[Infowarrior] - When "full disclosure" equals collusion, users are in danger

Richard Forno rforno at infowarrior.org
Sat Sep 30 16:34:32 EDT 2006


Title            When "full disclosure" equals collusion, users are in
danger
Date            2006.09.30 4:01
Author            Joe Barr
Topic            
http://software.newsforge.com/article.pl?sid=06/09/26/1828244

Gone are the days when "full disclosure" meant the immediate public release
of information about vulnerabilities or exploits uncovered by security
researchers. Whatever it means today is the result of a collaboration --
some might call it collusion -- between the researcher or firm finding the
flaw and the vendor or project responsible for the code. Recent patches from
Apple illustrate the dangers of this practice when proprietary software is
involved.

Last week, Apple announced three security patches for its wireless component
across virtually its entire platform line.

The first patch (CVE-2006-3507) is for two stack overflow vulnerabilities in
Airport, Apple's wireless driver. The second patch (CVE-2006-3508) fixes a
heap buffer overflow in Airport. The third patch (CVE-2006-3509) addresses
an integer overflow in Airport code which handles third-party wireless card
connections. All are ranked as "high" severity in the National Vulnerability
Database.

According to Apple, there are no known exploits for any of these
vulnerabilities. Of course, this is the same firm that denied its customers
were at risk from wireless vulnerabilities last month.

One bad Apple spoils the barrel

The problem is that Apple's claims that there are no known exploits are
false. Not only have exploits been found, they've been demonstrated,
explained, and widely publicized. They first surfaced at least as early as
June, when presentations were booked to demonstrate them. They are, after
all, the heart and soul of the "faux disclosure" controversy surrounding
Maynor and Ellch's presentation at Black Hat and DEFCON last month.

Nowadays, a vendor or project is typically told about a flaw privately, and
given time to fix it before any public disclosure is made. Whether or not
this new arrangement is better than the old practice of making a flaw public
as soon as possible, and setting aside any debate about who it is allegedly
better for, the vendor or their customers, it requires that both parties to
the agreement bring a minimum amount of integrity to the table in order for
it to work as designed. In theory, users are offered the optimum level of
security when a company does not make their exposure more widely known until
a patch is ready to close the hole.

But when a vendor deliberately silences one side of the "collaboration"
process through legal threats -- as Ellch hinted strongly that they did in
an email to a security mailing list on September 3 and Washington Post
writer Brian Krebs reported immediately following the Black Hat presentation
-- that impose an involuntary "cone of silence" over the researchers, and at
the same time issues public lies about the affair, the whole shoddy
collaboration falls apart like a house of cards, and the users get the worst
of both ends of the stick.

In the Washington Post story linked to above where Apple denied the
vulnerabilities, Krebs wrote, "Apple today issued a statement strongly
refuting claims put forth by researchers at SecureWorks that Apple's Macbook
computer contains a wireless-security flaw that could let attackers hijack
the machines remotely." The NIST site claims all three patches are for
"locally exploitable" vulnerabilities. It may be that Apple is playing on
the definition of remote versus local exploit its claims.

According to Donnie Werner of Zone-H.Org, all three patches are to close the
door on remote, not local, exploits. He explained that local exploits
usually require the rights of a local user of the machine being attacked,
which is definitely not the case with these.

The good news is that if you're using free/open source software, you're
largely immune not only to the vulnerabilities with a lifespan as long as
these, but to the depraved indifference of proprietary firms which value
their ad campaigns above the security of their customers. The transparency
of open source software makes the denial game impossible and long delays
inexcusable.

Links

   1. "announced three security patches" -
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=304420
   2. "CVE-2006-3507" - http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2006-3507
   3. "CVE-2006-3508" - http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2006-3508
   4. "CVE-2006-3509" - http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2006-3509
   5. "denied" - 
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/08/update_on_the_apple_macbo
ok_cl.html
   6. "Maynor and Ellch's presentation" -
http://software.newsforge.com/article.pl?sid=06/08/08/1351256&tid=78
   7. "email" - 
http://lists.immunitysec.com/pipermail/dailydave/2006-September/003459.html
   8. "reported" - 
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/08/followup_to_macbook_post.
html
   9. "Zone-H.Org" - http://www.zone-h.org/

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