-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - --ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT-- - ---EXTERNAL RELEASE---EXTERNAL RELEASE---EXTERNAL RELEASE---EXTERNAL RELEASE--- ======= ============ ====== ====== ======= ============== ======= ======= === === ==== ====== ====== === =========== ======= ======= === =========== === ======= === === === ==== === ===== === ======= ============== ===== === ===== ======= ============ ===== = ===== EMERGENCY RESPONSE SERVICE SECURITY VULNERABILITY ALERT 05 March 1996 14:00 GMT Number: ERS-SVA-C01-1996:001.2 =============================================================================== UPDATE TO ERS-SVA-C01-1996:001.1 This Security Vulnerability Alert provides updated information about the UNIX "sendmail" vulnerability described in ERS-SVA-C01-1996:001.1, which was released on 16 January 1996. As you will recall, ERS-SVA-C01-1996:001.1 described a vulnerability in the SMTP "EXPN" and "VRFY" commands offered by all versions of "sendmail". The original alert provided three ways to work around the problem, and indicated that as vendors released their fixes for the problem, we would issue updates to the advisory. This is the first of those updates. The vulnerabilities described in the original alert are caused by a more basic problem in the syslog(3) subroutine. This routine uses an internal buffer to build messages that it then sends to the syslogd(8) daemon for logging. As it is building the message, the syslog() routine does not check the bounds of the internal buffer, making it possible to overflow the buffer and rewrite the program's subroutine call stack. This makes it possible to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the original program that called syslog(). The information below concerns vendor fixes for the sendmail "EXPN" and "VRFY" vulnerabilities as well as the syslog(3) vulnerability (which, as described above, is the core of the problem). Note that sendmail patches do not address the syslog() vulnerability. Other programs that call syslog are still vulnerable. After vendor patches are installed, it is necessary to rebuild executables that are statically linked. As more information becomes available, IBM-ERS will continue to issue updates to this advisory. =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT SENDMAIL FROM ERIC ALLMAN Sendmail version 8.7.3 is not vulnerable. This version is available from ftp://ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail The current (as of this writing) version of sendmail is 8.7.4. =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT BSDI UNIX FROM BERKELEY SOFTWARE DESIGN, INC. Users of BSD/OS V2.0 and V2.0.1 by Berkeley Software Design, Inc. should install patch U201-001 which works for both versions. The patch is available to all BSDI customers in: ftp://ftp.bsdi.com:bsdi/patches/ =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT CONVEXOS AND SPPUX FROM CONVEX COMPUTER CORP. Vulnerable: ConvexOS (all releases) SPPUX (all releases) A patch is being developed to address this vulnerability in currently supported releases as detailed below. Contact the Convex Technical Assistance Center 1-800-952-0379 to obtain information and patches. There are no known automated attack programs in existence for Convex or SPP architectures. Development of such a program would require access to such a machine, as well as detailed knowledge of the architecture. However, the only completely secure work-around at this time would be to disable sendmail (known to have been successfully attacked on other architectures), as well as other daemons which can potentially log user-supplied strings. Note that the user-supplied strings do not have to actually be routed by syslogd in order for this vulnerability to occur. At this time we do not have a canonical list of affected software; sendmail is the only known-vulnerable agent. It should also be noted that Convex machines make use of a "SPU" workstation (also referred to as a "test station") which controls the machine; these workstations are vulnerable if sendmail is enabled on those workstations and the SPU or test station is located on an accessible network. Convex recommends disabling sendmail on SPU and test-station workstations until a patch can be obtained from Convex. Currently supported OS releases as of Sep 1, 1995: ConvexOS 10.1, 10.2, 11.0, 11.1 SPPUX 3.x =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT UNICOS FROM CRAY RESEARCH Information about fixes for the syslog problem can be found in FN #2011, dated October 10, 1995. Customers should receive this information from their Cray Research service representative. For all source installations, your Cray Research service representative can obtain the fix via the getfix tool. Due to the number of executables which use this library routine, it is not possible to