-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN IRIX runpriv Program Vulnerability May 15, 1997 17:00 GMT Number H-58 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: A security vulnerability exist in the /usr/sysadm/bin/runpriv program. PLATFORM: All SGI systems running IRIX 6.3 and 6.4. DAMAGE: Using a local account to exploit this vulnerability, remote or local users may obtain unauthorized root access. SOLUTION: Apply patches or workaround as indicated below. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Exploit details involving this vulnerability have been made ASSESSMENT: publicly available. CIAC recommends that the patches be implemented to eliminate exposure immediately. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start SGI Security Advisory ] - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: Program runpriv Security Issue Number: 19970503-01-PX Date: May 14, 1997 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall SGI be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - - ------------------ - - --- Background --- - - ------------------ The /usr/sysadm/bin/runpriv program is used by the System Desktop to allow unprivileged users to run selected privileged commands. Silicon Graphics has been informed of a potential security vulnerability involving this program. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems running IRIX versions 6.3 and 6.4. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - - -------------- - - --- Impact --- - - -------------- The /usr/sysadm/bin/runpriv program is part of the Indigo Magic System Administration subsystem of IRIX 6.3 and 6.4. Although other IRIX versions will have similar Desktop System Administration subsystems, only the IRIX 6.3 and 6.4 subsystems have the runpriv program. On IRIX 6.3 and 6.4, the Indigo Magic System Administration subsystem is installed by default. A potential security vulnerability has been found that can result in root privileges being obtained. A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability both locally and remotely. Publicity of this vulnerability has been limited and has afforded Silicon Graphics Inc. the opportunity to fully investigate this issue and provide the following information and solutions. - - --------------------- - - --- Temporary Fix --- - - --------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately many not be possible. The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by turning off the privileges capability. *************** *** WARNING *** *************** Turning off the privileges capability will disable unprivileged users using the visual administration tools. Only the root user will be able to run these programs. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Turn off the privileges capability. # chkconfig privileges off 3) Return to previous level. # exit $ - - ---------------- - - --- Solution --- - - ---------------- **** IRIX 3.x and 4.x **** Silicon Graphics Inc, no longer supports the IRIX 3.x and 4.x operating systems and therefore has no patches to provide. **** IRIX 5.x, 6.0, 6.0.1, 6.1, and 6.2 **** These versions of IRIX do not have the /usr/sysadm/bin/runpriv program and are therefore not vulnerable. No further action is required for these versions. **** IRIX 6.3 **** For the IRIX operating system version 6.3 an inst-able patch has been generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The patch is number 2077 and will install on IRIX 6.3 only. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 2077 can be found in the following directories on the FTP server: ~ftp/Security or ~ftp/Patches/6.3 ##### Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2077 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 34622 8 README.patch.2077 Algorithm #2 (sum): 22197 8 README.patch.2077 MD5 checksum: B3DFE9BAE87AFF4153A1CF3BFAD7B522 Filename: patchSG0002077 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 53668 1 patchSG0002077 Algorithm #2 (sum): 32550 1 patchSG0002077 MD5 checksum: EC35AE80FB77125305EA8BE98CC15C98 Filename: patchSG0002077.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 01148 1 patchSG0002077.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 40537 1 patchSG0002077.idb MD5 checksum: A23D679D06167F20DE125486592BABC9 Filename: patchSG0002077.sysadmdesktop_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10875 15 patchSG0002077.sysadmdesktop_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 46398 15 patchSG0002077.sysadmdesktop_sw MD5 checksum: 8B03D59C0E3A9748B90FED6C5994A739 **** IRIX 6.4 **** For the IRIX operating system version 6.4 an inst-able patch has been generated and made available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The patch is number 2078 and will install on IRIX 6.4 only. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Patch 2078 can be found in the following directories on the FTP server: ~ftp/Security or ~ftp/Patches/6.4 ##### Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2078 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 24207 8 README.patch.2078 Algorithm #2 (sum): 24278 8 README.patch.2078 MD5 checksum: 32AD0F5DB530D6E31315C31C76B45DD3 Filename: patchSG0002078 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 57740 1 patchSG0002078 Algorithm #2 (sum): 33268 1 patchSG0002078 MD5 checksum: C9AEEF6551A7280B3A7695B63B40B37C Filename: patchSG0002078.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 49797 1 patchSG0002078.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 40655 1 patchSG0002078.idb MD5 checksum: 18FE323A8FB7DAC71DD623B5DDA2B6E7 Filename: patchSG0002078.sysadmdesktop_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 06501 15 patchSG0002078.sysadmdesktop_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 28499 15 patchSG0002078.sysadmdesktop_sw MD5 checksum: 3020CBAE24B094CECB6C6C5FD73D0E97 - - ----------------------- - - --- Acknowledgments --- - - ----------------------- Silicon Graphics wishes to thank Joe Bester and Quay Ly of Harvey Mudd College for bringing this issue to Silicon Graphics attention, and then cooperating with Silicon Graphics during the generation of patches. - - ----------------------------------------- - - --- SGI Security Information/Contacts --- - - ----------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBM3oDV7Q4cFApAP75AQH4LwP/ePpNwri+ijMaLrYq1xE2SZb7agDaZfr6 /dIMvJJU6/41TUrpJpymM/kTXuytEJiThPAZHWEFaY+fxdSKi3aFjAh8k/RoDvmg 9nuy+xZrdzq1AELKfKRr2gU/62vMUKacs+tCwfmQLc2iFeWhdAIQ7H83Iw4TRMso EOgD1UOshbg= =JDZS - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [ End SGI Security Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc., Joe Bester and Quay Ly of Harvey Mudd College for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 510-422-8193 FAX: +1 510-423-8002 STU-III: +1 510-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 510-422-8193 and leave a message, or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://ciac.llnl.gov/ Anonymous FTP: ciac.llnl.gov (128.115.19.53) Modem access: +1 (510) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (510) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. CIAC-NOTES for Notes, a collection of computer security articles; 3. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 4. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, ciac-notes, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-notes You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) H-22a: talkd Buffer Overrun Vulnerability H-29a: HP-UX sendmail Patches Vulnerability H-50: HP-UX SYN Flood and libXt patches H-51: Vulnerability in libXt H-52: IRIX csetup Program Vulnerability H-53: Vulnerability in webdist.cgi H-54: Vulnerability in xlock H-55: IRIX netprint Program Security Vulnerability H-56: Solaris 2.x lp temporary files creation Vulnerability H-57: Windows NT/95 Out of Band Data Exploit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBM3zaTbnzJzdsy3QZAQGOXAP/Sq1g3rhlXL6z5P/gcrUvumrS5nsV4MxV s9xl2Ux4mAdXfkFQDFSwVPkNULoVJsRrTM6X5rXLiVxBEdIXx00OqzwQZudMStkB ftm0zqKskp0YiTaCke3q7xRJUcTEaaY5r85CyGjfTV0zioJ9vxkgVNyLC29VfXdH iL4SsVm+fE0= =SW7H -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----