From ciac@rumpole.llnl.gov Fri Feb 19 15:00:48 1999 From: CIAC Mail User To: ciac-bulletin@rumpole.llnl.gov Date: Thu, 18 Feb 1999 14:44:48 -0800 (PST) Subject: CIAC Bulletin J-030: Microsoft BackOffice Vulnerability [ For Public Release ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Microsoft BackOffice Vulnerability February 16, 1999 19:00 GMT Number J-030 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Microsoft has identified a vulnerability in the installer for BackOffice Server (R) 4.0. PLATFORM: Microsoft BackOffice Server 4.0 DAMAGE: Users who can log into the server locally would be able to access name and password for the accounts associated with the services which are part of a BackOffice 4.0 installation. SOLUTION: The fix for this problem is to delete the file \Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after each BackOffice 4.0 installation, whether successful or not. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Risk is low. In most cases, the ability to access this file ASSESSMENT: would be granted to selected users such as administrators. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start Microsoft Advisory ] Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-005) - -------------------------------------- BackOffice Server 4.0 Does Not Delete Installation Setup File Originally Posted: February 12, 1999 Summary ======= Microsoft (R) has learned of a potential vulnerability in the installer for BackOffice Server (R) 4.0. The installer asks the user to provide the account userid and password for selected services and writes these to a file in order to automate the installation process. However, the file is not deleted when the installation process completes. As detailed below, Microsoft recommends that BackOffice 4.0 customers delete this file. Microsoft has received no reports of customers being adversely affected by this problem. However, it is releasing this security bulletin in order to proactively provide customers with information about the problem in order to allow them to take steps to ensure their safe computing. Issue ===== When a user chooses to install SQL Server (R), Exchange Server (R) or Microsoft Transaction Server (R) as part of a BackOffice 4.0 installation, the BackOffice installer program requests the name and password for the accounts associated with these services. Specifically, it asks for the account name and password for the SQL Executive Logon account, the Exchange Services Account, and the MTS Remote Administration Account. These values are stored in \Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini, and used to install the associated services. BackOffice Server does not erase this file when the installation process is completed. This is true regardless of whether the installation process completes successfully or unsuccessfully. By default, the Microsoft BackOffice folder is not shared, so network access to reboot.ini generally does not pose a risk. Users who can log onto the server locally would be able to access the file, but in most cases this ability is granted only to selected users such as administrators. The fix for this problem is to delete the file \Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after each BackOffice 4.0 installation, whether successful or not. The file is created only by the installer, and, once deleted, will not be re-created unless BackOffice 4.0 is re-installed. Affected Software Versions ========================== The following software versions are affected: - Microsoft BackOffice Server 4.0 What Microsoft is Doing ======================= On February 12th, Microsoft sent this security bulletin to customers subscribing to the Microsoft Product Security Notification Service (see http://www.microsoft.com/security/services/bulletin.asp for more information about this free customer service). Microsoft has published the following Knowledge Base (KB) article on this issue: - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q217004, BackOffice Installer Tool Does Not Delete Password Cache File. http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q217/0/04.asp (Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting of this bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the Web-based Knowledge Base.) What customers Should Do ======================== Microsoft recommends that customers ensure that they delete the file \Program Files\Microsoft Backoffice\Reboot.ini after the installation program for BackOffice 4.0 completes More Information ================ Please see the following references for more information related to this issue. - Microsoft Security Bulletin MS99-005, BackOffice 4.0 Does Not Delete Installation Setup File (the Web-posted version of this bulletin), http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-005.asp. - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q217004, BackOffice Installer Tool Does Not Delete Password Cache File. http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q217/0/04.asp (Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting of this bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the Web-based Knowledge Base.) Obtaining Support on this Issue =============================== If you require technical assistance with this issue, please contact Microsoft Technical Support. For information on contacting Microsoft Technical Support, please see http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp. Revisions ========= - February 12, 1999: Bulletin Created For additional security-related information about Microsoft products, please visit http://www.microsoft.com/security - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ---- THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY. (C) 1999 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of Use. [ End Microsoft Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Microsoft for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@rumpole.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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