[Infowarrior] - DHS IG gets IED components past screeners

[Richard Forno]

(c/o DS)

http://hstoday.us/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2579&Itemid=149

DHS IG Gets Past Screeners With IED Components

by Anthony L. Kimery
Thursday, 27 March 2008

/*Growing strain on screeners feared could cause bomb materials to be
overlooked*/

Last week the Department of Homeland Security¹s Office of Inspector
General (OIG) released the unclassified summary
<http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_08-25_Feb08.pdf> of its
latest audit of covert testing of airport screeners¹ ability to detect
IEDs and IED components in both carry-on and checked baggage. OIG
undercover personnel conducted unannounced, clandestine testing at eight
domestic airports between late May 2007 through August 2007.

Meanwhile, questions have been raised by intelligence authorities and
lawmakers about whether high screener turn-over and some screeners at
congested airports having been told to speed up the screening process
have contributed to some of the problems DHS¹s OIG discovered.

There¹s no way to independently scrutinize the impact of these concerns
though because the OIG¹s report is classified. The summary assures,
however, that the IG¹s conclusions about ³the strengths and weaknesses
of the Transportation Security Administration¹s [TSA] procedures,
equipment, and supervision to ensure that Transportation Security
Officers are able to prevent threat items from being introduced into the
sterile areas and checked baggage systems of the nation¹s airports² have
been discussed with senior DHS officials ³and appropriate congressional
committees.²

DHS¹s OIG also is not divulging ³the number of tests conducted, the
names of the airports tested,² or ³the quantitative and qualitative
results of our testing² ­ all that also has been classified.

Clearly, though, problems were found. DHS¹s OIG stated that ³as a result
of our testing, we made six recommendations to TSA, which concurred with
all of them.²

In contrast, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in November
disclosed 
<http://hstoday.us/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=30&Itemid=150>
that its covert testers were able to sneak liquid bomb-making components
past screeners in carry-on luggage 19 times in 2007. In 2006, they were
able to get past screeners 21 times with incendiary devices and bomb
detonators that could have ³caused not insignificant explosions.²

Indeed. The two senior GAO officials involved in the testing told
lawmakers the liquid bomb and other explosives components they were able
to carry on board passenger jets could have been assembled in as little
as ten minutes. And if successfully detonated, they could have
potentially caused a ³catastrophic² explosion.

³Our tests clearly demonstrate that a terrorist group, using publicly
available information and few resources, could cause severe damage to an
airplane and threaten the safety of passengers by bringing prohibited
IED and IID components through security checkpoints,² GAO said
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0848t.pdf>.

That both GAO and DHS IG undercover testers succeeded in getting
prohibited explosive materials past screeners proved that gaps in
security existed.

³Given our degree of success, we are confident that our investigators
would have been able to evade transportation security officers at
additional airports had we decided to test them,² GAO stated.

³We understand the challenges TSA faces in balancing security risks with
the efficient movement of passengers; however, from a strict security
standpoint, current policies allowing substantial carry-on luggage and
related items through TSA checkpoints increases the risk of a terrorist
successfully bringing an IED, an IID, or both onto an aircraft
undetected,² GAO concluded. ³Even if current carry-on luggage policies
are left unchanged, our testing shows that risks can be reduced through
improvements in human capital, improved processes, and continued
advances in technology.²

GAO briefed TSA officials on August 16, 2007, and September 5, 2007, to
discuss its findings.

³TSA officials indicated that they did not disagree with our suggestions
in principle and that they would examine them closely to determine
whether and how they should be implemented,² GAO reported, adding, ³they
acknowledged vulnerabilities in human capital, processes, and technology.²

Similarly, DHS¹s OIG said in its February report that TSA didn¹t
substantively disagree with its findings, either, and that as a
consequence TSA ³is enhancing the effectiveness of screening by
expanding the unpredictability of screening measures.²

³When fully implemented,² DHS¹s IG said, its ³recommendations will
improve an already strong passenger and checked baggage screening process.²

Still, some intelligence and security officials and members of Congress
are concerned that the high rate of turn-over among TSA¹s screener
workforce and the consequent burden it sometimes puts on short-handed
airports to quickly move passengers through the screening process is
causing short-cuts to be taken and inexperienced new screeners to miss
things veteran screeners have learned to identify and look for.

