From ciac@tholia.llnl.gov Sat May 30 20:01:50 1998 From: CIAC Mail User To: ciac-bulletin@tholia.llnl.gov Date: Fri, 29 May 1998 15:48:08 -0700 (PDT) Subject: CIAC Bulletin I-055: SGI IRIX Vulnerabilities (NetWare Client, diskperf /diskalign) [ For Public Release ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN SGI IRIX Vulnerabilities (NetWare Client, diskperf/diskalign) May 28, 1998 23:00 GMT Number I-055 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: SGI has identified vulnerabilities in: 1) NetWare Client 1.0 2) diskalign(1) and diskperf(1) PLATFORM: 1) IRIX 6.3 2) IRIX 6.4 DAMAGE: If exploited, these vulnerabilities could lead to root access. SOLUTION: Apply patches or workaround. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ASSESSMENT: ALL vulnerable SGI systems. SGI has produced an additional advisory that is included at the end of this bulletin. The advisory outlines a methodology where scans of port number 1 are used in an attempt to identify SGI hosts. The positive results of these scans are then targeted for well known SGI security vulnerabilities. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisories ] 1) NetWare Client 1.0 - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX 6.3 NetWare Client 1.0 Vulnerabilities Number: 19980501-01-P2869 Date: May 27th, 1998 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ------------------------- - ----- Issue Specifics --- - ------------------------- The NetWare Client subsystem provides software to communicate with NetWare Servers with file sharing and remote printing capabilities. Unfortunately, several vulnerabilities have been discovered with NetWare Client 1.0 on IRIX 6.3 which can lead to a root compromise on the system. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - ---------------- - ----- Impact --- - ---------------- The NetWare Client 1.0 software subsystem is installed by default on IRIX 6.3. A user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to exploit NetWare Client 1.0 locally and remotely which can lead to root access. This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists. - ---------------------------- - ----- Temporary Solution --- - ---------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing the permissions of the NetWare Client 1.0 programs. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Verify a vulnerable NetWare Client 1.0 software subsystem is installed. Only NetWare Client 1.0 on IRIX 6.3 is vulnerable. # versions -b netwr_client I = Installed, R = Removed Name Date Description I netwr_client 04/30/97 NetWare Client 1.0 3) Change the permissions on the vulnerable NetWare Client 1.0 programs. # /bin/chmod 500 /usr/etc/netware/ipxchk # /bin/chmod 500 /usr/etc/netware/ipxlink 4) Verify the new permissions on the program. Note that the program sizes may be different depending on release. # ls -l /usr/etc/netware/ipxchk -r-x------ 1 root sys 9076 Feb 18 13:50 ipxchk # ls -l /usr/etc/netware/ipxlink -r-x------ 1 root sys 21412 Feb 18 13:50 ipxlink 5) Return to previous user level. # exit $ - ------------------ - ----- Solution --- - ------------------ OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no IRIX 4.x no IRIX 5.0.x no IRIX 5.1.x no IRIX 5.2 no IRIX 5.3 no IRIX 6.0.x no IRIX 6.1 no IRIX 6.2 no IRIX 6.3 yes 2869 IRIX 6.4 no Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2869 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52839 9 README.patch.2869 Algorithm #2 (sum): 1764 9 README.patch.2869 MD5 checksum: 1236AB82847EC3E53277B70989766F47 Filename: patchSG0002869 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52950 3 patchSG0002869 Algorithm #2 (sum): 40584 3 patchSG0002869 MD5 checksum: 8164932F4667258378598852C64090BC Filename: patchSG0002869.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 12067 6 patchSG0002869.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 30180 6 patchSG0002869.idb MD5 checksum: A33FB43AADBC15B98ABF42079BB63336 Filename: patchSG0002869.netwr_client_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 08086 210 patchSG0002869.netwr_client_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 55842 210 patchSG0002869.netwr_client_sw MD5 checksum: 49C619A6FA7FBA9102D1C566C9B1E736 Filename: patchSG0002869.sysadmdesktop_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22870 690 patchSG0002869.sysadmdesktop_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 28194 690 patchSG0002869.sysadmdesktop_sw MD5 checksum: 4932DB35E7C275CC846B31293A0BE5F6 - -------------------------- - ----- Acknowledgments --- - -------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT and the Internet community at large for their assistance in this matter. - ------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ------------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNWyFrbQ4cFApAP75AQFyWwP/dUUQLmmVV+CQ590wRwLOaDzD9gZbsyAQ GQDavlFt6o1+6VfX5+epib6NFsCdh+CtFBLVQQuR/D628f7ul1qTVetVJ/zZxexJ PDLlSUNKX6zhHT5XXn3vdZgu1omYzldaxosFskRug7bYmHmK3DQr9tASJbLSbIg3 tuFxCBv2SHA= =NzuT - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 2) diskalign(1) and diskperf(1) - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX 6.4 diskperf/diskalign Vulnerabilities Number: 19980502-01-P3030 Date: May 27, 1998 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - ------------------------- - ----- Issue Specifics --- - ------------------------- IRIX 6.4 Patch 2291 and its successors introduced several new tools for the Digital Media Community. Two of these new tools introduced are diskalign(1) and diskperf(1) which are used to assist in configuring IRIX for data streaming applications, like uncompressed digital video, to/from an XLV volume set of stripped disks. Unfortunately, a security hole was discovered that allows diskalign(1) and diskperf(1) to create arbitrary root-owned files which can lead to a root compromise. