[Infowarrior] - Paper: Quantum Crypto Network

[Richard Forno]

Received 25 March 2009
Published 2 July 2009

Abstract. In this paper, we present the quantum key distribution (QKD)  
network designed and implemented by the European project SEcure  
COmmunication based on Quantum Cryptography (SECOQC) (2004–2008),  
unifying the efforts of 41 research and industrial organizations. The  
paper summarizes the SECOQC approach to QKD networks with a focus on  
the trusted repeater paradigm. It discusses the architecture and  
functionality of the SECOQC trusted repeater prototype, which has been  
put into operation in Vienna in 2008 and publicly demonstrated in the  
framework of a SECOQC QKD conference held from October 8 to 10, 2008.  
The demonstration involved one-time pad encrypted telephone  
communication, a secure (AES encryption protected) video-conference  
with all deployed nodes and a number of rerouting experiments,  
highlighting basic mechanisms of the SECOQC network functionality.
The paper gives an overview of the eight point-to-point network links  
in the prototype and their underlying technology: three plug and play  
systems by id Quantique, a one way weak pulse system from Toshiba  
Research in the UK, a coherent one-way system by GAP Optique with the  
participation of id Quantique and the AIT Austrian Institute of  
Technology (formerly ARCNote21 ), an entangled photons system by the  
University of Vienna and the AIT, a continuous-variables system by  
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and THALES  
Research and Technology with the participation of Université Libre de  
Bruxelles, and a free space link by the Ludwig Maximillians University  
in Munich connecting two nodes situated in adjacent buildings (line of  
sight 80 m). The average link length is between 20 and 30 km, the  
longest link being 83 km.

The paper presents the architecture and functionality of the principal  
networking agent—the SECOQC node module, which enables the authentic  
classical communication required for key distillation, manages the  
generated key material, determines a communication path between any  
destinations in the network, and realizes end-to-end secure transport  
of key material between these destinations.

The paper also illustrates the operation of the network in a number of  
typical exploitation regimes and gives an initial estimate of the  
network transmission capacity, defined as the maximum amount of key  
that can be exchanged, or alternatively the amount of information that  
can be transmitted with information theoretic security, between two  
arbitrary nodes.

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http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/1367-2630/11/7/075001/njp9_7_075001.html