provide getfix packages for all binary installations. UNICOS binary update packages 8.0.4.2 and 9.0.1.2 include this mod. FIX AVAILABILITY ---------------- Release Level Fix Package Affected Product Containing Fix Availability ================ ============== =========== UNICOS 8.0 UNICOS 8.0.4.2 * source only UNICOS 8.3 ** source only UNICOS 9.0 UNICOS 9.0.1.2 *** source only * Released for all platforms. ** No more updates planned. *** Released for X-MP, Y-MP, C-90 and T-90 platforms but has not yet released for YMP-EL and J-90 platforms. =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT DG/UX FROM DATA GENERAL CORP. The DG/UX operating system is NOT vulnerable to this problem. This includes all currently supported release, DG/UX 5.4 Release 3.00, DG/UX 5.4 Release 3.10, DG/UX Release 4.10 and all related Trusted DG/UX products. =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT ULTRIX AND DEC OSF/1 FROM DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. As a modification to information provided at the time the CA-95:13 advisory was distributed, Digital Equipment Corporation has provided the following additional information. This information, and additional details, was originally published in Digital advisory SSRT0359, dated 29.NOV.1995. This information is available via normal support channels or by access of Digital's AES (advanced electronic services). Symptoms of this vulnerability have been verified on: ULTRIX V4.3 (VAX) DEC OSF/1 V2.0,(V2.0B,V2.1,V2.1B) ULTRIX V4.3 (MIPS) DEC OSF/1 V3.0 ULTRIX V4.3A (MIPS) DEC OSF/1 V3.0B ULTRIX V4.4 (VAX) DEC OSF/1 V3.2 ULTRIX V4.4 (MIPS) DEC OSF/1 V3.2B ULTRIX V4.5 (MIPS) DEC OSF/1 V3.2C ULTRIX V4.5 (VAX) Digital Equipment Corporation strongly urges Customers to upgrade to a minimum of ULTRIX V4.3 (VAX / MIPS) or DEC OSF/1 V3.2, then apply the appropriate solution kit identified below. Digital has corrected this potential vulnerability and provided kits containing new binaries. The appropriate kit and images are identified as follows: ULTRIX DEC OSF/1 ------ --------- ECO ID ECO ID SSRT0359_ULT45 SSRT0359_OSF1032C Image_Names Image_Names Within the tar file Within the tar file ----------------- ----------------- 4.3/MIPS/sendmail 3.0b/libc.so 4.3/MIPS/syslog.o 3.0b/libc.a 4.3/VAX/sendmail 3.0/libc.so 4.3/VAX/syslog.o 3.0/libc.a 4.3A/MIPS/sendmail 3.2b/libc.so 4.3A/MIPS/syslog.o 3.2b/libc.a 4.4/MIPS/sendmail 3.2c/libc.so 4.4/MIPS/syslog.o 3.2c/libc.a 4.4/VAX/sendmail 3.2/libc.a 4.4/VAX/syslog.o 3.2/libc.so 4.5/MIPS/sendmail 2.0/libc.a 4.5/MIPS/syslog.o 2.0/libc.so 4.5/VAX/sendmail 4.5/VAX/syslog.o Please note that ECO SSRT0359_ULT45 contains a version of sendmail that supersedes all previous sendmail related ECO's. The above kits can be obtained through your normal Digital support channels. They may also be obtained via the public link domain; http://www.service.digital.com/html/patch_service.html - Please refer to the applicable Cover Letter and Readme files information prior to the installation of the remedial solutions on your system. NOTE: For non-contract/non-warranty customers orders - there may be a nominal charge for the kits, to cover the costs of media and handling. As always, Digital urges you to periodically review your system management and security procedures. Digital will continue to review and enhance the security features of its products and work with customers to maintain and improve the security and integrity of their systems. =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT HP/UX FROM HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY PLATFORM: HP 9000 series 300/400s and 700/800s DAMAGE: The vulnerability potentially allows an attacker to gain super-user permissions on the host. SOLUTION: Apply patch PHCO_6595 (series 700/800, HP-UX 10.0, 10.01), or PHCO_6598 (series 800, HP-UX 9.X), or PHCO_6597 (series 700, HP-UX 9.0X), or PHCO_6224 (series 300/400, HP-UX 9.X), or PHCO_6162 (series 700, HP-UX 9.08 BLS), or PHCO_6161 (series 700, HP-UX 9.09 BLS), or PHCO_6160 (series 700, HP-UX 9.09+ BLS), or PHCO_6157 (series 700, HP-UX 10.09 BLS CMW). AVAILABILITY: All patches are available now, except for the BLS patches, which will be available after 29 February, 1996. Contact your FCO representative for patch availability . Hewlett Packard's HP-UX patches/Security Bulletins/Security patches are available via email and/or WWW (MOSAIC/NETSCAPE) To subscribe to automatically receive future NEW HP Security Bulletins from the HP SupportLine mail service via electronic mail, send a message to: support@us.external.hp.com (no Subject is required) Multiple instructions are allowed in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE, here are some basic instructions you may want to use: To add your name to the subscription list for new security bulletins, send the following in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE: