[Dataloss] fringe: Researchers: Disk Encryption Not Secure

[Evan Francen]

Do you think it would be possible to patch encryption products with
routines to wipe the memory address(es) where the key is stored at
specific times (i.e. on lock, hibernate, sleep, and shutdown)?


On 2/21/08, Roy M. Silvernail <roy at rant-central.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 04:34:09PM -0500, Rory Wasserman wrote:
>  > Roy,
>  >
>  > I agree with what you are saying, however if a portable hardware device is
>  > used for multifactor authentication and the key is stored in a secure place
>  > on the device, off of the hard drive, then this type of attack would be
>  > futile.
>
>
> I think you still misunderstand the threat model.  The threat is not
>  against authentication.  That has already been done and the
>  target machine is in a running state (though perhaps waiting at a
>  screensaver password).  In this state, the fully-encrypted disc is
>  mounted and decrypting for its proper user.  That means the FDE key
>  *must* be in core somewhere, so that the disc drivers can use it to
>  encrypt and decrypt the data as it is used.
>
>  And once Mallory has the FDE key, he don' need no steenkin'
>  authentication.  He grabs an image of the disc and trots off to decrypt
>  at leisure.
>
> --
>  Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
>    "A desperate disease requires a dangerous remedy."
>                    - Guy Fawkes
>             http://www.rant-central.com
>
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-- 
Evan Francen, CISSP CCNP MCSE
email: evan.francen at gmail.com