From ciac@rumpole.llnl.gov Fri Feb 19 15:01:03 1999 From: CIAC Mail User To: ciac-bulletin@rumpole.llnl.gov Date: Thu, 18 Feb 1999 13:15:07 -0800 (PST) Subject: CIAC Bulletin J-029: Buffer Overflows in Various FTP Servers [ For Public Release ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Buffer Overflows in Various FTP Servers February 16, 1999 19:00 GMT Number J-029 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Vulnerabilities have been identified in various FTP servers. PLATFORM: Any server running ProFTPD (1.2.Opre1) or Wuarchive ftpd (2.4.2-academ[BETA-18]). DAMAGE: If exploited, a buffer overflow may occur which can lead to a root compromise. SOLUTION: Check below to see if there are patches, updates, or workaround from your software vendor. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY The risk is high since the buffer overflow condition can lead ASSESSMENT: to root compromise. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start Netect, Inc. Advisory ] Netect, Inc. General Public Security Advisory % Advisory: palmetto.ftpd % Issue date: February 9, 1999 % Contact: Jordan Ritter % Revision: February 11, 1999 % Update: Appendices A and B corrected. [Topic] Remote buffer overflows in various FTP servers leads to potential root compromise. [Affected Systems] Any server running the latest version of ProFTPD (1.2.0pre1) or the latest version of Wuarchive ftpd (2.4.2-academ[BETA-18]). wu-ftpd is installed and enabled by default on most Linux variants such as RedHat and Slackware Linux. ProFTPD is new software recently adopted by many major internet companies for its improved performance and reliability. Investigation of this vulnerability is ongoing; the below lists software and operating systems for which Netect has definitive information. [Overview] Software that implements FTP is called an "ftp server", "ftp daemon", or "ftpd". On most vulnerable systems, the ftpd software is enabled and installed by default. There is a general class of vulnerability that exists in several popular ftp servers. Due to insufficient bounds checking, it is possible to subvert an ftp server by corrupting its internal stack space. By supplying carefully designed commands to the ftp server, intruders can force the the server to execute arbitrary commands with root privilege. On most vulnerable systems, the ftpd software is installed and enabled by default. [Impact] Intruders who are able to exploit this vulnerability can ultimately gain interactive access to the remote ftp server with root privilege. [Solution] Currently there are several ways to exploit the ftp servers in question. One temporary workaround against an anonymous attack is to disable any world writable directories the user may have access to by making them read only. This will prevent an attacker from building an unusually large path, which is required in order to execute these particular attacks. The permanent solution is to install a patch from your Vendor, or locate one provided by the Software's author or maintainer. See Appendices A and B for more specific information. Netect strongly encourages immediate upgrade and/or patching where available. Netect provides a strong software solution for the automatic detection and removal of security vulnerabilities. Current HackerShield customers can protect themselves from this vulnerability by either visiting the Netect website and downloading the latest RapidFire(tm) update, or by enabling automatic RapidFire(tm) updates (no user intervention required). Interested in protecting your network today? Visit the Netect website at http://www.netect.com/ and download a FREE 30 day copy of HackerShield, complete with all the latest RapidFire(tm) updates to safeguard your network from hackers. [Appendix A, Software Information] % ProFTPD Current version: 1.2.0pre1, released October 19, 1998. All versions prior to 1.2.0pre1: vulnerable. Fix: will be incorporated into 1.2.0pre2. Currently recommended action: upgrade to the new version when it becomes available, or apply the version 1.2.0pre1 patch found at: ftp://ftp.proftpd.org/patches/proftpd-1.2.0pre1-path_exploit2.patch % wu-ftpd Current version: 2.4.2 (beta 18), unknown release date. All versions through 2.4.2 (beta 18): vulnerability dependant upon target platform, probably vulnerable either due to OS-provided runtime vulnerability or through use of replacement code supplied with the source kit. No patches have been made available. Fix: unknown. Currently recommended action: