[Infowarrior] - Paper: Financial Costs of the No-Fly List
Richard Forno
rforno at infowarrior.org
Tue Feb 3 20:24:42 UTC 2009
Just How Much Does That Cost, Anyway? An Analysis of the Financial
Costs and Benefits of the “No-Fly” List
Marcus Holmes
The purpose of this article is to identify the financial costs
relative to the benefits of the “no-fly” list. Numerous scholars,
security experts, lawyers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
journalists, and bloggers have commented on the well-known flaws in
the current terrorist watch list system. Lawyers have pointed out the
many civil liberty issues associated with the list and its hindrance
of due process. 1 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has
repeatedly published the many flaws it sees in the way that the list
is administrated. 2 Bruce Schneier, a popular security columnist and
blogger, documents the various reasons why the no-fly list serves no
benefit at all, providing only “security theatre” rather than actual
protection. 3 Each of these analyses is useful and contributes to an
understanding of whether or not the no-fly list is, in aggregate,
helpful in protecting citizens against terrorism, and at what social
and civil liberty cost.
What is missing, however, is an analysis of the no-fly list from a
financial perspective. This article is interested in understanding the
monetary costs of the program. As such, it seeks to answer some basic
and fundamental questions that have not yet been answered (or asked):
How much does the no-fly list cost to create and maintain? What are
the costs of the consequences, both intended and unintended, of the
list? How many resources, both governmental and private, are involved
in the operation of the list? And, what are the benefits, both
tangible (i.e. monetary) and intangible, that the list provides? This
is an important set of questions because without understanding the
monetary costs of a protection program relative to the benefits, it is
difficult to assess whether or not the program is worth the costs.
Further, without such an understanding it is impossible to
intelligently decide how anti-terror money should be allocated. It is
surprising that, given the importance of these questions, they have
not been asked and addressed in a systematic fashion.
Consequently this article represents a “first take” at addressing
these questions by assessing the financial costs of the no-fly list
program. It does not, however, seek to serve as a comprehensive answer
to the question of “is the no-fly list worth the money we are putting
into it?” The reason is that one cannot begin to conduct such an
analysis without aggregating the costs and benefits first and then
placing the no-fly list in context of the other anti-terror programs
and their associated costs. The no-fly list might very well be worth
the expense if it is the government’s only tool in preventing
terrorist attacks. It might also be the case that the list is less
valuable given redundancy in the “layered security” model of securing
air travel. These are important questions and ones that can only be
addressed after having identified the financial costs and benefits of
the program. Thus this article should be viewed as the first step in
what will hopefully become a systematic and comprehensive approach to
understanding whether or not the no-fly list provides added value in
the context of the government’s anti-terrorism campaign.
As will be analyzed below, it is estimated that the costs of the no-
fly list, since 2002, range from approximately $300 million (a
conservative estimate) to $966 million (an estimate on the high end).
Using those figures as low and high potentials, a reasonable estimate
is that the U.S. government has spent over $500 million on the project
since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Using annual data,
this article suggests that the list costs taxpayers somewhere between
$50 million and $161 million a year, with a reasonable compromise of
those figures at approximately $100 million. Clearly the no-fly list
is a program that is not without substantial cost. It represents, at
least financially, a large part of the government’s protection of air
travel. 4 In order to begin to analyze whether or not the benefits are
worth the costs, both must be identified and analyzed. It is that task
to which the article will now turn.
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http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=5.1.6
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