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - ---------------- - ----- Impact --- - ---------------- The diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs are installed by default from the January Recommended/Required Patch Set for IRIX 6.4. Patch 2291 and 2848 are vulnerable to this exploit. A user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to exploit diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) locally and remotely. This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists. - ---------------------------- - ----- Temporary Solution --- - ---------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing the setuid permissions of the diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Verify the vulnerable diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs are installed. Only patch 2291 and 2848 are vulnerable. # versions -b patchSG0002291 patchSG0002848 I = Installed, R = Removed Name Date Description I patchSG0002291 02/02/98 Patch SG0002291: rollup for platform independent dmedia I patchSG0002848 03/04/98 Patch SG0002848: rollup for platform independent dmedia 3) Change the permissions on the vulnerable diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs. # /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/diskalign # /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/diskperf ************ *** NOTE *** ************ Removing the permissions from the vulnerable program will prevent non-root users from accessing diskalign(1)/diskperf(1). 4) Verify the new permissions on the program. Note that the program size may be different depending on release. # ls -al /usr/sbin/diskalign /usr/sbin/diskperf -r-x------ 1 root sys 17756 Mar 4 14:02 diskalign -r-x------ 1 root sys 42424 Mar 4 14:02 diskperf 5) Return to previous user level. # exit $ - ------------------ - ----- Solution --- - ------------------ OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no IRIX 4.x no IRIX 5.0.x no IRIX 5.1.x no IRIX 5.2 no IRIX 5.3 no IRIX 6.0.x no IRIX 6.1 no IRIX 6.2 no IRIX 6.3 no IRIX 6.4 yes 3030 Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.3030 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05597 34 README.patch.3030 Algorithm #2 (sum): 21922 34 README.patch.3030 MD5 checksum: DD5ABFFEAEAF479FEFF1FE0FB6DD9C0D Filename: patch3030.chksums.only Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 06000 4 patch3030.chksums.only Algorithm #2 (sum): 45369 4 patch3030.chksums.only MD5 checksum: 7D994C28C59CCF796F6FC5E7C8E44D65 Filename: patch3030.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39517 11 patch3030.pgp.and.chksums Algorithm #2 (sum): 12406 11 patch3030.pgp.and.chksums MD5 checksum: 503702949B44D83249E2C27747F3E411 Filename: patchSG0003030 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 57797 20 patchSG0003030 Algorithm #2 (sum): 41233 20 patchSG0003030 MD5 checksum: D9CDFB195EB0EF3928AE5752E62817A8 Filename: patchSG0003030.desktop_eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32697 48 patchSG0003030.desktop_eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 25898 48 patchSG0003030.desktop_eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 55CB2D9182FE8CE45F240DFFC2D10342 Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 26486 51 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 26722 51 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_man MD5 checksum: 700D287F5A02173EFD68B34E7434AF68 Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_src Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 57124 209 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_src Algorithm #2 (sum): 35449 209 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_src MD5 checksum: DC07141CDF0A989A3D7CAA8C2BA5FBD6 Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40323 4971 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 39176 4971 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_sw MD5 checksum: B52C5EC6B0822EEFBB11DBEA1589D12A Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_man Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 12852 125 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_man Algorithm #2 (sum): 63193 125 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_man MD5 checksum: 8909E51934CDCF28058B54FDE17FD1AB Filename: patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 06229 12946 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 28437 12946 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 7D33CFF002A66B6A1C1A9914F4C01A48 Filename: patchSG0003030.eoe_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 65347 227 patchSG0003030.eoe_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 16579 227 patchSG0003030.eoe_sw MD5 checksum: 08AC9BE254FAEB7E7880EA32B2FA3D3E Filename: patchSG0003030.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33473 42 patchSG0003030.