From s.esser@e-matters.de Wed May 19 04:46:04 2004 From: Stefan Esser To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com, bugtraq@securityfocus.com Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 08:39:54 +0200 Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Advisory 08/2004: Subversion remote vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 e-matters GmbH www.e-matters.de -= Security Advisory =- Advisory: Subversion remote vulnerability Release Date: 2004/05/19 Last Modified: 2004/05/19 Author: Stefan Esser [s.esser@e-matters.de] Application: Subversion <= 1.0.2 Severity: A vulnerability within Subversion allows remote compromise of Subversion servers. Risk: Critical Vendor Status: Vendor is releasing a bugfixed version. Reference: http://security.e-matters.de/advisories/082004.html Overview: Quote from: http://subversion.tigris.org "The goal of the Subversion project is to build a version control system that is a compelling replacement for CVS in the open source community. The software is released under an Apache/BSD-style open source license. Features of Subversion * Most current CVS features * Directories, renames, and file meta-data are versioned * Commits are truly atomic * Apache network server option, with WebDAV/DeltaV protocol * Standalone server option * Branching and tagging are cheap (constant time) operations * Natively client/server, layered library design * Client/server protocol sends diffs in both directions * Costs are proportional to change size, not data size * Efficient handling of binary files * Parseable output" Subversion versions up to 1.0.2 are vulnerable to a date parsing vulnerability which can be abused to allow remote code execution on Subversion servers and therefore could lead to a repository compromise. Details: Similar to the libneon issue a manual scan for common programming errors revealed an unsafe call to sscanf() in one of Subversions date parsing functions. When Subversions tries to convert a string into an apr_time_t it falls back to the vulnerable sscanf() to decode old-styled date strings. This function is exposed to an external attacker through a DAV2 REPORT query or a get-dated-rev svn-protocol command. Both ways have been proven exploitable, but exploiting through the DAV2 protocol is somewhat harder because the date string has to be in utf-8 format. On the other hand exploiting through the svn-protocol is a trivial standard stackoverflow with the exception that whitespace and the '\0' character is forbidden. And as a sidenotice: Exploiting this stackoverflow is even possible when Propolice or similar protections are in place because a lot of fancy things can be done by overwriting the function parameters. Proof of Concept: e-matters is not going to release an exploit for this vulnerability to the public. Disclosure Timeline: 02. May 2004 - Subversion developers and vendor-sec were notified by email 03. May 2004 - Subversion vendor started their own analysis of the issue and started compiling a list of big repositories to receive pre-notifications 11. May 2004 - Big subversion repositories (not already contacted through vendor-sec) got pre-notified 19. May 2004 - Coordinated Public Disclosure CVE Information: The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) has assigned the name CAN-2004-0397 to this issue. Recommendation: Exploiting this vulnerability on not heavily protected servers is trivial even for beginners, therefore it is strongly recommended to update immediately. Even Propolice users aren't safe because overwriting function arguments allows some fancy exploits. GPG-Key: http://security.e-matters.de/gpg_key.asc pub 1024D/3004C4BC 2004-05-17 e-matters GmbH - Securityteam Key fingerprint = 3FFB 7C86 7BE8 6981 D1DA A71A 6F7D 572D 3004 C4BC Copyright 2004 Stefan Esser. All rights reserved. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iD8DBQFAqV5Ib31XLTAExLwRAjb6AJ9r+ji0jpYK+idA5Gj3IDRsoLAcFwCgyr2m k5m7y6DFOS30aAfJs1p58v8= =Ct/a -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Stefan Esser s.esser@e-matters.de e-matters Security http://security.e-matters.de/ GPG-Key gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --recv-key 0xCF6CAE69 Key fingerprint B418 B290 ACC0 C8E5 8292 8B72 D6B0 7704 CF6C AE69 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Did I help you? Consider a gift: http://wishlist.suspekt.org/ -------------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html