****************************************************************************** ------ ----- ----- --- ----- | ----- ---- | | | | | |--- | | | | | | | | | |-- | | | | |-- | | | | | | | | \ | | ----- ---- ----- ----- | \ ----- A D V I S O R Y FA-98.43 ****************************************************************************** Topic: CERT* Summary CS-98.06 Source: CERT/CC Creation Date: June 11, 1998 Last Updated: To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, FedCIRC is forwarding the following information from CERT/CC summary CS-98.06. FedCIRC urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. If you have any questions, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov =======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CERT* Summary CS-98.06 June 11, 1998 The CERT Coordination Center periodically issues the CERT Summary to draw attention to the types of attacks currently being reported to our incident response team. The summary includes pointers to sources of information for dealing with the problems. Past CERT Summaries are available from http://www.cert.org/summaries/ ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_summaries/ - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Recent Activity - --------------- Since the last regularly scheduled CERT Summary issued in March 1998 (CS-98.03), we have seen these trends in incidents reported to us. 1. Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND In two previous special edition CERT Summaries, CS-98.04 and CS-98.05, we discussed several attack methods being used to exploit vulnerabilities in BIND. CS-98.04 and CS-98.05 are available from http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-98.04.html http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-98.05.html We have observed several changes to the methods of attack used to exploit the BIND vulnerabilities. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities might allow a remote intruder to gain privileged (root) access on your domain name server or to disrupt normal operation of your domain name server. Although the methods of attack are being modified, these attacks are still exploiting vulnerabilities described in CERT advisory CA-98.05. We encourage you to review this advisory, which describes the BIND buffer overflow vulnerability, and to apply the appropriate patches if you have not done so already. The advisory is available at http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.05.bind_problems.html 2. Scans to Port 1/tcpmux and unpassworded SGI accounts Over the past month we have received reports of widespread scans to TCP port 1. The service assigned to TCP port 1 is tcpmux. For more information, see RFC#1078, which is available at ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1078.txt We know that some of the scans originated from sites that had root compromises. From a site that was used to launch these scans, we were able to obtain files that indicate that the intruder was scanning for IRIX machines. By default, IRIX systems have tcpmux enabled. Once the intruder found a number of machines with a service running on port 1/tcpmux, the intruder then used another automated tool to telnet to each of these machines and attempt to log in as guest, lp, and demos. We have been in communication with SGI about this issue. At this time there does not appear to be any vulnerability in the SGI implementation of tcpmux or any service provided through tcpmux. IRIX Root Compromises In addition to the above incidents, we have noticed an increase in the number of reports of IRIX root compromises over the past month. We have also received numerous independent reports of widespread failed login attempts to lp, guest, demos, OutOfBox, and EZsetup accounts. IRIX machines ship by default with unpassworded accounts. As of IRIX 6.3 there is a security tool to easily disable or add passwords to these accounts at installation time. Please refer to the following advisories for more information about this issue: ftp://sgigate.sgi.com/security/19951002-01-I http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-95.15.SGI.lp.vul.html We strongly encourage you to ensure that the full set of security patches for each of your systems is applied. This is a major step in defending your systems from attack; its importance cannot be overstated. We encourage you to check with your vendor regularly for any updates or new patches that relate to your systems. We also encourage you to ensure that you are up to date with patches and workarounds referenced in CERT advisories. IRIX patches are available from http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html If your IRIX machine has unpassworded accounts, then in addition to disabling (or adding password protection to) accounts which do not have passwords, we encourage you to inspect your system for signs of intrusion. For instructions on how to do this, please refer to the "Recovering from an Incident" web page, available from http://www.cert.org/nav/recovering.html 3. Root Compromises We continue to receive daily reports of sites that have suffered a root compromise. Many of these compromises can be traced to systems that are unpatched or misconfigured, which the intruders exploit using well-known vulnerabilities for which CERT advisories have been published. We encourage you to check for signs of compromise. The following documents can help you review your systems: Intruder Detection Checklist This document outlines suggested steps for determining if your system has been compromised. ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/intruder_detection_checklist Steps for Recovering from a UNIX Root Compromise This document sets out suggested steps for responding to a root compromise. http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/root_compromise.html UNIX Configuration Guidelines This document describes common UNIX system configuration problems that have been exploited by intruders and recommends practices that can be used to help deter several types of break-ins. ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/UNIX_configuration_guidelines List of Security Tools This document describes tools that can be used to help secure a system and deter break-ins. ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/security_tools What's New and Updated - ---------------------- Information about new and updated CERT documents, such as advisories, is available through the CERT web site at http://www.cert.org/nav/whatsnew.html - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- How to Contact the CERT Coordination Center Email cert@cert.org Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax +1 412-268-6989 Postal address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA To be added to our mailing list for CERT advisories and bulletins, send your email address to cert-advisory-request@cert.org In the subject line, type SUBSCRIBE your-email-address CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET news group comp.security.announce CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other security-related information are available from http://www.cert.org/ ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/ If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise you to encrypt your message. We can support a shared DES key or PGP. Contact the CERT staff for more information. Location of CERT PGP key ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key - --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 1998 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be found in http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff/legal_stuff.html and ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/legal_stuff . If you do not have FTP or web access, send mail to cert@cert.org with "copyright" in the subject line. * CERT is registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNYAnx3VP+x0t4w7BAQH1nQQAiYMz9bJ742vAIJ5wFMZgoa+2LtQdr1lo ulcin+IFsNPNF4JVqosT06NlVnyWRBZrJ35J4GUktHN8HMXafIT818X59+FAStGE s4d1QLgL5bg8k0Gb7n/r1pyQoKnhOLmWGEqZFrHfJ2mZOF6zDKG8qHnZJVqpVrnO riWfaUKp7y4= =wsY8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has established a Federal Computer Incident response Capability (FedCIRC) to assist federal civilians agencies in their incident handling efforts by providing proactive and reactive computer security related services. FedCIRC is a partnership among NIST, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC), and the CERT* Coordination Center (CERT/CC). If you believe that your system has been compromised, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov Web Server: http://www.fedcirc.gov/ * Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute. The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.