[Infowarrior] - The Rise of Low-Tech Terrorism

[Richard Forno]

The Rise of Low-Tech Terrorism

By Daniel L. Byman
Sunday, May 6, 2007; Page B03

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/04/AR2007050402
550.html

The movies were an affront to God, encouraging vice and Western-style
decadence. So in August 1978, four Shiite revolutionaries locked the doors
of the Cinema Rex in the Iranian city of Abadan and set the theater on fire.
The firefighters were late, and nearby hydrants did not work. The victims'
shrieks could be heard while firefighters and police stood outside, watching
helplessly. At least 377 people -- perhaps many more -- were burned alive.

Never heard of the Cinema Rex fire? You're not alone. But the tragedy is
more than an obscure, grisly memory from the run-up to the 1979 Iranian
Revolution. It's also the second-deadliest terrorist attack in modern
history -- deadlier even than airline bombings such as Pan Am Flight 103 --
and one that offers many lessons about the changing threat of terrorism
today.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, most Americans have worried about what terrorism
experts call "spectaculars": massive, ingenious and above all theatrical
extravaganzas such as al-Qaeda's attack on the twin towers, its simultaneous
1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and its brazen
2000 suicide-boat assault on the USS Cole in Yemen. But perhaps we should be
more worried about the Cinema Rex attack.

Although Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants still dream of spectaculars, a
quick glance at the terrorist acts committed since 9/11 suggests that
perpetrators are going low-tech, too. As the survivors of attacks in London,
Madrid and the Russian town of Beslan will confirm, such tried-and-true
terrorism methods as low-tech bombs, hostage-taking and arson have
tremendous appeal to jihadists. Indeed, the State Department's annual survey
on terrorism, released last week, notes that "in 2006 most attacks were
perpetrated by terrorists applying conventional fighting methods that
included using bombs and weapons, such as small arms."

While the United States and other countries have devoted lots of attention
to bracing themselves for the big one, we've spent far too little time
considering what we can learn from more mundane -- and more repeatable --
terrorist attacks that can inflict mass casualties.

A look at the various suspects arrested in recent years for crimes linked to
radical Islamic terrorism in the United States suggests that the immediate
threat we face is angry amateurs, not poised, professional killers such as
Mohamed Atta, the leader of al-Qaeda's 9/11 team. Most of those arrested do
appear to have meant Americans harm, whether by conducting attacks on their
own or by raising money for other would-be killers. But these plots were
rarely well-developed, and the operators were at best enthusiastic novices.

Consider the case of one of the few Americans actually convicted of
terrorism since 9/11: Iyman Faris, an Ohio truck driver and naturalized U.S.
citizen born in Kashmir who pleaded guilty in 2003, plotted to destroy the
Brooklyn Bridge by severing its cables with blowtorches. Scary, sure -- but
a completely absurd way to destroy the bridge, whose many cables are more
than a foot in diameter.

These homegrown terrorists don't necessarily share the zeal and anonymity of
a seasoned professional such as Atta. Many of those arrested on terrorism
charges have a prison record and thus are known to law enforcement
officials.

One of the most advanced post-9/11 plots, against the Israeli consulate in
Los Angeles and U.S. military facilities in the area, involved four former
inmates who began their plotting while behind bars. Former prisoners rarely
make ideal comrades; many would sell their own mother for a small reward.

But it's a mistake to write off the angry amateurs. They're not terribly
skilled, but it doesn't take that much skill to kill dozens of people -- as
the shootings at Virginia Tech so tragically demonstrate. Attacks such as
the Cinema Rex fire are easily repeated, and they don't take the years of
onerous training and planning that spectaculars demand.

So how can we stop low-tech terrorism? Unfortunately, better defenses can
solve only part of the problem. We should defend the White House, nuclear
plants and other high-profile targets that would tempt terrorists to stage a
spectacular. But we can't defend every movie theater, synagogue, local
government building or shopping mall without spending hundreds of billions
of dollars and turning the United States into an armed camp.

That leaves offense -- at home as well as abroad. The FBI has tried to
penetrate cells of would-be terrorists, often opening itself to criticism
for spending enormous resources on disrupting what seems to be a bunch of
bungling blowhards. The bureau should keep at it. Of course, sometimes a
ballyhooed terrorism arrest will look foolish when the media reveal the
plotters' amateurish plans and backgrounds. But aggressive law enforcement
can help prevent these amateurs from becoming something more deadly.

Perhaps the best way to fight low-tech terrorists is through community
support. For instance, the FBI began to focus on the "Lackawanna Six," who
pleaded guilty in 2003 to providing material support to al-Qaeda, after
receiving an anonymous letter from a member of the Yemeni community in
Lackawanna, N.Y., near Buffalo. But to get these sorts of tips, Arab
Americans and Muslim Americans need to see the police as protectors, not
persecutors.

In this respect, Europe provides a cautionary tale. Governments there,
particularly France's, have spent more time trying to shake down their
Muslim communities for intelligence than they've spent reassuring and
integrating them. The result? An angry, unassimilated Muslim minority whose
fringes produce terrorists while its mainstream often resists police efforts
to find them. The U.S. government has a fine line to walk here, too. But
when in doubt, we should jettison intrusive measures in favor of those
likely to win sustained support from Muslim Americans.

Finally, the government needs to talk coolly and calmly to the American
people. Complete protection against arson, shootings and low-level bombings
is impossible. Americans will have to accept a certain amount of risk in
their daily lives, recognizing that effective government policies can reduce
the threat but not eliminate it. Public opinion is the fulcrum of
counterterrorism. Terrorists -- high-tech and low-tech alike -- rely on
overreaction from a rattled public and government to do their dirty work. We
shouldn't indulge them.