-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- =============================================================================== Security Advisory CERT-NL =============================================================================== Author/Source : Gert Meijerink Index : S-96-24 Distribution : World Page : 1 Classification: External Version: 1 Subject : Vendor Initiated Bulletin: Date : 20-May-96 FreeBSD-SA-96:10.mount_union =============================================================================== By courtesy of The FreeBSD Project, Inc. we received information on a vulnerability in FreeBSD 2.0, 2.0.5, 2.1, 2.1-stable, and 2.2-current. CERT-NL recommends to use the workaround provided until the FreeBSD Project distributes a full solution. ============================================================================== ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-96:10 Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project, Inc. Topic: system stability compromise via mount_union program Category: core Module: unionfs Announced: 1996-05-17 Affects: FreeBSD 2.0, 2.0.5, 2.1, 2.1-stable, and 2.2-current Corrected: (workaround) 2.1-stable and 2.2-current as of 1996-05-17 Source: 4.4BSD (lite) FreeBSD only: no Patches: ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/patches/SA-96:10/ ============================================================================= I. Background A bug was found in the union file system code which can allow an unprivileged local user to compromise system stability. This problem is present in all source code and binary distributions of FreeBSD version 2.x released before 1996-05-18. All FreeBSD users are encouraged to use the workaround provided until the FreeBSD Project distributes a full solution. II. Problem Description The union filesystem code had problems with certain mount ordering problems. By executing a certain sequence of mount_union commands, an unprivileged local user may cause a system reload. NOTE: This is a different problem than the one discussed in FreeBSD SA-96:09. The workaround for this vulnerability is similar to the one discussed in 96:09, but the proper solution for the unauthorized access problem in 96:09 does not address this vulnerability. III. Impact The problem could allow local users to compromise system stability. This vulnerability can only be exploited by users with a valid account on the local system. IV. Solution(s) The FreeBSD project is currently developing a solution to this problem, however the proper solution will not be available until a future FreeBSD release. We do not anticipate releasing patches for previous versions of FreeBSD due to the extensive nature of this fix. This security advisory will be updated as new information is made available. V. Workaround This vulnerability can quickly and easily be limited by removing the setuid permission bit from the mount_union program. This workaround will work for all versions of FreeBSD affected by this problem. As root, execute the command: % chmod u-s /sbin/mount_union then verify that the setuid permissions of the files have been removed. The permissions array should read "-r-xr-xr-x" as shown here: % ls -l /sbin/mount_union -r-xr-xr-x 1 root bin 53248 Apr 26 04:40 /sbin/mount_union In addition to changing the permissions on the executable files, if you have the source code installed, we suggest patching the sources so that mount_union will not be installed with the setuid bit set: *** /usr/src/sbin/mount_union/Makefile Sun Nov 20 14:47:52 1994 - - --- /usr/src/sbin/mount_union/Makefile Fri May 17 10:36:09 1996 *************** *** 8,14 **** CFLAGS+= -I${.CURDIR}/../../sys -I${MOUNT} .PATH: ${MOUNT} - - - BINOWN= root - - - BINMODE=4555 - - - .include - - --- 8,11 ---- ============================================================================= The FreeBSD Project, Inc. Web Site: http://www.freebsd.com/ Confidential contacts: security-officer@freebsd.org PGP Key: ftp://freebsd.org/pub/CERT/public_key.asc Security notifications: security-notifications@freebsd.org Security public discussion: security@freebsd.org Notice: Any patches in this document may not apply cleanly due to modifications caused by digital signature or mailer software. Please reference the URL listed at the top of this document for original copies of all patches if necessary. ============================================================================= ============================================================================== CERT-NL is the Computer Emergency Response Team for SURFnet customers. SURFnet is the Dutch network for educational, research and related institutes. CERT-NL is a member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). All CERT-NL material is available under: http://www.surfnet.nl/surfnet/security/cert-nl.html ftp://ftp.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security In case of computer or network security problems please contact your local CERT/security-team or CERT-NL (if your institute is NOT a SURFnet customer please address the appropriate (local) CERT/security-team). CERT-NL is one/two hour(s) ahead of UTC (GMT) in winter/summer, i.e. UTC+0100 in winter and UTC+0200 in summer (DST). Email: cert-nl@surfnet.nl Phone: +31 302 305 305 Fax: +31 302 305 329 Snailmail: SURFnet bv Attn. CERT-NL P.O. Box 19035 NL - 3501 DA UTRECHT The Netherlands A 7 * 24 hours phone number is available to SURFnet SSC's and FIRST members on request. ============================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMaBiJ2L2fnkJN/jpAQFvPAP+OtUXTpd6c7gddnzp0w6+1X5nYADitiHw llx2d71xEq5gRnTi67xcT0u0QGL3C6Whwg/6PIU7Nl7IeRyTf5o/aSyg/Q6xR0vE XkvJ7LV1GR3GN8qBNXz1IFlbBp5vGSIBcLHFT1fpC6nptY+kps9THQQux2XESMum 8AoTBmoY738= =wlgR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----