[Infowarrior] - The Coming Swarm

[Richard Forno]

The Coming Swarm
By JOHN ARQUILLA
Published: February 14, 2009

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/opinion/15arquilla.html

WITH three Afghan government ministries in Kabul hit by simultaneous  
suicide attacks this week, by a total of just eight terrorists, it  
seems that a new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist  
violence is emerging.

The basic concept is that hitting several targets at once, even with  
just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite  
counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away and  
organized to deal with only one crisis at a time. This approach  
certainly worked in Mumbai, India, last November, where five two-man  
teams of Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives held the city hostage for two  
days, killing 179 people. The Indian security forces, many of which  
had to be flown in from New Delhi, simply had little ability to strike  
back at more than one site at a time.

While it’s true that the assaults in Kabul seem to be echoes of  
Mumbai, the fact is that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been using  
these sorts of swarm tactics for several years. Jemaah Islamiyah — the  
group responsible for the Bali nightclub attack that killed 202 people  
in 2002 — mounted simultaneous attacks on 16 Christian churches in  
Indonesia on Christmas Eve in 2000, befuddling security forces.

Even 9/11 itself had swarm-like characteristics, as four small teams  
of Qaeda operatives simultaneously seized commercial aircraft and  
turned them into missiles, flummoxing all our defensive responses. In  
the years since, Al Qaeda has coordinated swarm attacks in Saudi  
Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen and elsewhere. And at the height of the  
insurgency in Iraq, terrorists repeatedly used swarms on targets as  
small as truck convoys and as large as whole cities.

This pattern suggests that Americans should brace for a coming swarm.  
Right now, most of our cities would be as hard-pressed as Mumbai was  
to deal with several simultaneous attacks. Our elite federal and  
military counterterrorist units would most likely find their responses  
slowed, to varying degrees, by distance and the need to clarify  
jurisdiction.

While the specifics of the federal counterterrorism strategy are  
classified, what is in the public record indicates that the plan  
contemplates having to deal with as many as three sites being  
simultaneously hit and using “overwhelming force” against the  
terrorists, which probably means mustering as many as 3,000 ground  
troops to the site. If that’s an accurate picture, it doesn’t bode  
well. We would most likely have far too few such elite units for  
dealing with a large number of small terrorist teams carrying out  
simultaneous attacks across a region or even a single city.

Nightmare possibilities include synchronized assaults on several  
shopping malls, high-rise office buildings or other places that have  
lots of people and relatively few exits. Another option would be to  
set loose half a dozen two-man sniper teams in some metropolitan area  
— you only have to recall the havoc caused by the Washington sniper in  
2002 to imagine how huge a panic a slightly larger version of that  
form of terrorism would cause.

So how are swarms to be countered? The simplest way is to create many  
more units able to respond to simultaneous, small-scale attacks and  
spread them around the country. This means jettisoning the idea of  
overwhelming force in favor of small units that are not “elite” but  
rather “good enough” to tangle with terrorist teams. In dealing with  
swarms, economizing on force is essential.

We’ve actually had a good test case in Iraq over the past two years.  
Instead of responding to insurgent attacks by sending out large  
numbers of troops from distant operating bases, the military strategy  
is now based on hundreds of smaller outposts in which 40 or 50  
American troops are permanently stationed and prepared to act swiftly  
against attackers. Indeed, their very presence in Iraqi communities is  
a big deterrent. It’s small surprise that overall violence across Iraq  
has dropped by about 80 percent in that period.

For the defense of American cities against terrorist swarms, the key  
would be to use local police officers as the first line of defense  
instead of relying on the military. The first step would be to create  
lots of small counterterrorism posts throughout urban areas instead of  
keeping police officers in large, centralized precinct houses. This is  
consistent with existing notions of community-based policing, and  
could even include an element of outreach to residents similar to that  
undertaken in the Sunni areas of Iraq — even if it were to mean taking  
the paradoxical turn of negotiating with gangs about security.

At the federal level, we should stop thinking in terms of moving  
thousands of troops across the country and instead distribute small  
response units far more widely. Cities, states and Washington should  
work out clear rules in advance for using military forces in a  
counterterrorist role, to avoid any bickering or delay during a  
crisis. Reserve and National Guard units should train and field many  
more units able to take on small teams of terrorist gunmen and  
bombers. Think of them as latter-day Minutemen.

Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen all responded to Qaeda attacks  
with similar “packetizing” initiatives involving the police and armed  
forces; and while that hasn’t eliminated swarm attacks, the terrorists  
have been far less effective and many lives have been saved.

As for Afghanistan, where the swarm has just arrived, there is still  
time to realize the merits of forming lots of small units and  
sprinkling them about in a countrywide network of outposts. As  
President Obama looks to send more troops to that war, let’s make sure  
the Pentagon does it the right way.

Yes, the swarm will be heading our way, too. We need to get smaller,  
closer and quicker. The sooner the better.

John Arquilla teaches in the special operations program at the Naval  
Postgraduate School and is the author of “Worst Enemy: The Reluctant  
Transformation of the American Military.”