[Infowarrior] - READ: The Airport Security Follies

[Richard Forno]

This is by far one of the best assessments of the joke known as commercial
aviation security I've read in a long time.  It's written by a career
commercial airline pilot, which makes it more relevant and
insightful.....even if it doesn't say anything that the few of us
"reality-based" security analysts don't already know, realize, or have tried
to preach since 9/11.

--rf

December 28, 2007,  6:52 pm
The Airport Security Follies

By Patrick Smith

http://jetlagged.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/28/the-airport-security-follies/


Six years after the terrorist attacks of 2001, airport security remains a
theater of the absurd. The changes put in place following the September 11th
catastrophe have been drastic, and largely of two kinds: those practical and
effective, and those irrational, wasteful and pointless.

The first variety have taken place almost entirely behind the scenes.
Explosives scanning for checked luggage, for instance, was long overdue and
is perhaps the most welcome addition. Unfortunately, at concourse
checkpoints all across America, the madness of passenger screening continues
in plain view. It began with pat-downs and the senseless confiscation of
pointy objects. Then came the mandatory shoe removal, followed in the summer
of 2006 by the prohibition of liquids and gels. We can only imagine what is
next.

To understand what makes these measures so absurd, we first need to revisit
the morning of September 11th, and grasp exactly what it was the 19
hijackers so easily took advantage of. Conventional wisdom says the
terrorists exploited a weakness in airport security by smuggling aboard
box-cutters. What they actually exploited was a weakness in our mindset ‹ a
set of presumptions based on the decades-long track record of hijackings.

In years past, a takeover meant hostage negotiations and standoffs; crews
were trained in the concept of ³passive resistance.² All of that changed
forever the instant American Airlines Flight 11 collided with the north
tower. What weapons the 19 men possessed mattered little; the success of
their plan relied fundamentally on the element of surprise. And in this
respect, their scheme was all but guaranteed not to fail.

For several reasons ‹ particularly the awareness of passengers and crew ‹
just the opposite is true today. Any hijacker would face a planeload of
angry and frightened people ready to fight back. Say what you want of
terrorists, they cannot afford to waste time and resources on schemes with a
high probability of failure. And thus the September 11th template is all but
useless to potential hijackers.

No matter that a deadly sharp can be fashioned from virtually anything found
on a plane, be it a broken wine bottle or a snapped-off length of plastic,
we are content wasting billions of taxpayer dollars and untold hours of
labor in a delusional attempt to thwart an attack that has already happened,
asked to queue for absurd lengths of time, subject to embarrassing pat-downs
and loss of our belongings.

The folly is much the same with respect to the liquids and gels
restrictions, introduced two summers ago following the breakup of a
London-based cabal that was planning to blow up jetliners using liquid
explosives. Allegations surrounding the conspiracy were revealed to
substantially embellished. In an August, 2006 article in the New York Times,
British officials admitted that public statements made following the arrests
were overcooked, inaccurate and ³unfortunate.² The plot¹s leaders were still
in the process of recruiting and radicalizing would-be bombers. They lacked
passports, airline tickets and, most critical of all, they had been
unsuccessful in actually producing liquid explosives. Investigators later
described the widely parroted report that up to ten U.S airliners had been
targeted as ³speculative² and ³exaggerated.²

Among first to express serious skepticism about the bombers¹ readiness was
Thomas C. Greene, whose essay in The Register explored the extreme
difficulty of mixing and deploying the types of binary explosives
purportedly to be used. Green conferred with Professor Jimmie C. Oxley, an
explosives specialist who has closely studied the type of deadly cocktail
coveted by the London plotters.

³The notion that deadly explosives can be cooked up in an airplane lavatory
is pure fiction,² Greene told me during an interview. ³A handy gimmick for
action movies and shows like Œ24.¹ The reality proves disappointing: it¹s
rather awkward to do chemistry in an airplane toilet. Nevertheless, our
official protectors and deciders respond to such notions instinctively,
because they¹re familiar to us: we¹ve all seen scenarios on television and
in the cinema. This, incredibly, is why you can no longer carry a bottle of
water onto a plane.²

The threat of liquid explosives does exist, but it cannot be readily brewed
from the kinds of liquids we have devoted most of our resources to keeping
away from planes. Certain benign liquids, when combined under highly
specific conditions, are indeed dangerous. However, creating those
conditions poses enormous challenges for a saboteur.

