[Dataloss] fringe: Researchers: Disk Encryption Not Secure

Paul Stevens paul at nosignal.net
Fri Feb 22 14:37:27 UTC 2008


Some FDE products already provide a feature which applies a limitation  
to the time your passphrase will be be held in memory. Typically  
though, there's a checkbox underneath which allows it to remain cached  
permanently. Ease of use trumps security every time.

On 22 Feb 2008, at 4:25 PM, Friedlander, Gary S wrote:

> Maybe the software can be patched to wipe the key from memory after so
> many minutes of inactivity - requiring re-entering the passphrase to
> re-mount the drive or re-enter the folder.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dataloss-bounces at attrition.org
> [mailto:dataloss-bounces at attrition.org] On Behalf Of Evan Francen
> Sent: Friday, February 22, 2008 8:14 AM
> To: Roy M. Silvernail
> Cc: security curmudgeon; dataloss at attrition.org
> Subject: Re: [Dataloss] fringe: Researchers: Disk Encryption Not  
> Secure
>
> Do you think it would be possible to patch encryption products with
> routines to wipe the memory address(es) where the key is stored at
> specific times (i.e. on lock, hibernate, sleep, and shutdown)?
>
>
> On 2/21/08, Roy M. Silvernail <roy at rant-central.com> wrote:
>> On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 04:34:09PM -0500, Rory Wasserman wrote:
>>> Roy,
>>>
>>> I agree with what you are saying, however if a portable hardware
> device is
>>> used for multifactor authentication and the key is stored in a
> secure place
>>> on the device, off of the hard drive, then this type of attack
> would be
>>> futile.
>>
>>
>> I think you still misunderstand the threat model.  The threat is not
>> against authentication.  That has already been done and the
>> target machine is in a running state (though perhaps waiting at a
>> screensaver password).  In this state, the fully-encrypted disc is
>> mounted and decrypting for its proper user.  That means the FDE key
>> *must* be in core somewhere, so that the disc drivers can use it to
>> encrypt and decrypt the data as it is used.
>>
>> And once Mallory has the FDE key, he don' need no steenkin'
>> authentication.  He grabs an image of the disc and trots off to
> decrypt
>> at leisure.
>>
>> --
>> Roy M. Silvernail is roy at rant-central.com, and you're not
>>   "A desperate disease requires a dangerous remedy."
>>                   - Guy Fawkes
>>            http://www.rant-central.com
>>
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>
>
> -- 
> Evan Francen, CISSP CCNP MCSE
> email: evan.francen at gmail.com
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>
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> solutions for large and small networks. Scan your network and monitor
> your
> traffic to find the data needing protection before it leaks out!
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>
> Tenable Network Security offers data leakage and compliance monitoring
> solutions for large and small networks. Scan your network and  
> monitor your
> traffic to find the data needing protection before it leaks out!
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