[Infowarrior] - Nuclear agency: Air defenses impractical

[Richard Forno]

Nuclear agency: Air defenses impractical
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070130/ap_on_go_ot/reactor_security;_ylt=AiCBz4
hqtx1pResnTW.S4X6s0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTA2Z2szazkxBHNlYwN0bQ--
By H. JOSEF HEBERT, Associated Press Writer 44 minutes ago

WASHINGTON - Making nuclear power plants crash-proof to an airliner attack
by terrorists is impracticable and it's up to the military to avert such an
assault, the government said Monday.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in a revised security policy, directed
nuclear plant operators to focus on preventing radiation from escaping in
case of such an attack and to improve evacuation plans to protect public
health and safety.

"The active protection against airborne threats is addressed by other
federal organizations, including the military," the NRC said in a statement.

The agency rejected calls by some nuclear watchdog groups that the
government establish firm no-fly zones near reactors or that plant operators
build "lattice-like" barriers to protect reactors, or be required to have
anti-aircraft weapons on site to shoot down an incoming plane.

The NRC, in a summary of the mostly secret security plan, said such
proposals were examined, but that it was concluded the "active protection"
against an airborne threat rests with organizations such as the military or
the
Federal Aviation Administration.

It said that various mitigation strategies required of plant operators ‹
such as radiation protection measures and evacuation plans ‹ "are sufficient
to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety" in case of an
airborne attack.

The commission unanimously approved the plan, which has been the subject of
internal discussions for 15 months, in a 5-0 vote at a brief meeting without
discussion.

"Nuclear power plants are inherently robust structures that our studies show
provide adequate protection in a hypothetical attack by an airplane," NRC
Chairman Dale Klein said in a statement, adding that plant operators already
must be able to manage large fires or explosions, no matter the cause.

Klein called the new rule "only one piece" of an effort to enhance reactor
security and said the NRC will continue to examine and discuss the issue of
airborne threats and take additional actions if found to be necessary.

The defense plan, formally known as the Design Basis Threat, spells out what
type of attack force the government believes might target a commercial power
reactor and what its operator must be capable of defending against.

While details are sketchy because of security concerns, the plan requires
defense against a relatively small force, perhaps no more than a half-dozen
attackers, but that they could come from multiple directions including by
water and could include suicide teams.

The plan, which formally approves many of the procedures that have long been
in place, reflects the increased concerns raised by the Sept. 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. It also includes measures to address cyber attacks,
according to the NRC.

Some members of Congress and nuclear watchdog groups have argued that the
requirements fall short of what is needed, given what was learned by the
Sept. 11 attacks on the twin towers in New York and at the
Pentagon.

These critics have argued that defenders of a reactor should be ready to
face up to 19 attackers ‹ as was the case on Sept. 11 ‹ and expect them to
have rocket-propelled grenades, so-called "platter" explosive charges and
.50-caliber armor-piercing ammunition.

The NRC does not assume such weapons being used and rejected the idea of a
19-member attack force, maintaining that the Sept. 11 attacks actually were
four separate attacks, each by four or five terrorists.

Sen. Barbara Boxer (news, bio, voting record), D-Calif., said that NRC
appears not to have followed the direction of Congress "to ensure that our
nuclear power plants are protected from air- or land-based terrorist
threats" of the magnitude demonstrated on Sept. 11.

The NRC "has missed an opportunity to provide the public with a real
solution to the nuclear reactor security problem," said Rep. Edward Markey
(news, bio, voting record), D-Mass., a frequent critic of the nuclear
industry and the NRC.

Daniel Hirsch, president of the Community to Bridge the Gap, a
California-based nuclear watchdog group that had urged the NRC to require
physical barriers to keep planes from hitting reactors, called the security
measures "irresponsible to the extreme."

"Rather than upgrading protections, (the NRC plan) merely codifies the
status quo, reaffirming the existing, woefully inadequate security measures
already in place at the nation's reactors," said Hirsch.

NRC officials have emphasized that the defense plan should require what is
"reasonable" to be expected of a civilian security force at the 103
commercial nuclear power reactors.

In an unclassified summary of the DBT, the NRC maintains that studies
"confirm the low likelihood" that an aircraft crashing into a reactor will
damage the reactor core and release radioactivity, affecting public health
and safety.

"Even in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to a terrorist use
of a large aircraft against a nuclear power plant, the studies indicate that
there would be time to implement the required onsite mitigating actions,"
says the summary.

___

On the Net:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: http://www.nrc.gov

Nuclear Energy Institute: http://www.nei.org