³I would not hesitate to allow that liquid explosives can pose a danger,²
Greene added, recalling Ramzi Yousef¹s 1994 detonation of a small
nitroglycerine bomb aboard Philippine Airlines Flight 434. The explosion was
a test run for the so-called ³Project Bojinka,² an Al Qaeda scheme to
simultaneously destroy a dozen widebody airliners over the Pacific Ocean.
³But the idea that confiscating someone¹s toothpaste is going to keep us
safe is too ridiculous to entertain.²

Yet that¹s exactly what we¹ve been doing. The three-ounce container rule is
silly enough ‹ after all, what¹s to stop somebody from carrying several
small bottles each full of the same substance ‹ but consider for a moment
the hypocrisy of T.S.A.¹s confiscation policy. At every concourse checkpoint
you¹ll see a bin or barrel brimming with contraband containers taken from
passengers for having exceeded the volume limit. Now, the assumption has to
be that the materials in those containers are potentially hazardous. If not,
why were they seized in the first place? But if so, why are they dumped
unceremoniously into the trash? They are not quarantined or handed over to
the bomb squad; they are simply thrown away. The agency seems to be saying
that it knows these things are harmless. But it¹s going to steal them
anyway, and either you accept it or you don¹t fly.

But of all the contradictions and self-defeating measures T.S.A. has come up
with, possibly none is more blatantly ludicrous than the policy decreeing
that pilots and flight attendants undergo the same x-ray and metal detector
screening as passengers. What makes it ludicrous is that tens of thousands
of other airport workers, from baggage loaders and fuelers to cabin cleaners
and maintenance personnel, are subject only to occasional random screenings
when they come to work.

These are individuals with full access to aircraft, inside and out. Some are
airline employees, though a high percentage are contract staff belonging to
outside companies. The fact that crew members, many of whom are former
military fliers, and all of whom endured rigorous background checks prior to
being hired, are required to take out their laptops and surrender their
hobby knives, while a caterer or cabin cleaner sidesteps the entire process
and walks onto a plane unimpeded, nullifies almost everything our T.S.A.
minders have said and done since September 11th, 2001. If there is a more
ringing let-me-get-this-straight scenario anywhere in the realm of airport
security, I¹d like to hear it.

I¹m not suggesting that the rules be tightened for non-crew members so much
as relaxed for all accredited workers. Which perhaps urges us to reconsider
the entire purpose of airport security:

The truth is, regardless of how many pointy tools and shampoo bottles we
confiscate, there shall remain an unlimited number of ways to smuggle
dangerous items onto a plane. The precise shape, form and substance of those
items is irrelevant. We are not fighting materials, we are fighting the
imagination and cleverness of the would-be saboteur.

Thus, what most people fail to grasp is that the nuts and bolts of keeping
terrorists away from planes is not really the job of airport security at
all. Rather, it¹s the job of government agencies and law enforcement. It¹s
not very glamorous, but the grunt work of hunting down terrorists takes
place far off stage, relying on the diligent work of cops, spies and
intelligence officers. Air crimes need to be stopped at the planning stages.
By the time a terrorist gets to the airport, chances are it¹s too late.

In the end, I¹m not sure which is more troubling, the inanity of the
existing regulations, or the average American¹s acceptance of them and
willingness to be humiliated. These wasteful and tedious protocols have
solidified into what appears to be indefinite policy, with little or no
opposition. There ought to be a tide of protest rising up against this
mania. Where is it? At its loudest, the voice of the traveling public is one
of grumbled resignation. The op-ed pages are silent, the pundits have
nothing meaningful to say.

The airlines, for their part, are in something of a bind. The willingness of
our carriers to allow flying to become an increasingly unpleasant experience
suggests a business sense of masochistic capitulation. On the other hand,
imagine the outrage among security zealots should airlines be caught
lobbying for what is perceived to be a dangerous abrogation of security and
responsibility ‹ even if it¹s not. Carriers caught plenty of flack, almost
all of it unfair, in the aftermath of September 11th. Understandably, they
no longer want that liability.

As for Americans themselves, I suppose that it¹s less than realistic to
expect street protests or airport sit-ins from citizen fliers, and maybe we
shouldn¹t expect too much from a press and media that have had no trouble
letting countless other injustices slip to the wayside. And rather than
rethink our policies, the best we¹ve come up with is a way to skirt them ‹
for a fee, naturally ‹ via schemes like Registered Traveler. Americans can
now pay to have their personal information put on file just to avoid the
hassle of airport security. As cynical as George Orwell ever was, I doubt he
imagined the idea of citizens offering up money for their own subjugation.

How we got to this point is an interesting study in reactionary politics,
fear-mongering and a disconcerting willingness of the American public to
accept almost anything in the name of ³security.² Conned and frightened, our
nation demands not actual security, but security spectacle. And although a
reasonable percentage of passengers, along with most security experts, would
concur such theater serves no useful purpose, there has been surprisingly
little outrage. In that regard, maybe we¹ve gotten exactly the system we
deserve.