[Infowarrior] - Schneier: "Clear" Registered Traveller Program

[Richard Forno]

"Clear" Registered Traveller Program
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/clear_registere.html

CLEAR, a private service that prescreens travelers for a $100 annual fee,
has come to Kennedy International Airport. To benefit from the Clear
Registered Traveler program, which is run by Verified Identity Pass, a
person must fill out an application, let the service capture his
fingerprints and iris pattern and present two forms of identification. If
the traveler passes a federal background check, he will be given a card that
allows him to pass quickly through airport security.

Sounds great, but it¹s actually two ideas rolled into one: one clever and
one very stupid.

The clever idea is allowing people to pay for better service. Clear has been
in operation at the Orlando International Airport since July 2005, and
members have passed through security checkpoints faster simply because they
are segregated from less experienced fliers who don¹t know the drill.

Now, at Kennedy and other airports, Clear is purchasing and installing
federally approved technology that will further speed up the screening
process: scanners that will eliminate the need for cardholders to remove
their shoes, and explosives detection machines that will eliminate the need
for them to remove their coats and jackets. There are also Clear employees
at the checkpoints who, although they can¹t screen cardholders, can guide
members through the security process. Clear has not yet paid airports for an
extra security lane or the Transportation Security Administration for extra
screening personnel, but both of those enhancements are on the table if
enough people sign up.

I fly more than 200,000 miles per year and would gladly pay $100 a year to
get through airport security faster.

But the stupid idea is the background check. When first conceived, traveler
programs focused on prescreening. Pre-approved travelers would pass through
security checkpoints with less screening, and resources would be focused on
everyone else. Sounds reasonable, but it would leave us all less safe.

Background checks are based on the dangerous myth that we can somehow pick
terrorists out of a crowd if we could identify everyone. Unfortunately,
there isn¹t any terrorist profile that prescreening can uncover. Timothy
McVeigh could probably have gotten one of these cards. So could have Eric
Rudolph, the pipe bomber at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. There isn¹t
even a good list of known terrorists to check people against; the government
list used by the airlines has been the butt of jokes for years.

And have we forgotten how prevalent identity theft is these days? If you
think having a criminal impersonating you to your bank is bad, wait until
they start impersonating you to the Transportation Security Administration.

The truth is that whenever you create two paths through security -- a
high-security path and a low-security path -- you have to assume that the
bad guys will find a way to exploit the low-security path. It may be
counterintuitive, but we are all safer if the people chosen for more
thorough screening are truly random and not based on an error-filled
database or a cursory background check.

I think of Clear as a $100 service that tells terrorists if the F.B.I. is on
to them or not. Why in the world would we provide terrorists with this
ability?

We don¹t have to. Clear cardholders are not scrutinized less when they go
through checkpoints, they¹re scrutinized more efficiently. So why not get
rid of the background checks altogether? We should all be able to walk into
the airport, pay $10, and use the Clear lanes when it¹s worth it to us.

This essay originally appeared in The New York Times.

I've already written about trusted traveller programs, and have also written
about Verified Identity Card, Inc., the company that runs Clear. Note that
these two essays were from 2004. This is the Clear website, and this is the
website for Verified Identity Pass, Inc.