****************************************************************************** ------ ----- ----- --- ----- | ----- ---- | | | | | |--- | | | | | | | | | |-- | | | | |-- | | | | | | | | \ | | ----- ---- ----- ----- | \ ----- A D V I S O R Y FA-98.55 ****************************************************************************** Topic: SGI IRIX BIND DNS named(1M) Vulnerabilities Source: CIAC Creation Date: June 18, 1998 Last Updated: To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, FedCIRC is forwarding the following information from CIAC bulletin I-062. FedCIRC urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. If you have any questions, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov =======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ [ For Public Release ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI IRIX BIND DNS named(1M) Vulnerabilities June 18, 1998 19:00 GMT Number I-062 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: SGI has identified a vulnerability in the Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) software, an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS). PLATFORM: The BIND named(1M) program for IRIX 3.X through IRIX 6.4. DAMAGE: If exploited, this can lead to a root compromise. A local user account is not need to exploit these vulnerabilities. SOLUTION: Apply patches or workaround. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends ASSESSMENT: the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. These vulnerabilities have been publicly discussed in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ] - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX BIND DNS Vulnerabilities Title: CERT CA-98.05 Number: 19980603-01-PX Date: June 18, 1998 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ------------------------- - ----- Issue Specifics --- - ------------------------- The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) software is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS). DNS provides Internet domain name service through a server daemon called named(1M). Unfortunately, several vulnerabilities were discovered in BIND and also in named(1M) that can disrupt or lead to a root compromise on a named server. These BIND vulnerabilities were reported in CERT CA-98.05 which can be found at: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.05.bind_problems.html Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - ---------------- - ----- Impact --- - ---------------- The BIND named(1M) daemon is not installed by default on IRIX. The BIND named(1M) program for IRIX 3.X through IRIX 6.4 has these vulnerabilities. A local user account is not need in order to exploit these vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities have been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists. - ---------------------------- - ----- Temporary Solution --- - ---------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to remove the root compromise vulnerability by removing fake-iquery option in named(1M) configuration file. Unfortunately, named(1M) will still be vulnerable to disruption of service unless the patches are installed. 1) Verify you have named(1M) installed on this server. % versions eoe1.sw.named {IRIX 3.X-5.X} % versions eoe.sw.named {IRIX 6.X} I eoe.sw.named 05/22/97 Berkeley Internet Name Domain Server 2) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 3) Edit /etc/named.boot file and find the options line. If the options line has the "fake-iquery" flag present, the buffer overflow vulnerability is present and you will want to remove the flag. If the "fake-iquery" flag is not present, the buffer overflow vulnerability is temporarily addressed until patches can be installed. # vi /etc/named.boot {Find the "options" block or line, an example is given below} options forward-only query-log fake-iquery {Remove the "fake-iquery" entry} options forward-only query-log {Save and exit the file} Refer to man named(1M) for further information. ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Removing the "fake-iquery" entry may prevent old versions of nslookup(1C) program from working correctly. 4) Restart named(1M) daemon. # /usr/sbin/named.restart 5) Return to previous user level. # exit % - ------------------ - ----- Solution --- - ------------------ OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- --------- ------------- IRIX 3.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3. IRIX 4.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3. IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3. IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3. IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3. IRIX 5.3 yes 3123 IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3. IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3. IRIX 6.2 yes 3117 IRIX 6.3 yes 2740 IRIX 6.4 yes 2741 IRIX 6.5 no NOTES 1) Upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system. 2) See "Temporary Solution" section for a workaround. 3) Unsupported "freeware" BIND distributions can be found at http://www.isc.org/bind.html Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2740 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52811 7 README.patch.2740 Algorithm #2 (sum): 6852 7 README.patch.2740 MD5 checksum: C386BECBE87845EDACEDC59FD331B839 Filename: patchSG0002740 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 47740 1 patchSG0002740 Algorithm #2 (sum): 29219 1 patchSG0002740 MD5 checksum: 0242CB2E892557FD914F2F0AEDC3F025 Filename: patchSG0002740.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 51555 277 patchSG0002740.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 15806 277 patchSG0002740.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 898287766E9B429E38E87D45103DB45E Filename: patchSG0002740.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45146 1 patchSG0002740.