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 8655 42 patchSG0003030.idb MD5 checksum: 3BFC27BA00AEE38686FA0961240F1F23 Filename: patchSG0003030.sysadmdesktop_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 16622 27 patchSG0003030.sysadmdesktop_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 52053 27 patchSG0003030.sysadmdesktop_sw MD5 checksum: 8837A995D8439365442BF8E95188236D - -------------------------- - ----- Acknowledgments --- - -------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT for their assistance in this matter. - ------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ------------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNWyO/bQ4cFApAP75AQG6UQQAjJ2+RL0p3ru1xrndMXT8b2ba5Vt/zdwa iHyr1dXNWDYSIXHOX5UtJs3QwXpS6S2UWJMyHO+khsPUK7pxm4gQFBEfdUmwgFFA ulMnXgk4JoXSxQduLO1siRqcR4rij7CYn/E3v0uNDpLJREMDPZFmWytRRI7i9Ngs 58B3f/kb2Zo= =KHpM - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- 3) - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: tcpmux Port Scanning and Root Compromises Number: 19980503-01-I Date: May 28, 1998 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics has been in communication with the CERT Coordination Center in regards to observed increases in tcpmux/port 1 scanning and root compromises on IRIX based systems. Upon examining this trend, Silicon Graphics and the CERT Coordination Center have theorized that a new methodology is currently being used to identify the continually increasing number of Silicon Graphics IRIX based systems on the Internet, in order to then target them for potential attack and compromise. - ------------------------ - ---- Issue Specifics --- - ------------------------ Silicon Graphics believes at this time that no new IRIX vulnerability has been found. However, this new methodology is based upon an understanding of the default IRIX environment and could lead to a system compromise. The tcpmux protocol is used by many computing platforms. By default, Silicon Graphics based IRIX systems have the tcpmux protocol activated for use on port 1. Utilizing this fact, widespread scanning of networks for systems that respond to probes of port 1 could be used to obtain a list of systems that might be running IRIX. Again, at this time, there is no known vulnerability in the tcpmux protocol or the services it provides and responding to a probe of port 1 is normal behavior for the tcpmux protocol. Using a scan generated list, the next component of the methodology would be to attempt to exploit IRIX-specific security problems. This may include attempting to log into well known accounts that are unpassworded by default and upon successfully finding any open default account, attempting security exploits requiring local account access. These accounts are shipped unpassworded by default to foster a "collaborative" environment and are documented in SGI system documentation and also in SGI security advisory 19951002. Additionally, the scan generated list could be used to target systems for remote exploits, which do not require local account access. In both local and remote cases, a system compromise is possible if security patches have not been installed and/or the system is misconfigured. - ----------------- - ---- Solution --- - ----------------- At this time, Silicon Graphics does not believe any new vulnerability exists in regards to this issue and therefore has no patches to offer. All current security patches and information can be found at: http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html ftp://sgigate.sgi.com/patches ftp://sgigate.sgi.com/security Silicon Graphics believes the best measures for preventing exposure to this new methodology is to 1) ensure all accounts have good passwords or are disabled, and 2) that all current security patches are installed. Furthermore, keeping current with new security information and system monitoring for intrusions would be considered prudent. If your IRIX machine currently has unpassworded accounts, it would be prudent to inspect your system for signs of intrusion. Please refer to the "Recovering from an Incident" section at the CERT Coordination Center website (www.cert.org). - ------------------------- - ---- Acknowledgments --- - ------------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center for their assistance in this matter. - ------------------------------------------------------------ - ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - ------------------------------------------------------------ If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNW38erQ4cFApAP75AQGBhgP8Cp6UXtNAuN2L/052n09TNdwoAJykstoS uk/JAQXjp5rgYPb3B281OE4fL06Um/ZCeDvCLYzhpxn6E3jWRm273CFA9oNlID3R Nfvh1KEVZ3QhU0DtVfRoQeHaZ59NfLPftgnBecwFls36p79O+pP+uS0T3MkrKELE A+C0hS8OB44= =kuZ7 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisories ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ (or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org (or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine) Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) I-045: SGI IRIX LicenseManager(1M) Vulnerabilities I-046: Open Group xterm and Xaw Library Vulnerabilities I-047: HP-UX OpenMail Vulnerability I-048: SunOS mountd Vulnerability I-049: SunOS ufsrestore Vulnerability I-050: Digital UNIX softlinks - advfs Vulnerability I-051: FreeBSD T/TCP Vulnerability I-052: 3Com(r) CoreBuilder and SuperStack II LAN Vulnerabilities I-053: ISC DHCP Distribution Vulnerability I-054: Cisco Web Cache Control Protocol Router Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBNW82WrnzJzdsy3QZAQFHUgP/Wl0J9AMuxzlMwMaM/K1pmPdCt82+XZ4v GDbaNvhf4SbPvfMEdEiIAv2oPC5Nov2P4pf07P1cfempKX4JC5O9JMyfod5b1Hog X+71+GjXHijxA1yq3S32hTL1mlXPeEF+vf5FcKiYClnJcBD0AsfwkM6bhFEZ4Z35 1y7J6Dyj5eg= =xVTU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----