A /USA Today/ investigation last month found that the turnover among
airport security screeners is among the worst in the federal workforce
despite a $100 million effort to improve salaries and work duties.

One in five screeners left between Oct. 1, 2006, and Sept. 30, 2007,
federal Office of Personnel Management figures revealed. The turnover
rate was the same for the previous same 12-month period. Attrition for
the rest of the federal government was eight percent in 2006-07.

³Twenty percent [turnover] is pretty high,² said former DHS Inspector
General Clark Kent Ervin. ³You want people who are as sharp and
experienced as possible, and that¹s why it¹s a concern.²

Airport screening checkpoints are ³chronically short-handed,² Rebecca
O¹Bryan told /USA Today/. O¹Bryan quit her full-time screener job at San
Jose International Airport in January. ³You¹ve got these inexperienced
people who are really slow using the equipment. It slows everything
down,² she said.

But it¹s clearly been a problem for some time. Three years ago
HSToday.us reported that screeners at airports across the country said
during interviews they were having to work longer hours and extra shifts
because of understaffing, and were sometimes called to work on days off
because of the lack of manpower to meet workloads.

(Also see the HSToday.us report, ³/Reasons for TSA Understaffing,
Strains on Screeners Outlined in Report/
<http://hstoday.us/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=38&Itemid=150>²
) 


In more recent interviews with screeners around the nation, they said
increased security measures have put a strain on the existing workforce,
including having to cut short scheduled breaks because of staffing
problems.

Similarly, a screener at Atlanta's Hartsfield-Jackson International
Airport, one of the busiest in the nation and an international hub,
earlier told /USA Today/ that ³If there's a long line Š [managers]
cancel breaks.²

The New Jersey /Star-Ledger/ reported
<http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/base/news-13/1204004801205390.xml&
coll=1> 
in late February that ³security screeners and supervisors at Newark
Liberty International Airport are being pressured to move as many as 200
passengers through checkpoint lanes every hour to minimize wait times,
according to security officials at the airport.²

The 200 passengers-per-hour goal has never been widely publicized,
although TSA acknowledged it, and it has surprised some aviation
security experts who assert 18 seconds of screening simply isn¹t enough
time ­ either for the screeners watching the x-ray machines or the
Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Behavior Detection
Officers (BDOs) who may be questioning flyers looking for hints of
deception and dishonesty.

At major international hubs like Los Angeles and JFK airports, evidence
indicates delayed flights into the US have especially put strains on
screeners trying to process long lines of passengers arriving in the US
who must go through TSA security before catching their domestic-bound
connecting flights.

Upon returning from France last summer on a delayed flight to JFK, I
encountered a TSA screening checkpoint where screeners were scrambling
to process passengers through only two screening lanes because two of
the normally four lanes were shut down because of ³technical problems²
and manpower shortages, several screeners confided. The screeners on
hand when I arrived were visibly tired, stressed, and obviously taking
well-reasoned shortcuts ­ they allowed me through with prohibited
quantities of liquids, just as they did my traveling companion.

According to the /Atlanta Journal-Constitution/, screeners at
Hartsfield-Jackson told it the pressure to shorten lines had resulted in
missing some of the training mandated by TSA. Screeners said they were
threatened with disciplinary action or dismissal if they didn¹t sign a
form each week stating they had received the training. Rather than the
stipulated three hours a week, some screeners say their training has
been reduced to minutes.

TSA officials have dismissed most such allegations, some of which are
the subject of on-going investigations by the DHS IG¹s office.

In an effort to help ease gridlock at security checkpoints at Boston¹s
Logan International Airport's Terminal A, TSA has established
<http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2008/03/19/logan_lanes_pave_way_for
_shorter_waits/>multiple
³self-select lanes.² There¹s a "families and special assistance,"
"expert," and ³casual" lane.

The Diamond Lane Self Select Program
<http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/saltlake_lanes.shtm> debuted last
month in Salt Lake City and Denver. Last week it was rolled out at in
Spokane, Washington and Orlando.