From ciac@rumpole.llnl.gov Thu Mar 30 04:04:52 2000 From: CIAC Mail User Resent-From: mea culpa To: ciac-bulletin@rumpole.llnl.gov Resent-To: jericho@attrition.org Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 15:00:00 -0800 (PST) Subject: CIAC Bulletin K-026: Microsoft SQL Server Admin Login Encryption Vulnerability [ For Public Release ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Microsoft SQL Server Admin Login Encryption Vulnerability March 21, 2000 17:00 GMT Number K-026 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A vulnerability has been identified in the Microsoft SQL Server 7.0 encryption used to store administrative login id. PLATFORM: All Microsoft Windows 95, Windows 98, and NT platforms that an SQL DBA (database administrator) could log into with a roaming profile. DAMAGE: Remote and local attackers can decrypt the weakly encrypted file containing the DBA login ID and password. SOLUTION: Follow the procedures given in the bulletin below to prevent passwords from being stored. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is medium. A DBA would have to log into a workstation ASSESSMENT: that the attacker has access to, and the login procedure needs to create a weakly encrypted file with the DBA login id and password. ______________________________________________________________________________ http://www.ciac.org/ciac/bulletins/k-026.shtml ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Internet Security Systems (ISS) for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), use one of the following methods to contact CIAC: 1. Call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or 2. Call 888-449-8369 to send a Sky Page to the CIAC duty person or 3. Send e-mail to 4498369@skytel.com, or 4. Call 800-201-9288 for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. 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Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) K-016: Microsoft "Malformed IMAP Request" Vulnerability K-017: Microsoft "Malformed RTF Control Word" Vulnerability K-018: HP-UX - Security Vulnerability with PMTU Strategy K-019: Microsoft - "Spoofed LPC Port Request" Vulnerability K-020: Majordomo open() call Vulnerability K-021: Malicious HTML Tags Vulnerability K-022: FreeBSD - Asmon/Ascpu Vulnerability K-023: FreeBSD - Delegate Proxy Server Vulnerability K-024: Microsoft Systems Management Server Vulnerability K-025: MySQL Password Authentication Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBONkzB7nzJzdsy3QZAQFaUgP9EbBx1b8EzVPXpEVGYTVFrbQFroP6f5d0 MknltUua/5303jP/yl51ouyMEMXTMsbgZGkwGyQaAXrz5n5j16ukLPeO1uF1QK3g Hy+Wv++XTWuKFdk0YOkraLx0H6hXNCcDIKGMcvhF3nmD6w/45wSuw3mZAN0u77D3 ynUb7ShQrcQ= =0a/0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----