[Infowarrior] - 9/11 + 6: Is the U.S. Ready to Get Serious About Terrorism?

[Richard Forno]

Are we safer today?

Six Years After 9/11 and Three Years After the 9/11 Report, Is the U.S.
Ready to Get Serious About Terrorism?

Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton are the former chairman and vice chairman
of the 9/11 commission.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/07/AR2007090702
050_pf.html

Sunday, September 9, 2007; B01

Are we safer today?

Two years ago, we and our colleagues issued a report card assessing the U.S.
government's progress on the bipartisan recommendations in the 9/11
commission report. We concluded that the nation was not safe enough. Our
judgment remains the same today: We still lack a sense of urgency in the
face of grave danger.

The U.S. homeland confronts a "persistent and evolving terrorist threat,"
especially from al-Qaeda, according to a National Intelligence Estimate
issued in July. Six years after the attacks, following a series of ambitious
reforms carried out by dedicated officials, how is it possible that the
threat remains so dire?

The answer stems from a mixed record of reform, a lack of focus and a
resilient foe. Progress at home -- in our ability to detect, prevent and
respond to terrorist attacks -- has been difficult, incomplete and slow, but
it has been real. Outside our borders, however, the threat of failure looms.
We face a rising tide of radicalization and rage in the Muslim world -- a
trend to which our own actions have contributed. The enduring threat is not
Osama bin Laden but young Muslims with no jobs and no hope, who are angry
with their own governments and increasingly see the United States as an
enemy of Islam.

Four years ago, then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld famously asked his
advisers: "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more
terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are
recruiting, training and deploying against us?"

The answer is no.

U.S. foreign policy has not stemmed the rising tide of extremism in the
Muslim world. In July 2004, the 9/11 commission recommended putting foreign
policy at the center of our counterterrorism efforts. Instead, we have lost
ground.

Our report warned that it was imperative to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries.
But inside Pakistan, al-Qaeda "has protected or regenerated key elements of
its homeland attack capability," according to the National Intelligence
Estimate. The chief threat to Afghanistan's young democracy comes from
across the Pakistani border, from the resurgent Taliban. Pakistan should
take the lead in closing Taliban camps and rooting out al-Qaeda. But the
United States must act if Pakistan will not.

We are also failing in the struggle of ideas. We have not been persuasive in
enlisting the energy and sympathy of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims against
the extremist threat. That is not because of who we are: Polling data
consistently show strong support in the Muslim world for American values,
including our political system and respect for human rights, liberty and
equality. Rather, U.S. policy choices have undermined support.

No word is more poisonous to the reputation of the United States than
Guantanamo. Fundamental justice requires a fair legal process before the
U.S. government detains people for significant periods of time, and the
president and Congress have not provided one. Guantanamo Bay should be
closed now. The 9/11 commission recommended developing a "coalition
approach" for the detention and treatment of terrorists -- a policy that
would be legally sustainable, internationally viable and far better for U.S.
credibility.

Moreover, no question inflames public opinion in the Muslim world more than
the Arab-Israeli dispute. To empower Muslim moderates, we must take away the
extremists' most potent grievance: the charge that the United States does
not care about the Palestinians. A vigorous diplomatic effort, with the
visible, active support of the president, would bolster America's prestige
and influence -- and offer the best prospect for Israel's long-term
security.

And finally, no conflict drains more time, attention, blood, treasure and
support from our worldwide counterterrorism efforts than the war in Iraq. It
has become a powerful recruiting and training tool for al-Qaeda.

Beyond all our problems in the Muslim world, we must not neglect the most
dangerous threat of all. The 9/11 commission urged a "maximum effort" to
prevent the nightmare scenario: a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists.
The recent National Intelligence Estimate says that al-Qaeda will continue
to try to acquire weapons of mass destruction and that it would not hesitate
to use them. But our response to the threat of nuclear terrorism has been
lip service and little action. The fiscal 2008 budget request for programs
to control nuclear warheads, materials and expertise is a 15 percent real
cut from the levels two years ago. We are in dire need of leadership,
resources and sustained diplomacy to secure the world's loose nuclear
materials. President Bush needs to knock heads and force action.

Military power is essential to our security, but if the only tool is a
hammer, pretty soon every problem looks like a nail. We must use all the
tools of U.S. power -- including foreign aid, educational assistance and
vigorous public diplomacy that emphasizes scholarship, libraries and
exchange programs -- to shape a Middle East and a Muslim world that are less
hostile to our interests and values. America's long-term security relies on
being viewed not as a threat but as a source of opportunity and hope.