subscribe security_info To retrieve the index of all HP Security Bulletins issued to date, send the following in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE: send security_info_list To get a patch matrix of current HP-UX and BLS security patches referenced by either Security Bulletin or Platform/OS, put the following in the text portion of your message: send hp-ux_patch_matrix Note: The patch matrix is updated every 24 hours, so always use the most current one. To obtain a copy of the HP SupportLine email service User's Guide, send the following in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE: send guide.txt The Users Guide explains the process for downloading HP-UX patches via email and other services available. Our World Wide Web service for browsing of bulletins is available via our URL: (http://us.external.hp.com) Choose "Support news", then under Support news, choose "Security Bulletins" If you want instructions on how to connect via modem/ftp, reply to this message with that request. If you discover a security problem send a brief description of the problem to security-alert@hp.com. Please either encrypt the report using the security-alert pgp key, or provide information on how to contact you and leave out key technical details. HP's public key for pgp communication with us is available on public key servers (http:\\www.pgp.net) labeled security-alert@hp.com. =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT AIX FROM IBM CORPORATION IBM-ERS has received the following information, quoted verbatim, from IBM Corporation. This information describes how to obtain and configure a patch which addresses the "EXPN"/"VRFY" security vulnerability. - ---------- Begin Quoted Text From IBM Corporation ---------- IBM has incorporated options into sendmail that disable the VRFY and EXPN features of sendmail. Use the '-o' parameter on the command line or the O control line in the configuration file to activate these options. Security options for the SMTP server (daemon) mode of sendmail are: + Turns on secure SMTP. When enabled, this option disables the VRFY and EXPN commands. These commands are required and do run, but they echo their argument back to the user rather than expanding the argument to indicate whether it is valid or invalid. - Turns on SMTP security logging. When enabled, any use of the VRFY and EXPN commands is logged, even if the commands are disabled by the + option. Any invalid user given to the RCPT command is also logged. The log message is sent to syslogd as a mail.warning message. The message includes the date, time, user's hostname, command, and argument given to SMTP. AIX 3.2 ------- APAR - IX41105 PTF - U426334 To determine if you have this PTF on your system, run the following command: lslpp -lB U426334 AIX 4.1 ------- APAR - IX49343 (bos.net.tcp.client 4.1.2.2 or later) To determine if you have this fix on your system, run the following command: lslpp -h | grep -p bos.net.tcp.client Your version of bos.net.tcp.client should be 4.1.2.2 or later. To Order -------- To order an APAR from IBM in the U.S. call 1-800-237-5511. APARs may be obtained outside the U.S. by contacting a local IBM representative. - ---------- End Quoted Text From IBM Corporation ---------- IBM-ERS has also received the following information about patches for the syslog(3) vulnerability: Both fixes are now currently available. Please reference the following fixes: AIX 4.1 - IX53718 AIX 3.2 - IX53358 =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT OSF/1 FROM THE OPEN SOFTWARE FOUNDATION * NOTE: Users of DEC OSF/1 on Digital Equipment Corp. systems should read the section from Digital. OSF cannot reproduce the security hole in OSF/1. However we have reproduced the problem with syslog(3). We have a fix for the syslog(3) problem. Support customers should contact OSF for the fix. The fix will be included in the OSF/1 R1.3.2 update release. =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT IRIX FROM SILICON GRAPHICS Silicon Graphics issued Patch Number 19951001-01-P825 in October, 1995 to address security vulnerabilities in the IRIX version of "sendmail". This patch updates IRIX 5.2, 5.3, 6.0, 6.0.1, and 6.1 versions of "sendmail" to Sendmail 8.6.12, which is not vulnerable to the problem described in the IBM-ERS advisory. The following information was obtained from README.patch.825: For the IRIX operating system versions 5.2, 5.3, 6.0, 6.0.1, and 6.1 an inst-able patch has been generated and made available via anonymous ftp and/or your service/support provider. The patch is number 825 and will install on IRIX 5.2, 5.3, 6.0 and 6.0.1 . Additional Silicon Graphics security information and advisories, as well as patches for IRIX security problems, is available from: http://www.sgi.com/Products/WebFORCE/Security.html The SGI anonymous ftp