[Infowarrior] - Former DHS IG OpEd on TSA Screeners

[Richard Forno]

Screening Dreams

By Clark Kent Ervin

http://jetlagged.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/screening-dreams/

If you are someone who suspects that what is billed as ³aviation security²
is often more show than substance, you are not alone. In fact, you are part
of what Nixon aides used to call the ³silent majority.² The security
bureaucracy seems to think that as long as it is seen as doing something,
and so long as another terror attack does not occur, the public will at
least feel secure enough not to insist that it do whatever needs to be done
actually to make us secure.

Any number of examples could be cited to support this proposition, but let¹s
focus first on the foiled plot in the summer of 2006 to blow up several
jetliners over the United States with liquid explosives. Because no
technology had been developed to detect or thwart liquid explosives, the
Transportation Security Administration was forced to take, for a time, the
draconian step of banning all liquids and gels. We were told at the time
that even liquids and gels that are harmless in and of themselves could
become incendiary when combined in sufficient quantity.

Predictably, a hue and cry ensued from the general public and the travel
industry. And, then, without yet developing any effective
counter-technology, the T.S.A. relaxed the ban somewhat. Small quantities of
liquids and gels can now be brought through security, provided they are
sealed in clear plastic bags. And any quantity of liquids and gels can be
purchased at airport vendors past checkpoints.

So, if even small quantities of harmless liquids and gels can become harmful
when combined in the right way and quantity, why should passengers be
allowed to bring any amount past checkpoints? Couldn¹t two or more
terrorists conspire among themselves to bring collectively the requisite
amount to make a bomb?

And, why should passengers be able to fly with unlimited quantities of
liquids and gels purchased from airport vendors past checkpoints? Liquids
and gels sold by these restaurants and shops aren¹t analyzed for their
explosive potential.

And, yet, the T.S.A. can say that it¹s done something; the ³something² done
doesn¹t unduly inconvenience the traveler or crimp the economy; and there¹s
no hell to pay because no terrorist has yet exploited this loophole to pull
off another attack.

Likewise, the agency can say that it screens every passenger and every
checked bag for guns, knives and bombs. But, unless you¹ve been living for
the last few years in a cave that is much more remote and much less
technologically sophisticated than Osama bin Laden¹s, you know that
government investigation after government investigation has shown that it is
just as easy today to sneak deadly weapons past screeners as it was on 9/11.
Just a few weeks ago the T.S.A. was defending itself against the latest such
report ‹ one from the Government Accountability Office ‹ finding screeners
at 19 airports around the country to be inept. (The G.A.O. added that it
would likely have found similarly dismal results at other airports.)

At least the T.S.A.¹s defense was audacious, laughably so: the agency chief,
Kip Hawley, more or less told Congress that poor results were to be expected
because undercover tests nowadays are much more sophisticated than they were
before 9/11. In other words, it¹s a good thing that screeners are
consistently failing these tests because otherwise the tests wouldn¹t be
much of a test.

The problem with this, of course, is that terrorists (at least the ones we
have to worry most about ‹ the hardened Al Qaeda types) are sophisticated.
When they test for holes in our security, they, too, will do their very best
to think of inventive and clever ways to conceal deadly weapons. Who cares
if screeners can spot obvious weapons when terrorists are likely to be more
like post-9/11 inspectors than pre-9/11 ones in their sophistication?

And, then there¹s the old T.S.A. argument that, after all, there are
multiple (19, to be more precise) layers of security. If screeners fail to
catch terrorists¹ weapons at the checkpoints, there are 18 more
opportunities to foil their plots.

But, at the risk of mixing metaphors, security layers as a whole constitute
a chain that is only as strong as its weakest link. The screener link in
this chain is very weak, indeed. And, as links go, this is arguably the most
important one. Barring the occasional exception, the only time that
passengers and their carry-ons are screened for weapons is at the
checkpoint. At the gate, only one¹s boarding pass is checked. So screeners
are the last line of defense before would-be terrorists can board airplanes
with guns, knives and bombs.

If ignorance is bliss, let those of who believe T.S.A. press releases be
happy. And if it is better to be lucky than good, TSA, so far at least, has
it made.