[Infowarrior] - Cross an Al Qaeda boss? Get a nasty memo

[Richard Forno]

Penalty for crossing an Al Qaeda boss? A nasty memo

http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-fg-qaedaculture16apr16,1,2
897775.story


In two pages mixing flowery religious terms with itemized complaints, the
Egyptian boss accused the militant of misappropriating cash, a car, sick
leave, research papers and an air conditioner during "an austerity
situation" for the network. He demanded a detailed letter of explanation.

"I was very upset by what you did," Atef wrote. "I obtained 75,000 rupees
for you and your family's trip to Egypt. I learned that you did not submit
the voucher to the accountant, and that you made reservations for 40,000
rupees and kept the remainder claiming you have a right to do so. . . . Also
with respect to the air-conditioning unit, . . . furniture used by brothers
in Al Qaeda is not considered private property. . . . I would like to remind
you and myself of the punishment for any violation."

The memo by Atef, who later died in the U.S.-led assault on Osama bin
Laden's Afghan refuge in 2001, is among recently declassified documents that
reveal a little-known side of the network. Although Al Qaeda has endured
thanks to a loose and flexible structure, its internal culture has
nonetheless been surprisingly bureaucratic and persistently fractious,
investigators and experts say.

The documents were captured in Afghanistan and Iraq and date from the early
1990s to the present. They depict an organization obsessed with paperwork
and penny-pinching and afflicted with a damaging propensity for feuds.

"The picture of internal strife that emerges from the documents highlights
not only Al Qaeda's past failures but also -- and more importantly -- it
offers insight into its present weaknesses," concludes a study of the
documents issued in September by the Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point. "Al Qaeda today is beset by challenges that surfaced in leadership
disputes at the beginning of the organization's history."

In the years after 2001, anti-terrorism officials worked to understand a foe
that defied a Western mind-set. In contrast to state-sponsored extremist
groups, Al Qaeda was a decentralized alliance of networks. Recruits in
Afghanistan had access to Bin Laden and other bosses. Operatives were often
given great autonomy.

But the egalitarian veneer coexisted with the bureaucratic mentality of the
chiefs, mostly Egyptians with experience in the military and highly
structured extremist groups.

"They may have imposed the blindingly obdurate nature of Egyptian
bureaucracy," said a senior British anti-terrorism official who asked to
remain anonymous for security reasons. "You see that in the retirement
packages they offered, the lists of members in Iraq, the insecure attitude
about their membership, the rifts among leaders and factions."

Like newly arrived fighters in Iraq today, recruits in the 1990s filled out
applications that were kept in meticulous rosters. The shaggy,
battle-scarred holy warriors of Afghanistan were micromanagers. They
scrupulously documented logistical details -- one memo accounts for a
mislaid Kalashnikov rifle and 125 rounds of ammunition. They groused and
nagged about money.

In a brief letter from the late 1990s, a militant wished Atef "Peace and
God's mercy and blessings" and "praise to the Lord and salvation to his
prophet." Then he got down to business: "I have not received my salary in
three months and I am six months behind in paying my rent. . . . You also
told me to remind you, and this is a reminder."

A stern Egyptian bean-counter set the austere policies. Mustafa Ahmed Al
Yahzid, a 52-year-old trained as an accountant, ran the network's finance
committee between 1995 and 2007, said Rohan Gunaratna, author of "Inside Al
Qaeda."

"He is known as being a very stringent administrator, who keeps tight
control of Al Qaeda's finances," Gunaratna said.

Committees and titles proliferated. And for years, schisms pitted Bin
Laden's inner circle against factions who saw him as a chaotic commander
prone to military miscalculation. They also faulted him and his deputies for
disdain toward non-Arabs, a persistent point of conflict, according to the
West Point study.

Dissent was loud. Two influential Syrians scolded Bin Laden "like a
disobedient child" in an e-mail in 1999, the study says. They urged him to
end tensions with Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief.

"I think our brother [Bin Laden] has caught the disease of screens, flashes,
fans and applause," the Syrians wrote. "You should apologize for any
inconvenience or pressure you have caused."

The documents also suggest a vexing struggle to retain operational control
in recent years.

Iraq is the best example. The rise of Al Qaeda in Iraq under Abu Musab
Zarqawi attracted new fighters and funds. But the fiery Jordanian had kept
his distance even when he ran his own Afghan training camp. As he gained the
spotlight in Iraq, he feuded with the core leadership in Pakistan, who
worried that his onslaught of bombings and beheadings would backfire.

Their efforts to rein in Zarqawi are documented by a letter from a Libyan
chief known only as Atiyah. U.S. troops found the 13-page letter in the safe
house where an airstrike killed Zarqawi in 2006. Atiyah sounds like a sage
veteran alternately chiding and praising a rookie hothead as he urges
Zarqawi to mend fences with Bin Laden and refrain from indiscriminate
violence.

"My dear brother, today you are a man of the public," Atiyah wrote from
Pakistan on July 9, 2005. "Your actions, decisions and behavior result in
gains and losses that are not yours alone, but rather they are for Islam."

As predicted, Zarqawi's rampage had weakened Al Qaeda in Iraq by the time he
died. In the aftermath, the leadership in Pakistan lost a chief who was
captured en route to Iraq on a mission to take charge there.

Atiyah's advice describing the fall of Algerian Islamic movements a decade
ago remains relevant, experts said.

"They destroyed themselves with their own hands," Atiyah wrote to Zarqawi.
"Their enemy did not defeat them, but rather they defeated themselves."

rotella at latimes.com