use of cyber  
weapons?
	• Should the U.S. adopt a “No First Use” policy on the use of cyber  
weapons?
	• How can the U.S. develop a credible cyber deterrence strategy?
	• Will deterrence work if our cyber capabilities are kept secret and/ 
or have not been demonstrated?
	• Under what circumstances and how would the Cyber Command work with  
the private sector in the event of a cyber attack on civilian critical  
infrastructure systems?
	• With the Director of the NSA dual-hatted as the head of Cyber  
Command, how will he balance his roles as chief of a major  
intelligence agency and the nation’s highest-ranking cyber warrior?

It was a few months ago, at the end of June, that Secretary of Defense  
Robert Gates ordered the creation of Cyber Command to oversee military  
operations in cyberspace.  In a memorandum to Pentagon officials,  
Gates said that the nation’s increasing dependence on cyberspace,  
coupled with an increase in cyber threats and vulnerabilities,  
required a new command with the technical capabilities and a clear  
mission to secure the U.S. military’s freedom of action in  
cyberspace.  He also ordered that the Cyber Command should achieve  
initial operating capability by October.  It is now the first of  
October and, though the Cyber Command will soon come online, details  
are still scarce, particularly in regards to what its mission will be.  
We are therefore justified in wondering whether this latest initiative  
from the Pentagon will indeed make us safer or only arouse suspicions  
and fear that might provoke other nations to develop cyber warfare  
capabilities.