At home, the situation is less dire, but progress has been limited.

Some badly needed structures have been built. In 2004, Congress created a
director of national intelligence to unify the efforts of the 16 agencies
that make up the U.S. intelligence community. The new DNI, Mike McConnell,
must now take charge and become the dynamic, bold leader the commission
envisioned, rather than just another bureaucratic layer. He has recognized
the importance of sharing intelligence, of moving from a culture based on
the "need to know" to one based on the need to share, as we recommended in
our report. But he is still struggling to gain control of budgets and
personnel. No DNI will be able to make reform last without significant time
in the job and strong support from the president.

Congress also created the National Counterterrorism Center, where CIA
analysts, FBI agents and other experts from across the government sit side
by side and share intelligence continuously. This is a clear improvement
over the pre-9/11 way of doing business, but those inside the center still
face restrictions on what they can share with their home agency -- a
disturbing echo of failed practices. State and local officials also complain
that they are not getting the information they need.

In 2004, George J. Tenet, then the director of central intelligence,
testified that it would take five years to fix the CIA. Three years later,
we have seen signs of progress, but it is not fixed yet. Flush with
resources, the CIA is investing heavily in training intelligence analysts
and improving its ability to collect information on terrorist targets,
particularly by agents on the ground. Disappointingly, despite recruitment
drives, only 8 percent of the CIA's new hires have the ethnic backgrounds
and language skills most needed for counterterrorism.

A wider problem is that, because of intelligence failures (notably involving
Iraq and 9/11) and controversial policies (notably about abuse and
interrogation), the public lacks confidence in the CIA. That is not good for
the agency or the country. We recognize that intelligence agencies must keep
many secrets, but more candor and openness are the only ways to win
sustained public support for the reforms we still need.

The FBI, the agency responsible for domestic intelligence, also has much
more to do. The number of bureau intelligence analysts has more than doubled
since 9/11 (to about 2,100), but they are still second-class citizens in the
FBI's law-enforcement culture. Modern 21st-century information systems are
not yet in place, and top positions are turning over too often. Six years
after 9/11, the FBI's essential unit on weapons of mass destruction is just
beginning its work.

When it comes to transportation security -- the failure so basic to 9/11 --
we have seen some successes. For example, the Terrorist Screening Center has
a football-field-size room filled with a giant electronic board and dozens
of experts who track the flight manifests of 2,500 international flights
arriving in the United States each day. But the prescreening of passengers
is still left to the airlines, which lack access to complete watch lists of
suspected terrorists. Congress mandated national standards for secure
driver's licenses but has not given states the money to make it happen.
Moreover, technological improvement has been far too slow. A pilot program
of high-tech explosive-detecting "puffer devices" at airports is of doubtful
effectiveness and has been delayed indefinitely. Advanced baggage-screening
systems will not be in place until 2024. That timeline may work for our
grandchildren, but it won't work for us.

Nor will the pace of efforts to prepare the country to respond to future
attacks. Congress passed a better formula for distributing federal
homeland-security grants to the states on the basis of risk and
vulnerability, rather than pork and politics. But the new law still allows
the broadcast industry until February 2009 to hand over the prime slice of
the broadcast spectrum that police and firefighters need to beam radio
messages through concrete and steel. Disaster could well strike before then.

We also lack a legal framework for fighting terrorism without sacrificing
civil liberties. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board created in
response to our recommendations has been missing in action. The board has
raised no objections to wiretaps without warrants and to troubling detention
and interrogation practices. It even let the White House edit its annual
report. Now strengthened by a new law, the board must become a firm public
voice in support of civil liberties.

Finally, there's the question of Congress. Three years ago, we said that
strengthening congressional oversight of counterterrorism was among the most
difficult and important of our recommendations. Congressional oversight of
homeland security and intelligence must be robust and effective. It is not.
Three years ago, the 9/11 commission noted that the Department of Homeland
Security reported to 88 congressional committees and subcommittees -- a
major drain on senior management and a source of contradictory guidance.
After halfhearted reforms followed by steps backward, that number is now 86.

Those are just the main items on our list of concerns. Six years later, we
are safer in a narrow sense: We have not been attacked, and our defenses are
better. But we have become distracted and complacent. We call on the
presidential candidates to spell out how they would organize their
administrations and act urgently to address the threat. And we call on
ordinary citizens to demand more leadership from our elected
representatives. The terrible losses our country suffered on 9/11 should
have catalyzed efforts to create an America that is safer, stronger and
wiser. We still have a long way to go.

Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton are the former chairman and vice chairman
of the 9/11 commission.