site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Patch 825 can be found in the following directories on the ftp server: ~ftp/Security or ~ftp/Patches/5.2 ~ftp/Patches/5.3 ~ftp/Patches/6.0 ~ftp/Patches/6.0.1 ##### Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.825 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 01444 57 README.patch.825 Algorithm #2 (sum): 12914 57 README.patch.825 MD5 checksum: 98C010655D46A61F77D791A279493BAC Filename: patchSG0000825 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 37486 2 patchSG0000825 Algorithm #2 (sum): 62783 2 patchSG0000825 MD5 checksum: 37D9840567CB48C58F43FA10A83E2CC0 Filename: patchSG0000825.eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 51345 75 patchSG0000825.eoe1_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 13139 75 patchSG0000825.eoe1_man MD5 checksum: 7CB2968AB462CF3C4BBC78002F005EEF Filename: patchSG0000825.eoe1_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 21533 381 patchSG0000825.eoe1_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 18413 381 patchSG0000825.eoe1_sw MD5 checksum: 1BE858D769A51AA5A4D0754F03CC3124 Filename: patchSG0000825.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 41651 4 patchSG0000825.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 10648 4 patchSG0000825.idb MD5 checksum: 05B2D1CE3D9804F45CBDEFC27A53CAB5 =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT SOLBOURNE O/S FROM SOLBOURNE (GRUMMAN) Solbourne 2.5 is not vulnerable. =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT NEWS-OS FROM SONY CORPORATION NEWS-OS 6.0.3 and 6.1 are not vulnerable. =============================================================================== INFORMATION ABOUT SUNOS AND SOLARIS FROM SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. SunOS 5.5 is not vulnerable. Sun Microsystems has made the following patches available to address this vulnerability: PATCH # VERSION RELEASED --------- ----------- ------------ 100891-13 - SunOS 4.1.3 Oct 27, 1995 101558-07 - SunOS 4.1.3_U1 Oct 27, 1995 102545-04 - SunOS 4.1.4 Nov 16, 1995 102903-01 - Solaris 2.3 Nov, 2, 1995 101945-36 - Solaris 2.4 Jan 11, 1996 102905-01 - Solaris 2.4_x86 Nov, 2, 1995 Sun security patches are available from http://sunsolve1.sun.com. =============================================================================== ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS IBM-ERS would like to thank the Department of Energy's Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC) and the Defense Information Systems Agency's Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team (ASSIST) for compiling the information contained in this update. =============================================================================== IBM's Internet Emergency Response Service (IBM-ERS) is a subscription-based Internet security response service that includes computer security incident response and management, regular electronic verification of your Internet gateway(s), and security vulnerability alerts similar to this one that are tailored to your specific computing environment. By acting as an extension of your own internal security staff, IBM-ERS's team of Internet security experts helps you quickly detect and respond to attacks and exposures across your Internet connection(s). As a part of IBM's Business Recovery Services organization, the IBM Internet Emergency Response Service is a component of IBM's SecureWay(tm) line of security products and services. From hardware to software to consulting, SecureWay solutions can give you the assurance and expertise you need to protect your valuable business resources. To find out more about the IBM Internet Emergency Response Service, send an electronic mail message to ers-sales@vnet.ibm.com, or call 1-800-742-2493 (Prompt 4). Copyright 1996 International Business Machines Corporation. The material in this security alert may be reproduced and distributed, without permission, in whole or in part, by other security incident response teams (both commercial and non-commercial), provided the above copyright is kept intact and due credit is given to IBM-ERS. This security alert may be reproduced and distributed, without permission, in its entirety only, by any person provided such reproduction and/or distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes and with the intent of increasing the awareness of the Internet community. - ---EXTERNAL RELEASE---EXTERNAL RELEASE---EXTERNAL RELEASE---EXTERNAL RELEASE--- - --ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT--ERS-ALERT-- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7.1 iQCVAwUBMbbrQvWDLGpfj4rlAQFwCAQA6+LtTqyZhXxASHH7+kjJAwA2AwrlNvOG Rx9fpsbo37rYG/MGmfJvW6ul9u6J5/7MkbQphr+m54yCR9W2xjeWgWIDweIVvQh9 Ixic7yCFNOpl9VCCQhk6S0I3L6ugWuZ+xR/1Hg1IMWZRGEmql/AjzzHA0J3deUXR 3tzzewXkJbY= =mXan -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----