[Infowarrior] - Gadfly zeroes in on Oracle bugs

Tue Mar 6 17:10:16 EST 2007

CNET News.com    http://www.news.com/
Gadfly zeroes in on Oracle bugs

By Joris Evers
http://news.com.com/Gadfly+zeroes+in+on+Oracle+bugs/2008-1002_3-6164785.html

Story last modified Tue Mar 06 11:52:47 PST 2007

ARLINGTON, Va.--Don't even try to tell David Litchfield that Oracle is
unbreakable.

Litchfield, a noted bug hunter, has made it his mission to tell the world
that database software is insecure--Oracle's database software in
particular. Litchfield has been vocal in his criticism of Oracle, even
calling for the resignation of Oracle Chief Security Officer Mary Ann
Davidson.

For too long, Oracle and its customers have stuck their heads in the sand
when it comes to security, according to Litchfield. And Oracle has taken the
wrong approach to address mounting security concerns, he argues.

Litchfield, co-founder of Next Generation Security Software in the U.K., is
on a crusade. In January he published The Oracle Hacker's Handbook. The
book, according to its cover, offers readers a complete arsenal to assess
and defend Oracle systems.

While dissing Oracle, Litchfield is cheerleading for Microsoft. He has
publicly stated that SQL Server 2005, the latest version of Microsoft's
database software, is secure. This must hurt at Oracle, a Microsoft arch
rival, which has already seen a significant piece of the database market go
to the Redmond, Wash.-based software giant.

When not hunting for bugs, Litchfield likes to go out with his two
greyhounds, and he helps charities find homes for other canines. In fact, he
is so passionate about his dogs that he dedicated The Oracle Hacker's
Handbook to his wife and two girls, the girls being his greyhounds.

At last week's Black Hat DC event, Litchfield discussed a new attack
technique that increases the severity of certain vulnerabilities in Oracle's
database software. He sat down with CNET News.com at the event to explain
why such disclosures are necessary.

Q: Why are you into database security? There's so much other software out
there.
Litchfield: Because that's where the crown jewels are for any organization.
Every organization on this planet has a database and that's where the
lifeblood of that organization exists. Where better to secure it than at the
source. We can secure it at the perimeter, but with vulnerabilities like SQL
injection, that security is completely undone.
My relationship has gotten slightly better with Oracle and they understand
that it's not so much a battle of wills.

Despite having a firewall, despite having the Web server locked down, an SQL
injection flaw in your Web app takes us all the way through to the back end
of the database server. If that database is not using the principle of least
privilege or is not fully patched, then we can gain full access to the
database server and suck out all your data. The database has to be secured.
The problem is that nobody has ever really dealt with the back end until
recently. It has always been about securing the perimeter.

Lately you have especially been looking closely at Oracle's databases. Is
there a specific reason that you're looking at Oracle more than Microsoft or
IBM?
Litchfield: Yes. SQL Server 2005 is secure. (Microsoft has) solved the
problem. Oracle is in the process of solving that problem. IBM, I have
looked at DB2 and Informix and sent them a bunch of bugs, probably about 50,
ranging from buffer overflows to privilege escalation issues. But IBM's
security response was mature. In the most recent past, the Oracle security
response was not so mature. They have been combative, as opposed to: "This
guy is just trying to make our products more secure." But it is getting
better. Oracle is beginning to understand that we're fighting on the same
side, just from different perspectives.

When a vendor like Oracle becomes more combative, you become more combative
as well?
Litchfield: I will. It is unfortunate that it happens that way, but if you
have to defend yourself, then you should defend yourself. I would rather be
working, like I do with Microsoft and IBM, with their security response
team. We've got good relationships with Microsoft and IBM. What better way
to get things done than have a good relationship, as opposed to sniping at
each other from the gutter.

My relationship has gotten slightly better with Oracle, and they understand
that it's not so much a battle of wills. I'm trying to make them aware of
these problems in their database because it affects me indirectly. If
someone breaks into that database server and steals my information, then I'm
paying for it, not Oracle.

Some might think that it's some sort of an extortion game that's being
played.
Litchfield: I've never asked Oracle for money. If people think that, they
are ill-informed.

