[Infowarrior] - Matt Blaze on architecture and airport security

Richard Forno rforno at infowarrior.org
Fri Jan 12 10:04:18 EST 2007


Blog link: http://www.crypto.com/blog/airport_architecture/

TSA manual link: 
http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/airport_security_design_guidelines.pdf


Architecture and airport security

Please try to compose yourself

I saw an interesting story (thanks to Dave Farber's Interesting-People list)
on how the TSA is considering selling advertising space at airport security
checkpoints. My distaste at the prospect of being subjected to ads during
these already humiliating and irritating screenings aside, I found the most
fascinating part of this article to be its glimpse at the officious
technical jargon that has emerged for airport security paraphernalia. Those
grey tubs that you put your laptop in (after removing it from its case, of
course) are apparently properly called "divestiture bins"; after X-ray, we
retrieve our items at the "composure tables". I don't know about you, but I
don't usually feel especially composed after making it through a long
security line.

I'd say you can't make this stuff up, but apparently someone does.

Newly armed with the official terminology, I did a bit of googling this
morning and found the TSA's Airport Security Design guidelines. This 333
page (PDF format) manual specifies, in all the detail one could ever hope
for, everything there is to know about designing the security infrastructure
for an airport, right down to the layout of the divest tables for the X-ray
ingress points at sterile concourse station SSCPs. It's all very meticulous
and complete, even warning of the "potential for added delay while the
passenger divests or composes" (page 99). For some geeky reason, I find all
this mind-numbing detail about the physical architecture of security to make
strangely compelling reading, and I can't help but look for loopholes and
vulnerabilities as I skim through it.

Somehow, for all the attention to minutiae in the guidelines, everything
ends up just slightly wrong by the time it gets put together at an airport.
Even if we accept some form of passenger screening as a necessary evil these
days, today's checkpoints seem like case studies in basic usability failure
designed to inflict maximum frustration on everyone involved. The tables
aren't quite at the right height to smoothly enter the X-ray machines, bins
slide off the edges of tables, there's never enough space or seating for
putting shoes back on as you leave the screening area, basic instructions
have to be yelled across crowded hallways. According to the TSA's manual,
there are four models of standard approved X-ray machines, from two
different manufacturers. All four have sightly different heights, and all
are different from the heights of the standard approved tables. Do the
people setting this stuff up ever actually fly? And if they can't even get
something as simple as the furniture right, how confident should we be in
the less visible but more critical parts of the system that we don't see
every time we fly?




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