[Infowarrior] - Schneier: Renew your passports now to avoid RFID headaches

Richard Forno rforno at infowarrior.org
Sat Sep 16 23:37:22 EDT 2006


The ID Chip You Don't Want in Your Passport

By Bruce Schneier
Saturday, September 16, 2006; A21
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/15/AR2006091500
923_pf.html

If you have a passport, now is the time to renew it -- even if it's not set
to expire anytime soon. If you don't have a passport and think you might
need one, now is the time to get it. In many countries, including the United
States, passports will soon be equipped with RFID chips. And you don't want
one of these chips in your passport.

RFID stands for "radio-frequency identification." Passports with RFID chips
store an electronic copy of the passport information: your name, a digitized
picture, etc. And in the future, the chip might store fingerprints or
digital visas from various countries.

By itself, this is no problem. But RFID chips don't have to be plugged in to
a reader to operate. Like the chips used for automatic toll collection on
roads or automatic fare collection on subways, these chips operate via
proximity. The risk to you is the possibility of surreptitious access: Your
passport information might be read without your knowledge or consent by a
government trying to track your movements, a criminal trying to steal your
identity or someone just curious about your citizenship.

At first the State Department belittled those risks, but in response to
criticism from experts it has implemented some security features. Passports
will come with a shielded cover, making it much harder to read the chip when
the passport is closed. And there are now access-control and encryption
mechanisms, making it much harder for an unauthorized reader to collect,
understand and alter the data.

Although those measures help, they don't go far enough. The shielding does
no good when the passport is open. Travel abroad and you'll notice how often
you have to show your passport: at hotels, banks, Internet cafes. Anyone
intent on harvesting passport data could set up a reader at one of those
places. And although the State Department insists that the chip can be read
only by a reader that is inches away, the chips have been read from many
feet away.

The other security mechanisms are also vulnerable, and several security
researchers have already discovered flaws. One found that he could identify
individual chips via unique characteristics of the radio transmissions.
Another successfully cloned a chip. The State Department called this a
"meaningless stunt," pointing out that the researcher could not read or
change the data. But the researcher spent only two weeks trying; the
security of your passport has to be strong enough to last 10 years.

This is perhaps the greatest risk. The security mechanisms on your passport
chip have to last the lifetime of your passport. It is as ridiculous to
think that passport security will remain secure for that long as it would be
to think that you won't see another security update for Microsoft Windows in
that time. Improvements in antenna technology will certainly increase the
distance at which they can be read and might even allow unauthorized readers
to penetrate the shielding.

Whatever happens, if you have a passport with an RFID chip, you're stuck.
Although popping your passport in the microwave will disable the chip, the
shielding will cause all kinds of sparking. And although the United States
has said that a nonworking chip will not invalidate a passport, it is
unclear if one with a deliberately damaged chip will be honored.

The Colorado passport office is already issuing RFID passports, and the
State Department expects all U.S. passport offices to be doing so by the end
of the year. Many other countries are in the process of changing over. So
get a passport before it's too late. With your new passport you can wait
another 10 years for an RFID passport, when the technology will be more
mature, when we will have a better understanding of the security risks and
when there will be other technologies we can use to cut the risks. You don't
want to be a guinea pig on this one.

Bruce Schneier writes often on security subjects.
© 2006 The Washington Post Company





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