From idlabs-advisories@idefense.com Thu Aug 19 07:30:15 2004
From: idlabs-advisories@idefense.com
To: idlabs-advisories@idefense.com
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 2004 12:32:55 -0400
Reply-To: customerservice@idefense.com
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] iDEFENSE Security Advisory 08.18.04:
    Courier-IMAP Remote Format String Vulnerability

Courier-IMAP Remote Format String Vulnerability

iDEFENSE Security Advisory 08.18.04
www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=131&type=vulnerabilities
August 18, 2004

I. BACKGROUND

Courier-IMAP is an IMAP/POP3 mail server popular on sites utilizing
Qmail/Exim/Postfix. More information is available here:

    http://www.courier-mta.org/imap/

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a format string vulnerability in Double Precision
Inc.'s, Courier-IMAP daemon allows attackers to execute arbitrary code.

The vulnerability specifically exists within the auth_debug() function
defined in authlib/debug.c:

void auth_debug( const char *fmt, va_list ap ) {
    char    buf[DEBUG_MESSAGE_SIZE];
    int     i;
    int     len;

    // print into buffer to be able to replace control and other 
    // unwanted chars.
    vsnprintf( buf, DEBUG_MESSAGE_SIZE, fmt, ap );
    len = strlen( buf );

    // replace nonprintable chars by dot
    for( i=0 ; i<len ; i++ )
            if( !isprint(buf[i]) )
                    buf[i] = '.';

    // emit it
    fprintf( stderr, buf );   // <- Format String Vulnerability
    fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
}

The 'buf' variable utilized in the fprintf() call is attacker-controlled
and can contain format string modifiers allowing an attacker to
manipulate the stack and eventually execute arbitrary code.

III. ANALYSIS

Successful exploitation does not require authentication thereby allowing
any remote attacker to execute arbitrary code under the privileges of
the user that the IMAP daemon runs as. The vulnerable function
auth_debug() is only called if login debugging is enabled requiring that
the 'DEBUG_LOGIN' be set to either '1' or '2' in the imapd configuration

file.

IV. DETECTION

iDEFENSE has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in
Courier-IMAP, v2.2.1. It is reported that all versions of Courier-IMAP
from 1.6.0 to 2.2.1 inclusive are vulnerable.

V. WORKAROUND

Disable the login debugging option of Courier-IMAP. This can be
accomplished by setting 'DEBUG_LOGIN' to '0' in the configuration file
usually located at /usr/lib/courier-imap/etc/imapd.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

This issue has been resolved in the latest version of Courier IMAP
(v3.0.7). As well, the default setting of 'DEBUG_LOGIN' is '0'.

VII. CVE INFORMATION

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CAN-2004-0777 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for
security problems.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

08/10/2004   Initial vendor contact
08/10/2004   iDEFENSE clients notified
08/11/2004   Initial vendor response
08/18/2004   Public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

An anonymous contributor is credited with discovering this
vulnerability.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://www.idefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright (c) 2004 iDEFENSE, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDEFENSE. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please
email customerservice@idefense.com for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an as is condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
this information.

_______________________________________________
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