[Infowarrior] - RAND: Terror Effort Is Not a 'War'

[Richard Forno]

Strategy Against Al-Qaeda Faulted
Report Says Effort Is Not a 'War'
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 30, 2008; A04

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/29/AR2008072902041_pf.html

The Bush administration's terrorism-fighting strategy has not  
significantly undermined al-Qaeda's capabilities, according to a major  
new study that argues the struggle against terrorism is better waged  
by law enforcement agencies than by armies.

The study by the nonpartisan Rand Corp. also contends that the  
administration committed a fundamental error in portraying the  
conflict with al-Qaeda as a "war on terrorism." The phrase falsely  
suggests that there can be a battlefield solution to terrorism, and  
symbolically conveys warrior status on terrorists, it said.

"Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy  
warriors," authors Seth Jones and Martin Libicki write in "How  
Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda," a 200-page  
volume released yesterday.

But the authors contend that al-Qaeda has sabotaged itself by creating  
ever greater numbers of enemies while not broadening its base of  
support. "Al-Qaeda's probability of success in actually overthrowing  
any government is close to zero," the report states.

The study was based in part on an analysis of more than 600 terrorist  
movements tracked over decades by Rand and the Memorial Institute for  
the Prevention of Terrorism. Jones and Libicki sought to determine why  
such movements ultimately die out, and how lessons from recent history  
can be applied to the current struggle against al-Qaeda.

The researchers found that more than 40 percent of terrorist movements  
fade away when their political objectives are met -- but that this  
outcome occurs only when groups are secular and have narrow goals. By  
contrast, al-Qaeda's religious and political agenda calls for nothing  
less than the overthrow of secular Arab governments and the  
establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

A roughly equal number of terrorist groups die when their key leaders  
are arrested or killed. In the vast majority of instances, this is  
accomplished by local law enforcement, the study notes.

"In most cases, military force isn't the best instrument," said Jones,  
a terrorism expert and the report's lead author.

Addressing the U.S. campaign against al-Qaeda, the study noted  
successes in disrupting terrorist financing, but said the group  
remains a formidable foe. Al-Qaeda is "strong and competent," and has  
succeeded in carrying out more violent attacks since Sept. 11, 2001,  
than in all of its previous history. Moreover, its organizational  
structure has adapted and evolved over time, "making it a more  
dangerous enemy," Jones and Libicki wrote.

The authors call for a strategy that includes a greater reliance on  
law enforcement and intelligence agencies in disrupting the group's  
networks and in arresting its leaders. They say that when military  
forces are needed, the emphasis should be on local troops, which  
understand the terrain and culture and tend to have greater legitimacy.

In Muslim countries in particular, there should be a "light U.S.  
military footprint or none at all," the report contends.

"The U.S. military can play a critical role in building indigenous  
capacity," it said, "but should generally resist being drawn into  
combat operations in Muslim societies, since its presence is likely to  
increase terrorist recruitment."