Upgrade to wu-ftpd VR series. % wu-ftpd VR series Current version: 2.4.2 (beta 18) VR13, released January 28, 1999. All versions prior to 2.4.2 (beta 18) VR10: vulnerable. Fix: incorporated into VR10, released November 1, 1998. Available from: ftp://ftp.vr.net/pub/wu-ftpd/ Filenames: wu-ftpd-2.4.2-beta-18-vr13.tar.Z wu-ftpd-2.4.2-beta-18-vr13.tar.gz % BeroFTPD [NOT vulnerable] Current version: 1.3.3, released February 7, 1999. All versions prior to 1.2.0: vulnerable. Fix: incorporated into 1.2.0, released October 26, 1998. Available from: ftp://ftp.croftj.net/usr/bero/BeroFTPD/ ftp://ftp.sunet.se/pub/nir/ftp/servers/BeroFTPD/ ftp://sunsite.cnlab-switch.ch/mirror/BeroFTPD/ Filename: BeroFTPD-1.3.3.tar.gz % NcFTPd [NOT vulnerable] Current version: 2.4.0, released February 6, 1999. All versions prior to 2.3.4: unknown. Available from: http://www.ncftp.com/download/ Notes: % NcFTPd 2.3.4 (libc5) ftp server has a remotely exploitable bug that results in the loss of the server's ability to log activity. % This bug cannot be exploited to gain unintended or privileged access to a system running the NcFTPd 2.3.4 (libc5) ftp server, as tested. % The bug was reproducible only on a libc5 Linux system. The Linux glibc version of NcFTPd 2.3.4 ftp server is NOT vulnerable. % The bug does not appear to be present in version NcFTPd 2.3.5 or later. Affected users may upgrade free of charge to the latest version. Thanks go to Gregory Lundberg for providing the information regarding wu-ftpd and BeroFTPD. [Appendix B, Vendors] % RedHat Software, Inc. % RedHat Version 5.2 and previous versions ARE vulnerable. Updates will be available from: ftp://updates.redhat.com/5.2// Filename: wu-ftpd-2.4.2b18-2.1..rpm % Walnut Creek CDROM and Patrick Volkerding % Slackware All versions ARE vulnerable. Updates will be available from: ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/pub/linux/slackware-3.6/slakware/n8/ ftp://ftp.cdrom.com/pub/linux/slackware-current/slakware/n8/ Filenames tcpip1.tgz (3.6) [971a5f57bec8894364c1e0d358ffbfd4] tcpip1.tgz (current) [e1e9a9a50ad65bab1e120a7bf60f6011] Notes: % The md5 checksums are current for the above mentioned Revision date only. % Caldera Systems, Inc. % OpenLinux Latest version IS vulnerable Updates will be available from: ftp://ftp.calderasystems.com/pub/OpenLinux/updates/ % SCO % UnixWare Version 7.0.1 and earlier (except 2.1.x) IS vulnerable. % OpenServer Versions 5.0.5 and earlier IS vulnerable. % CMW+ Version 3.0 is NOT vulnerable. % Open Desktop/Server Version 3.0 is NOT vulnerable. Binary versions of ftpd will be available shortly from the SCO ftp site: ftp://ftp.sco.com/SSE/sse021.ltr - cover letter ftp://ftp.sco.com/SSE/sse021.tar.Z - replacement binaries Notes: This fix is a binary for the following SCO operating systems: % SCO UnixWare 7.0.1 and earlier releases (not UnixWare 2.1.x) % SCO OpenServer 5.0.5 and earlier releases For the latest security bulletins and patches for SCO products, please refer to http://www.sco.com/security/. % IBM Corporation % AIX Versions 4.1.x, 4.2.x, and 4.3.x ARE NOT vulnerable. % Hewlett-Packard % HPUX Versions 10.x and 11.x ARE NOT vulnerable. HP is continuing their investigation. % Sun Microsystems, Inc. % SunOS All versions ARE NOT vulnerable. % Solaris All versions ARE NOT vulnerable. % Microsoft, Inc. % IIS Versions 3.0 and 4.0 ARE NOT vulnerable. % Compaq Computer Corporation % Digital UNIX V40b - V40e ARE NOT vulnerable. % TCP/IP(UCX) for OpenVMS V4.1, V4.2, V5.0 ARE NOT vulnerable. % Silicon Graphics, Inc. (SGI) % IRIX and Unicos Currently, Silicon Graphics, Inc. is investigating and no further information is available for public release at this time. As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be issued via the normal SGI security information distribution method including the wiretap mailing list. Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/ % NetBSD % NetBSD All versions ARE NOT vulnerable. [Appendix C, Netect Contact Information] Copyright (c) 1999 by Netect, Inc. The information contained herein is the property of Netect, Inc. The contact for this advisory is Jordan Ritter . PGP signed/encrypted email is preferred. Visit http://www.netect.com/ for more information. [ End Netect, Inc. Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Netect, Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. 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Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. 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