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 34825 1 patchSG0002740.idb MD5 checksum: C1043EAF2A0A55F35BBB5252C76F4D77 Filename: README.patch.2741 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32803 7 README.patch.2741 Algorithm #2 (sum): 1238 7 README.patch.2741 MD5 checksum: 1DC3AC5CFCBB9C98CE903903DCD88E7F Filename: patchSG0002741 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18539 1 patchSG0002741 Algorithm #2 (sum): 30008 1 patchSG0002741 MD5 checksum: CDAB96BBBE3CCFB2E8B93ABB067BDCBC Filename: patchSG0002741.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 58631 288 patchSG0002741.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 45800 288 patchSG0002741.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 8A9E3015CC9D083303234967E1CA95AE Filename: patchSG0002741.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 14226 1 patchSG0002741.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 34771 1 patchSG0002741.idb MD5 checksum: C7154177CF69C7140A2B965D0C97CC08 Filename: README.patch.3117 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 31458 30 README.patch.3117 Algorithm #2 (sum): 20680 30 README.patch.3117 MD5 checksum: AA5C247E1BAD0AE44D4D52C74712FC7F Filename: patch3117.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00000 0 patch3117.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #2 (sum): 0 0 patch3117.pgp.and.chksums MD5 checksum: D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E Filename: patchSG0003117 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30144 14 patchSG0003117 Algorithm #2 (sum): 28648 14 patchSG0003117 MD5 checksum: 936433D0D84DCFE1ECA5495B43D5A855 Filename: patchSG0003117.eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 60740 74 patchSG0003117.eoe_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 15611 74 patchSG0003117.eoe_man MD5 checksum: C45B59724AC5F81F5960BE78104A6B9E Filename: patchSG0003117.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10439 1975 patchSG0003117.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 1394 1975 patchSG0003117.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: B12BCB4F7EB71EFEBE6E1E8F9270AFEB Filename: patchSG0003117.eoe_sw64 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55729 104 patchSG0003117.eoe_sw64 Algorithm #2 (sum): 46796 104 patchSG0003117.eoe_sw64 MD5 checksum: 35477907C33C9489EE1AC55291979B9D Filename: patchSG0003117.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40506 15 patchSG0003117.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 62723 15 patchSG0003117.idb MD5 checksum: 76F6F7CF90D83ED2547C28689B4FA7BE Filename: patchSG0003117.netman_data_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 56900 15 patchSG0003117.netman_data_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 58999 15 patchSG0003117.netman_data_man MD5 checksum: 42BEB35E700813967F637E9BB0640385 Filename: patchSG0003117.nfs_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05186 17 patchSG0003117.nfs_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 21113 17 patchSG0003117.nfs_man MD5 checksum: F090E7476C01DC64F12F3A094EFAD64B Filename: patchSG0003117.nfs_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 38617 73 patchSG0003117.nfs_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 63548 73 patchSG0003117.nfs_sw MD5 checksum: 7AEE5EF7B5C4A8F316EC4CA5A2CCA453 Filename: README.patch.3123 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 07822 7 README.patch.3123 Algorithm #2 (sum): 18842 7 README.patch.3123 MD5 checksum: 81D840AE11A6F1D7F8B85AA23B9A538B Filename: patchSG0003123 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 56712 1 patchSG0003123 Algorithm #2 (sum): 27329 1 patchSG0003123 MD5 checksum: 63D458B968B7AC5FF5449D8C11BEE11E Filename: patchSG0003123.eoe2_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 36459 289 patchSG0003123.eoe2_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 21988 289 patchSG0003123.eoe2_sw MD5 checksum: 41A07B779A229785903F405F288D5F60 Filename: patchSG0003123.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05460 1 patchSG0003123.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 35446 1 patchSG0003123.idb MD5 checksum: 56E9772636EECE067EAA9E0F568A14D8 - -------------------------- - ----- Acknowledgments --- - -------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center for their assistance in this matter. - ------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ------------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNYlOULQ4cFApAP75AQFHtQQAlI/QJo1VpfAuPu7eYs09GYAkvt9Z8EEE 6UfWdL9gnTCrKnwAE7r2S8YQuV7YEK+nO7h9OMve4egc6Y+eOsa7wokuMawl/ot9 cf4EvPNUnuXMkwaSuuCzDXsdX5WpPdhpOX74z+TFQgX59l9ULbL097D34gZL4hhJ sqA28mPYdqM= =+/IU - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) I-052: 3Com CoreBuilder and SuperStack II LAN Vulnerabilities I-053: ISC DHCP Distribution Vulnerability I-054: Cisco Web Cache Control Protocol Router Vulnerability I-055: SGI IRIX Vulnerabilities (NetWare Client, diskperf/diskalign I-056: Cisco PIX Private Link Key Processing and Cryptography Vulnerabilities I-057: FreeBSD NFS Kernel Code Error I-058: SunOS rpc.nisd Vulnerability I-059: SUN ftpd Vulnerability I-060: SGI IRIX OSF/DCE Denial of Service Vulnerability I-061: SGI IRIX mediad(1M) Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBNYmLu7nzJzdsy3QZAQF7wQP+MSor0LDMBZC2mg/XvYvVpfJb+H4UXOYv zfmXEZOI5v3y9eMiq1qVCO9c/C77v6sQSgpzjtgNfdE9uqYgiW/7a3LX3+U2AZAG xKlPPzWfnYnmC950qyExIahi1NgWll0on0NSvul/HeiH3TIbEcHSggpjvgA17q6J wjz3xK6t4Ko= =BNd+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has established a Federal Computer Incident response Capability (FedCIRC) to assist federal civilians agencies in their incident handling efforts by providing proactive and reactive computer security related services. FedCIRC is a partnership among NIST, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC), and the CERT* Coordination Center (CERT/CC). If you believe that your system has been compromised, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov Web Server: http://www.fedcirc.gov/ * Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute. The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.