And Microsoft doesn't pay you to say SQL Server 2005 is secure.
Litchfield: I'm not being paid by Microsoft to say they're secure, and if
anyone is going find a bug in SQL Server 2005, it better be me. It would
undermine my ability to be able to say in the future that a product is
secure if bugs are found by anyone else. So, if there are bugs in SQL Server
2005, I hope I'm the one who finds them, and I'm looking.

What's the business of NGS Software?
Litchfield: There are three sides to the business. We sell tools to help
assess your state of vulnerability and whether you're compliant with
Sarbanes-Oxley, etc. We consult to a number of organizations, and we also do
vulnerability research and sell that research.

What types of organizations are your typical research customers?
Litchfield: Government organizations, those who are responsible for critical
national infrastructure and the protection thereof. We try to give them
advance warning of security problems. We can tell them that there's a flaw
in a particular product, along with a risk mitigation strategy. Even in the
absence of a vendor-supplied patch, these systems will be protected.
Security through ignorance really doesn't work because one person's
ignorance is someone else's revenue stream.

NGS has been growing over the past years. Where is the demand?
Litchfield: It's mostly in consultancy, which is a bit of a shame because I
set out to build a software company and we're more of a consultancy. That's
one of my personal failures though and I've not given up. We will be a
software company at some stage.

What does a typical consultant do?
Litchfield: He might do penetration tests, code reviews or threat modeling.
It is not installing firewalls; our consultants do the high-end stuff.

What is it that drives you to get up and do your job every day?
Litchfield: Well, I'm good at it, and if you're good at something, you've
got more drive to do. If I was a good painter, I would paint more, you know.
But since I am crap, I don't bother doing that. I enjoy the work.

Particularly the bug hunting part of it?
Litchfield: Yes, it's just a question of analysis. If I were trying to
subvert the system, how would I do it? The other reason is that it has an
effect on everyone's lives. Now, it's not like I'm curing cancer, but I know
that one database server tomorrow is going to be more secure because of
something I did, and that means that, for example, more credit card numbers
are safe that day.

If people at Oracle say that you actually hurt security because of the
disclosure of vulnerabilities, what do you say?
Litchfield: They have a case. In certain cases it does raise the risk level,
OK, and that's one of the major problems with this kind of work. However, in
raising the risk level, people are more inclined to protect their systems.

Now, as an example of this, I just put out that new attack method that
allows an attacker without any special privileges to exploit flaws that were
thought to be only exploitable by people with higher privileges. Now we know
that that's not true, people have no reason to say they are not going to
patch.

Someone has, within day zero of me posting my new method, modified their
exploits and posted them publicly to use my new methods. Those exploits now
can be run by anyone. So, yes it has increased the risk.

Back in August 2002, I presented some code that was then taken to form the
basis of SQL Slammer. There was that initial raising of risk, but after that
short-term pain, there are now more patched SQL Servers out there than there
ever were before. The short-term risk has been raised for the long-term
benefit, that's the way I look at it.

If people like you weren't around, some might say we wouldn't know of any
security risks and nobody would be exploiting them either. You don't think
that's true?
Litchfield: I don't think that's true. There are always going to be bad guys
out there. If there aren't good guys working with the vendors to close these
holes, then we'll be walking around with our head in the clouds thinking
we're all secure when we're not. Security through ignorance really doesn't
work because one person's ignorance is someone else's revenue stream.

What makes you pull your hair out?
Litchfield: When people say things like I'm increasing risk or doing it for
selfish reasons. I'm not like that. But I can't always be the popular guy. I
just wish there were fewer detractors.

You published The Oracle Hacker's Handbook recently. What do you hope to
achieve with the book?
Litchfield: The Oracle security world is smug basically, and I'm trying to
take that security blanket away from them. There are too many people out
there who think that the Oracle product is secure and that they don't need
to be doing anything. That's irresponsible, as far as I'm concerned.

What would you like people to know you for?
Litchfield: I would like to be the person who helped convince people that
database security is important to look at. I would like to think that it's
through my work, and obviously that of some of my peers in the industry,
that we've helped shape the way security is dealt with at places like Oracle
and Microsoft.